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INTRODUCTION 
A dominant feature of industrialisation in independent India 
has been the regulation and control of business and 
industry. In the process, state intervention gained 
respectability as it supported the ideals of 'planned 
industrial development' and 'socialistic pattern of 
society'. It was perceived by the policy makers that the 
regulatory environment would provide the desired direction 
and growth to the industrial sector. However, the complexity 
of the regulatory mechanism and the inconsistent inter 
linkages within the control system ensured that the 
envisaged performance of the economy do not match its real 
potent ia1. 
The slow economic growth and stagnant industrial production 
pointed towards the inefficiency and rigidity of 
Governmental policies. Although many expert committees 
criticised the inherent weaknesses of the regulatory 
structure, yet the Government took only hesitant corrective 
steps which inevitably enhanced the infirmity of the system. 
In short, lack of political will and ideological dilemma 
made way for inward - looking strategies. 
Economic pressures and developmental necessities, however, 
reverted the system of management of various segments of the 
economy. It was realised that the structure, mechanism and 
commercial wisdom of the Government had been unsuccessful in 
adapting and responding to the envisioned objectives. 
A review of experience, the dynamics of international geo 
politics, and the globalisation of the market system laid 
the foundation for circumscribing of a vigorous set of 
policies in January, 1985 collectively referred to as 
liberalisation policy. Political compulsions. ideological 
tunnel - vision, traditional bureaucracy, and protected 
entrepreneurship, however, are some of the reasons why 
liberalisation had a sub - optimal impact on business and 
industry until recently. 
The process of liberalisation was revitalised and 
accelerated in mid - 1991 which rapidly changed the business 
environment. The broad objective of the policy measures is 
to make the economy internationally competitive and globally 
integrative. The liberalisation process aims at making the 
economy flexible and adaptive in order to meet the 
challenges of impending threats and avail the emerging 
opportuni ties. 
It may be of use. and interest, to study the strategic 
behaviour and response of Indian companies to the Government 
policy changes and draw lessons for chief executives of 
organisations who are facing new and varied challenges in 
managing their business. This is the basic idea of the 
present study. 
Contents of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One tries 
to present a general view of business and industry in 
independent India , and the regulatory business environment 
in which it used to operate. Later, it more specifically 
highlights the regime of controls and regulations, and 
exemplifies the paradoxical nature of Governmental policies. 
The process of liberalisation initiated in 1985, its gradual 
slow - down and subsequent revita1isation in 1991 have been 
briefly discussed next, and extends to describing of 
liberalisation measures announced in the post - 1984 period. 
The last section attempts at evaluating the present scenario 
in the context of policy changes brought about by the 
Government. 
Chapter Two of the study deals with the Indian automobile 
industry which has been presented in the form of an industry 
profile. The automobile industry profile primarily 
constitutes of six industry factors viz. Industry Structure, 
Growth of the Industry, Market Characteristics, The State of 
Competition, Resource Usage, and Modernisation and 
Upgradation of Technology. Each of these industry factors 
comprise of several sub - factors. To facilitate 
understanding, qualitative description is supplemented by 
quantitative data. To provide an element of completeness to 
the profile, the chapter begins with the historical 
development of the industry and, at the end, evaluates the 
present status and future prospects of automobile industry. 
The methodology of research adopted for the purposes of the 
present study has been presented in Chapter Three. The 
chapter consi sts of review of literature, identification of 
research gaps, the enumeration of need for study, research 
problem formulation, and operational definitions. Later, the 
general research propositions have been stated which is 
followed by research and sample designs adopted for the 
study. In the subsequent sections, the methods of data 
collection, the form of analyses and interpretation, and the 
limitations of the study have been dealt with. 
The profiles of four selected private sector companies 
Bajaj Auto Ltd, Escorts Ltd, Premier Automobiles Ltd, and 
the Tata Engineering &< Locomotive Co. constitute 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven respectively. The company 
profiles have primarily been presented on the basis of six 
Business Policy variables which were identified during the 
course of formulation of research problem. The identified 
Business Policy variables are : Organisation Structure and 
Management, Size and Growth, Capital Acquisition and 
Finance, Marketing Policies, Production and Operations 
Policies, and Management of Human Resources. However, to 
impart completeness to the company profiles, the evolution 
of the companies, their corporate objectives, and strategic 
plans and future outlook have also been included. The 
various sections of the company profiles are divided into 
related sub - sections. For a puposeful understanding of 
companies' strategic behaviour and responses, the researcher 
has attempted to punctuate qualitative description with 
quantitative data. In presenting the profiles of the 
companies, elements of analyses/criticism have been avoided. 
Chapter Eight of the thesis analyses and interprets the 
impact of liberalisation on business policies of selected 
private sector companies. The impact of liberalisation on 
business policy of each company has been analysed separately 
which is followed by a descriptive consolidation of results 
and concluding comments. 
On the basis of analyses done in the previous chapter, the 
summarised findings and conclusions of the study have been 
presented in Chapter Nine. The last section of the chapter 
attempts at providing some directions for future . 
Refere-nces made in the study appear at the end of respective 
chapters. The list of books, and Government documents and 
publications. counsulted and referred has been appended at 
the end of the thesis in the form of Bibliography. 
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
The research propositions for the purposes of the present, 
study are : 
(1) Liberalisation has had a varying impact on different 
policy variables. 
(2) Liberalisation has had a varying impact on different 
private sector companies. 
(3) Liberalisation has had an impact on business policies 
of private sector companies. 
Methodology of Research 
Keeping in view the objectives of the study, and in order to 
justify the need for research, the researcher has conducted 
a review of existing literature in the subject. This led to 
identification of research gaps. Later, the need for the 
study has briefly been mentioned. 
In formulating the research problem, the major 
liberalisation measures have been chosen for the present 
study. The liberalisation measures considered are : 
Delicensing, Minimum Economic Capacity, Capacity Re-
endorsement, Broad Banding, Procedures for Industrial 
Approvals and Foreign Collaborations, and Procedures for 
MRTP and FERA Companies. The researcher has also constructed 
a conceptual framework which graphically explains the main 
dimensions to be studied. 
The scope of the study has been described later followed by 
the operational definitions of terms used in the research 
topic. This is followed by description of research design. 
In view of the nature of study, exploratory research design 
has been selected. The sample design explains and justifies 
the selection of four private sector companies belonging to 
the automobile industry. The four companies selected for the 
study are Bajaj Auto Ltd (BAD, Escorts Ltd, Premier 
Automobiles Ltd (PAL) and Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. 
(TELCO). 
Subsequently, the methods of data collection have been 
described. The present study relies on secondary data. The 
problems associated with collection and use of secondary 
data have been briefly stated. 
The analyses have been done in broadly two ways. Firstly, 
the impact of selected liberalisation measures on business 
policy variables has been analysed separately for each 
company. Later, the results arising out of individual 
company - analyses has been presented in the form of 
consolidated results. The basis of analyses is the profiles 
of selected companies. Precisely, the researcher has laid 
emphasis on studying the impact of six liberalisation 
measures on six business policy variables. Finally, the 
findings and conclusions have been summarised in a separate 
chapter. 
MAIN FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
The main findings of the present study are as follows : 
Bajaj Auto Ltd (BAD 
1. BAL restructured some of its divisions in post -
liberalisation period; slashed decision hierarchy. 
2. BAL expanded its installed production capacity for two 
and three - wheelers; established a new plant and a 
separate three - wheelers manufacturing division; 
phenomenal growth. 
3. Expansion strategy followed by BAL increased its capital 
requirements in the post - liberalisation period; 
turnover and profitability increased. 
4. Introduced new products and new models in post 
liberalisation period; entered into motorcycle segment; 
adopted aggressive marketing strategy; increased 
promotional expenditure; restrenghtened dealership 
network; market share in two - and three - wheeler 
segments increased; decline in scooter market share. 
5. BAL adopted modernisation strategies in the post 
liberalisation period; emphasis on quality and 
productivity, in - house R & D and manufacturing cost 
reduct i on. 
6. BAL changed its recruitment policy in the post 
liberalisation period; emphasis on in - house training 
and team work. 
Escorts Ltd 
1. To regain its position, Escorts is following combination 
grand strategy through stability, expansion and 
retrenchment; started group planning; restructuring to 
become a lean organisation. 
2. Escorts increased its production capacity in the post 
liberalisation period; did not expand in a big way; 
moderate growth. 
3. Modernisation and diversification in post 
liberalisation period increased capital requirements; 
increase in turnover but decline in net profits: more 
vulnerable to takeovers due to under - capitalisation. 
4. Introduced new products; promotional expenditure 
increased; adopted aggressive marketing strategy; dealer 
network restrengthened; market share declined 
considerably in the post - liberalisation period. 
5. Adopted newer production technology; increased automation 
to improve quality and productivity; emphasis on 
manufacturing cost reduction and in - house R & D . 
6. Reducing manpower strength through automation; 'golden 
handshake' to affected workers; emphasis on workers 
training; freeze on fresh induction. 
Premier Automobi1es Ltd (PAL) 
1. PAL changed its style of management in post 
liberalisation period; adopted decentralised system; 
delegating authority and responsibility; management 
structure flattened; becoming a lean organisation. 
2. Increased production capacity in post - liberalisation 
period; decelerated growth; related diversification 
increased volume of production. 
3. Expansion and modernisation programmes increased capital 
requirements; turnover increased; profits stagnated. 
A. PAL re - oriented marketing strategy; introduced a new 
model and variants of existing products; aggressive 
marketing strategy; increase in promotional expenditure; 
declining market share. 
5. Adopted modernisation strategy; emphasis on product 
upgradation, quality, productivity, indigenisation, in-
house R &( D; reducing manufacturing cost. 
6. PAL reduced employee strength through Voluntary 
Retirement Scheme in post - liberalisation period; 
stopped over - time payments and productivity - linked 
incent i ves. 
Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. (TELCO) 
1. TELCO changed its strategic planning process in post 
liberalisation period; planning consolidation; 
possibility of mergers and acquisitions which will affect 
TELCO. 
2. Increased production capacity; established new assembly 
plant; excellent growth, 
3. Expansion and modernisation strategies increased capital 
requirements in post - liberalisation period; turnover 
increased phenomenally; profits increased. 
A. TELCO entered a new segment of commercial vehicles in 
post - liberalisation period; entered passenger car 
segment; introduced variants of existing products; 
aggressive marketing strategy; change in product 
positioning strategy; market share in light commercial 
vehicle segment increased exceptionally. 
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5. Embarked on programme of product development and 
modernisation in post - liberalisation period; emphasis 
on quality, reliability and appearance of products; 
establishing flexibility of operations; increase in in 
house R & D . 
6. TELCO is emphasising on training of employees; retrenched 
casual workers; fixed retirement age for chief executives 
and top managers; emphasis on succession planning. 
Consolidated Results 
The summarised findings, based on the case studies of the 
four selected companies, lead to the following conclusions : 
1. Companies have started long - term planning in the post -
liberalisation period while some others have graduated to 
strategic planning. Unrelated diversified companies are 
rationalising their businesses while the vertically / 
horizontally integrated companies are moving towards 
concentric diversification. 
Companies are increasingly relying on professional style 
of management and are delegating authority and 
respons i b i1i ty. 
Restructuring exercises adopted by companies aim at 
consolidation of their businesses. As large size of the 
organisation is a cause for being less adaptive to the 
changes, emphasis is on lean organisation. 
11 
2. Governmental policies of minimum economic capacity, 
capacity re-endorsement, and expansion have led to growth 
in production capacity in the post - liberalisation 
period. Companies have largely followed volume expansion 
strategy. Growth strategy of the companies have been 
supported by overseas collaborations due to relaxation in 
foreign technology and collaboration policies. 
3. Grand strategies and growth path followed by companies in 
the post - liberalisation period have led to an increase 
in capital requirements. Companies have followed 
different policies, or a financial policy - mix, in this 
regard. Turnover of companies have increased but intense 
competition has put pressure on profits with varying 
degrees. 
4. Increased competition has widened product choices in the 
post - liberalisation period. There is a perceptible 
change in adoption of marketing - mix strategies. 
Companies have adopted aggressive marketing and 
promotional strategies. There is price competitiveness 
and price consciousness among the companies. 
5. In the post liberalisation period, companies are laying 
emphasis on product upgradation, manufacturing 
efficiency, and plant modernisation. The level of 
automation and computerisation has increased. 
Manufacturing cost reduction, quality and productivity is 
12 
being emphasised. Priority is being accorded to R & D 
act iV i ties. 
6. The present emphasis of companies is on cost reduction 
and lean organisation. Various strategies have been 
adopted in post - liberalisation period to reduce 
manpower strength. Recruitment policies, too. have 
changed. In - house training, team work, employee 
involvement, and succession planning have gained 
importance in the post - liberalisation period. 
The findings, therefore, support the general propositions of 
the study. 
* * * * * * 
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EfiEEiiCEL 
The regulation and control of business and industry in 
independent India had been a dominant feature of economic 
nationalism. The slow economic growth and stagnancy in 
industrial production, however, is an indication of the 
inefficiency of the regulatory system. A review of 
experience of managing a controlled economy coupled with the 
increasing acceptance, and popularity of the free market 
system worldwide led to a gradual loosening of the controls 
through successive policy measures initiated in January 
1985. These measures are collectively referred to as the 
liberalisation policy. 
The process of liberalisation, accelerated in 1991, rapidly 
changed the business environment in order to make the 
economy internationally competitive and globally 
integrative. It is widely accepted now that liberalisation 
is no more a political expediency but an economic reality. 
The main focus of liberalisation is to make the economy 
flexible and adaptive to meet the challenges of impending 
threats and avail the emerging opportunities. The strategic 
behaviour and response of organisations to the Government 
policy changes need to be studied in order to draw lessons 
for chief executives of Indian companies who are facing 
newer challenges in managing their businesses. This idea 
forms the basis of the present study. 
This study is, in fact, an extension of the researcher's 
pre-doctoral (M. Phil.) work on 'Impact of Liberalisation 
(iii) 
Measures on Selected Industries'. The study covered three 
industries - - automobile, fertilizer, and petrochemicals. 
The profile of automobile industry, prepared in the previous 
study, has been adapted for the purposes of present study 
albeit with addition of one more section. Although the basic 
theme of automobile industry remains intact, a major portion 
of the profile has been changed and data updated in order to 
incorporate the latest changes and developments in the 
industry. 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter One tries 
to consolidate the evaluation of regulatory regime in India 
and the policy environment in which business and industry 
operated. It later traces the origins and reasons for 
liberalisation of economy and industry, and extends to 
enumerating the liberalisation measures in the post-1984 
period. The last section briefly evaluates the present 
scenario in the context of Governmental policy changes. 
Chapter Two of the thesis consists of the details about 
Indian automobile industry. The industry profile has been 
presented primarily on the basis of six industry factors; 
each factor comprises of several sub-factors. The 
qualitative description is supplemented by quantitative data 
in order to facilitate understanding of the performance of 
industry. In order to impart completeness to the profile, 
the chapter begins with the historical development of the 
industry. The last section of the automobile industry 
profile evaluates the present scenario and future prospects. 
(iv) 
Chapter Three of the study deals with the methodology of 
research. The review of available literature leads to the 
identification of research gaps and the need for study. The 
research problem has been formulated by conceptualising a 
framework for the study. Later, the scope of the study has 
been enumerated which is followed by defining of operational 
terms of the research topic. A set of research propositions;, 
framed for the purpose of the present study, precedes 
research and sample designs. In the subsequent section, 
methods of data collection and the accompanying problems 
have been described. The form of analyses is accompanied by 
an analytical framework in the next section. The Chapter 
ends with the indication of the limitations of the study. 
Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven consists of profiles of 
the four selected private sector companies viz. Bajaj Auto 
Ltd, Escorts Ltd, Premier Automobiles Ltd and Tata 
Engineering & Locomotive Co. respectively. The six Business 
Policy variables, identified earlier during the formulation 
of research problem, forms the basis of company profiles. 
However, in order to present the profile in its entirety, 
the company profiles also describe the evolution of 
companies, their corporate objectives, and future plans. The 
various sections of company profiles are divided into 
related sub-sections. For a purposeful understanding of 
companies' performance, an attempt has been made to lace 
qualitative description with quantitative data. In 
presenting the company profiles, elements of analyses or 
(V) 
criticism have been avoided and all efforts have been made 
to report only the bare facts. 
Chapter Eight analyses and interprets the impact of 
liberalisation on business policies of the selected 
companies in light of the information and data collected. 
Separate analyses has been done for each company which is 
followed by a xlescriptive consolidation of results and 
conclucling comments. 
Chapter Nine presents the summarised findings and 
conclusions of the study, on the basis of analyses and 
interpretation done in the preceding chapter. The researcher 
has also attempted to identify some directions for future 
research. 
References made in the study are documented at the end of 
respective chapters. A list of books, and Government 
documents and publications, consulted and referred during 
the course of study has been compiled and appended at the 
end of the thesis in the form of Bibliography. 
To the best of the researcher's knowledge and belief, this 
study is a maiden effort in highlighting the impact of 
Government's liberalisation policy on business policies of 
private sector companies. The evaluation of the impact of 
liberalisation on organisational performance may provide 
insights to chief executives into the policy making process, 
and a direction to the Government policy makers in devising 
future policies for the industrial sector. Indian companies 
(vi) 
and their chief executives might find the study useful for 
understanding the relationship between national policies and 
corporate policies. Chief executives and general managers 
may also find the study helpful in understanding the 
relationship between corporate policy and functional 
policies and in identifying the relevant business policy 
variables in the context of changing Indian business 
environment. To many others, the study may prove of interest 
in knowing how different companies have responded to the new 
environment and what alternatives have been considered by 
them in the course of changing Government policies. For 
academicians, the study would be useful for a critical 
appraisal of liberalisation policy. The study shall prove 
helpful in providing a direction for future research in this 
area. To students, this research study may serve as a tool 
for understanding the Government's liberalisation policy and 
how organisational policies are shaped for achieving 
distinctiveness and competitive advantage in a rapidly 
changing environment. 
(vii) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Business and Industry in Independent India 
1.2 The Regime of Controls and Regulations 
1.3 The Liberalisation of Economy and Industry 
l.A Liberalisation Measures 
1.5 Present Scenario 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BUSINESS AHD INDUSTRY TH TNDKPENnKHT INDIA 
Deliberate policy making with State help for economic 
development was a part of the early economic nationalism. 
Apart from the actual experience of industrialisation under 
the impact of 'protection' offered by the- colonial 
government, other influences also shaped the thinking of 
both policy makers and the entrepreneurial class in 
acknowledging the crucial role of state intervention in 
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economic development. State intervention, in India, was 
bound to play a fairly important role both because of the 
enormity of the task of industrialisation and because of the 
commitment to planning. 
The consensus about the rhetoric of planning was based not 
only on the vision of an activist State. It was based also 
on an agreement that the State would not seriously interfere 
in the processes of money-making and power-wielding within 
the society. The consensus involved not only Indian big 
business but also foreign capital with which local 
entrepreneurs were eager to collaborate. In 1949, the 
Central Government brought out a special statement assuring 
foreign capital that its existing bastions would not be 
assaulted by the [then] new government, and that it would be 
allowed to expand in most fields of economic activity with 
the exception of few sectors reserved for the Government. 
The consensus at the top, even while it lasted, did not 
always looked like an achieved fact -- it often looked like 
contentiousness. There were, of course, issues to be settled 
out, and resources to be contended for. The area of 
operation was the whole reach of the State and society. The 
Constitution and the laws defining the limits of State power 
were all objects of contention as well as attempts at 
transformation. The State was forced to be minimalist in 
many areas but in contention bureaucratically 
interventionist in commercialisable relations and resources. 
Investment licensing, which was supposed to ration resources 
for attaining socially desirable ends, became an instrument 
of patronage in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians. 
The division of the economy between the private and public 
domain shifted with shifting perceptions of elite about the 
constraints and opportunities. 
The emphasis placed on state intervention and planning by 
the Indian industrialist class dates back to as early as 
1938, when the National Planning Committee of the Indian 
National Congress was formed with such eminent spokesmen of 
Indian business enterprise as Seth Purushotamdas Takurdas on 
it. The Bombay Plan authored in 1946 by eminent businessmen 
like JRD Tata and GD Birla, among others, put forward a 
virtual manifesto for state intervention in the industrial 
economy of India. After independence in 1947, the Indian 
Government unequivocally committed itself to state ownership 
of the means of production. 
Indian business viewed state intervention not only from the 
perspective of the creation of sustained stimulation of a 
home market but also from the perspective of creating the 
necessary infrastructure and providing the capital for the 
expansion of private enterprise. 
The nature of industrialisation and the process of raising 
the necessary capital led to the emergence of the public 
sector which was envisaged to take the responsibility for 
developing the main infrastructural facilities and basic 
industries like mining, metals and machine building. 
Economic independence, or self-reliance was identified with 
setting up a heavy industrial sector, something that 
colonialism had all along thwarted. 
Foreign collaborations were ubiquitous not only in the 
public sector but also in the private sector of big capital. 
With the exception of cotton and jute textiles, virtually 
all other manufacturing concerns of big businesses were 
carried on with some foreign collaboration or the other. The 
ability of these firms to produce for the Indian market 
depended on their collaboration and, in combination with the 
licensing system, established their monopoly positions in 
the Indian market. While acquiring their technology through 
collaborations, they did least possible to absorb the 
technology, confining such absorption to adoption to locally 
available raw materials. The result of this dependent 
technological position was that in the Indian monopolies 
completely lacked the technological dynamism that was 
expected. 
Besides a high degree of product concentration, monopoly in 
India consisted of the predominance of few representative 
units of capital in most areas of industry. Even as far 
back as 1965, the Monopolies Inquiry Commission had reported 
that of a total of 1298 products studied by it, 87.7 per 
cent were in the hands of oligopolists, with 437 being 
n 
produced by only one firm each and 229 by two firms each. 
Moreover, given the extremely diversified and 
technologically integrated structure of the business group, 
a few houses tended to monopolise most areas through firms 
Q 
under their control . The Government's stated objectives 
notwithstanding, the large business houses were able to 
corner disproportionate share of licences issued by the 
Government in all areas of industrial activity. 
The behaviour of the private corporate sector and the 
consequent developments with regard to the commodity 
composition of industrial output also crystallised the role 
to be played by the public sector. Though the industrial 
policy resolutions and statements with regard to the 
"commanding heights" role of the public sector suggested 
that it was to play a leading role in industrial 
development, in practice it merely adjusted to an inevitable 
residual role in an industrialisation process where market 
signals and private decision making determined the direction 
of growth. 
Consequently, being the harbinger of 'socialistic pattern' 
of society, the Government followed the dual economic 
objectives expanding the public sector in conjunction with 
the industrial licensing policy in controlling the 
q 
concentration of private economic power. As a corollary, 
the Government took various steps in regulating business 
enterprises. The very essence of enactment of numerous 
legislative acts was a substantial measure of regulation and 
control. Thus, while free enterprise was not ruled out as 
such, its scope was severely restricted. The raison d'etre 
for doing so was to curb the concentration of wealth, growth 
of monopolies, and to channelise proper utilisation of the 
nation's resources; and put an end to other unfair trade 
practices. 
India was perceived as an economy at 'take-off' stage after 
the adoption of the 'planned' model of economic development 
and 'socialistic pattern of society'. However, the 
performance of the economy did not match the euphoric 
expectations of the society. Probably, the base was built on 
an false analogy that the State will be a virtually 
autonomous entity acting on a passive society-- or, rather a 
society that could be galvanised into appropriate responses 
as desired by planners and policy makers. 
As a result, social scientists and industrialists started 
attacking the inconsistencies in Governmental policy. There 
was a mounting attack on the State 'meddling' with economy 
and on policies that served the interests of a handful 
few. It was realised that the overall industrial growth of 
economy was slow due to the growing chasm between India's 
potential and its real performance. And that slow growth was 
an inevitable result of the overall industrial regime which, 
because of comprehensive controls and a systematic blunting 
of foreign and domestic competition, led to inefficiencies, 
misallocation of resources and creation of a very high cost 
1 7 industrial structure. Nearly all the elements of the 
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industrial policy regime had a 'growth-choking effect' on 
business and industry. 
This aroused a vociferous demand for 'liberalising' the 
industrial and economic policies of the Government. The 
attack on state regulation, on the [inefficient] public 
sector, on controls and even on certain types of subsidies 
all pointed to a change in the perception of the business 
class with respect to the role of the State in the 
economy. 
1-2 THE REGIME QF CQHTRQLS AHD RSgULATIQNS 
Organised thinking concerning the direction of industri-al 
development in India can be traced to the Statement of 
Industrial Policy 1945, and more particularly to the 
adoption of Industrial Policy Resolution of 1948 which 
demarcated the spheres and limits of public and private 
sectors. The most significant features of this Resolution 
was Government's stress on following a policy of "mixed 
economy' -- a mid-course between industrial capitalism and 
planned socialism. The adherence to such a concept was not 
simply seen as providing the wherewithal for capitalist 
development, or providing the financial and infrastructural 
support for business and industry, but as a crucial 
"stabilising' factor restoring 'equilibrium' to an 
15 inherently unstable system . In fact, the move was regarded 
as a design to deal with the deep economic crisis that the 
country suffered at the hands of colonial regime. 
The 1945 Statement of Industrial Policy of the then Indian 
Government is regarded as a precursor of all industrial 
policy resolutions after independence. It was in this 
Statement that the first mention of the concept of 
industrial licensing appeared. Special importance was given 
to the development of steel, heavy engineering, machine 
tools and heavy chemical industries. This emphasis has been 
characteristic of Indian industrial policy thinking ever 
since. The idea that the Government should actively 
participate in the setting up of certain important 
1 R 
industries was also mooted in this policy statement. 
The power of the Central Government for the regulation of 
industrial development emanates from the Industries 
(Development & Regulation) Act of 1951, which was enacted in 
accordance with the principles of Industrial Policy 
Resolution, 1948 and also with the priorities indicated by 
each five-year Plan. Prior to this Act, the development of 
industries was a provincial subject. 
Later, significant changes in the economy were witnessed as 
the country passed through one five-year Plan. The first 
five-year Plan indicated that the scope and need for 
development of industries was so great that it was necessary 
for the public sector to develop those industries 'in which 
private enterprise is unable or unwilling to invest the 
resources required'. The idea was that the rest of the field 
1 7 
could be left free for private enterprise. These factors 
led to the inevitable formulation of another industrial 
policy and thus, the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 
came into being. Despite significant statements relating to 
this resolution were reframed, redefined and reoriented in 
1978, 1980, 1962, 1965, and 1991, the 1956 Resolution is 
still the backbone of industrial policy in the country. 
Adoption of the Companies Act of 1956, the MRTP (Monopolies 
and Restrictive Trade Practices) Act of 1969, the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), the Imports & Exports 
(Control) Act, the Capital Issues (Continuance of Controls) 
Act, etc. gave the Government almost exclusive powers of 
« 
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regulation and direct administrative control over the 
functioning of private corporate sector. In fact, many of 
these Acts were 'essential extensions' of the Defence of 
India powers acquired by the Central Government during the 
Second World War.^^ 
In consonance with the numerous Acts and other schemes of 
Governmental allocation and controls such as allocation of 
raw materials and credit, and price controls, the system of 
industrial licensing was introduced in 1956. It was meant to 
curb concentration of economic power in industrial houses 
through barriers of entry and restrictions on capacity 
growth. However, the original intention was that the 
licensing provisions would be used on the basis of knowledge 
concerning different industries according to indepth surveys 
and reports that would be prepared on a regular basis. 
Thus, the original intention behind licensing provisions was 
indeed developmental. 
As a result of the combination of thinking originating from 
the exigencies and requirements of the economy, Indian 
nationalistic aspirations and the socialistic paradigm of 
planning, the planners and policy makers used a wide variety 
of instruments and controls to steer industrial development 
in a desired direction. However, there was mismatch between 
the intentions expressed and licensing instruments available 
on 
for realising them. Although the intention of licensing 
mechanism was to use power selectively for the promotion of 
a few important industries, it was later used to control 
almost all industries. As an inevitable outcome regulation 
rather than development became the feature of the system. 
Quite ironically, keeping aside the social objectives of 
growth and development, licences were given irrespective of 
the Plan targets. Powerful business houses prevented entry 
of new competitors by acquiring multiple licences in the 
name of different units which led to concentration of 
economic power. But cornering these licences did not 
necessarily lead to the creation of capacity as they did not 
translate the licences into installed capacity. This 
defensive strategy permitted retaining of the bases of 
monopoly power without actually investing in productive 
capacity. Such a pre-emptive behaviour of the business had a 
number of adverse implications. For instance, it implied 
that Government efforts at diverting investment in certain 
directions — in keeping with the priorities defined in its 
21 plans --were never realised. As a result, many significant 
areas were deprived of much needed investments for 
modernisation. 
The immediate impact of this situation was that productive 
capacity fell short of targets and even actual demand in 
many cases. In response to this, the Government not only 
resorted to stricter scrutiny of applications but also the 
practice of "overlicensing" based on an assessment of the 
10 
share of approved applications that have "pre-emption" as 
their motive. This whole process defeated the purpose for 
which licensing was adopted, resulting in an implicit 
breakdown of the licensing system. 
The impact of this investment behaviour of the business 
group was also visible in the case of price control. Being 
in a position to pre-empt capacity as well as having the 
option of investing in a rather wide range of areas, the 
response of the business group to price control has been 
that of choking off production in the areas concerned as 
po 
price control inevitably means lower profits. 
Government intervention notwithstanding, the growth of large 
businesses corresponded not only to effective market demand 
but also more specifically to those areas which assured some 
"target" rate of return. This resulted in spreading the 
utilisation of investible resources of the group across a 
number of areas. The tendency to spread risks resulted in a 
specific investment level, which predetermined the scales of 
production. Even though in most cases these scales were 
uneconomic, utilising the protection offered by the 
Government, business houses chose to establish capacity 
resulting in the highly uneconomic units operating in a 
number of areas like plastic intermediates, synthetics and 
automobiles. This only aggravated the tendency towards 
uneconomic scales resulting from the practice of dividing 
11 
licences for targetted capacities among a number of 
applicants with the aim of curbing monopoly. 
That this system was unsuited for directing industrial 
development was realised in the early 1960s. Private 
entrepreneurs were disenchanted with the system and dubbed 
it as an 'autarkic' prejudice against private small 
businesses. The most common criticism has been the 
cumbersome and time-consuming procedure that involved too 
many agencies and governmental departments to establish an 
industrial enterprise. In addition to the numerous 
approvals, since the enactment of the MRTP Act in 1969, the 
firms covered under this needed to obtain separate MRTP 
clearances from the Department of Company Affairs. 
Probably, like Japanese bureaucrats' belief that business is 
incapable of making satisfactory decisions by itself and 
that it is essential for Government to provide guidance on 
25 
virtually every aspect of operations, India too took steps 
in similar directions which only lengthened the red-tape. 
The failure of licensing policy to operate in accordance 
with Plan priorities and objectives led to the appointment 
of a number of committees to review the working of the 
policy. These included the Swaminathan Committee (Industrial 
Development Procedures Committee, 1964), the Hahalanobis 
Committee (Commitee on Distribution of Income and Levels of 
Living, 1964), the Monopolies Inquiry Commission (1965), the 
Hazari Committee (Industrial Planning and Licensing Policy 
Committee, 1967), the Dutt Committee (Industrial Licensing 
Policy Inquiry Committee, 1969), the Administrative Reforms 
Commission (1969) and the Dagli Committee (Committee on 
Controls and Subsidies, 1969). Despite that all these 
committees were highly critical of the licensing and control 
mechanisms, the Government did little to bring about any 
substantive changes in the industrial regulation system. 
Instead, in the wake of recommendations of Dutt Committee, 
the Government enacted another regulatory act in 1969 — the 
MRTP Act. Needless to emphasise, this is merely an 
illustration of the kind of thinking that dominated the 
Indian industrial regulatory environment. 
Despite all the evidence to the contrary, it was assumed 
that the system of controls and regulations, supports the 
ideals of planned industrial development. One probable 
reason for the persistence of such ill-founded beliefs was 
the increasing complexity of the whole regulatory system, 
particularly the linkage of industrial licensing with 
foreign exchange allocations. Inter-linkages within the 
control system was such that it looked practically far-
fetched to make any incremental changes. 
1.3 THE LIBERALISATTQH Qf ECQHQMY AHD IMDUSTRY 
After a quarter of a century of planning for 
industrialisation and growth in India, there was an 
increasing perception around the mid-1970s that something 
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had gone wrong somewhere. In fact, the stagnation of 
Indian industrial production between the mid-1960s and 1970s 
induced some serious new thinking. Following a period of 
'official reflection' and academic debate in the second half 
of the 1970s, industrial policy in the last decade began 
coming to terms with the basic tenet that economic growth is 
essential for improving the standard of living of the 
masses. It was recognised that while guiding the growth of 
agriculture and industry in desired directions, it is 
important to ensure that growth itself is not choked in the 
27 process. 
Consequently, there emerged a consensus in the early part of 
last decade that Indian industry was exhibiting a slowing 
down in industrial growth due to low productivity, high 
costs, low quality of products and obsolete technology. 
Moreover, controls and regulations in general were 
administered on a crude priority basis, and were often based 
on 'repeat licensing' which reflected post-allocation needs 
and "undermined progress towards the national objective of a 
•pa 
socialistic pattern of society. ""^ ° These, and other such, 
factors induced a wave of pessimism and created disturbing 
and disorienting uncertainty about methods of formulating 
future strategy.-^^ 
There emerged a considerable revision of Indian optimism 
about controls. As a result, three important committees were 
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set up in the early 1980s: the Abid Hussain Committee 
(Committee on Trade Policies, 1984), the Sengupta Committee 
(Committee to Review Policy for Public Enterprises, 1984) 
and the Narasimham Committee (Committee to Examine 
Principles of a Possible Shift from Physical to Financial 
Control, 1985). These committees clearly recommended an 
easing up of trade policy, the substitution of physical and 
quantitative controls by fiscal and other means of macro-
economic management, the promotion of greater public sector 
autonomy in business and operating decisions, and the need 
for measures for enhancing productivity and modernisation. 
1-3.1 Liberalisation Process Initiated between 1985 and 1990 
Starting from mid-1980s, there had been a slow conversion to 
the need to rely less on controls and regulations. There was 
also a clearer recognition of the potential role of the 
private sector and foreign capital. In fact, the Government 
decision makers claim to have realised that Government 
policy will have to drag the economy forward and remove the 
bureaucratic obstacles and inertia of a stagnant economy. 
The Government, too, on its part realised the weaknesses, 
irrationalities, distortions, and rigidities in the control 
structure. 
After coming to power in 1984, the objective of the Congress 
Government was translated into action by its Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi by reinforcing the operation of market 
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mechanism. It started the process of lubricating the 
'recovery' of the late 1970s by not just granting relatively 
freer access to imports but [also] by adoption of a package 
of policies that aimed at providing greater flexibility to 
30 private sector. Thus, the rational economic policy changes 
of far-reaching consequences, commonly described as 
'liberalisation' measures, were introduced in early 1985. 
The liberalisation process of 1985 attempted at policy 
changes in almost all sectors of the economy -- industrial, 
trade, fiscal, and monetary. A number of changes were made 
in the industrial licensing system including provision for 
the delicensing of investments by MRTP firms if they 
invested in backward areas and, in some cases, with 
stipulated minimum export obligation. Moreover, 32 groups of 
industries were delicensed without any investment limit. 
Later, in 1988, all industries, except for a specified 
negative list of 28 industries, were exempted from licensing 
subject to a maximum investment limit. However, this 
exemption from licensing did not apply to MRTP companies. 
The Government also specified a minimum economic capacity 
for initially 73 industries which went up to 108 in 
subsequent years. The scheme of broadbanding was also 
introduced in 1985. Several other measures relating to 
industrial approvals, foreign collaborations, MRTP and FERA 
companies, etc. were announced primarily in 1985 but 
extended upto 1989 in small doses. Since most of these 
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changes came in a piecemeal fashion throughout the 1980s, 
the system had become increasingly complex to comprehend and 
administer effectively. Nevertheless, there was a distinct 
movement away from physical controls and discretionary 
regulations, and greater reliance on the market mechanism. 
Efforts were also made during this period to redress the 
balance in favour of investments in the infrastructure 
sector which had been heavily neglected in the decade of the 
1970s. Reflecting a recognition that stability in the policy 
framework is essential for creating an economic environment 
conducive to growth, the first steps were taken in 1985 in 
this direction by projecting the long-term fiscal policy 
(LTFP) and medium-term trade policy, although the concept of 
stability suffered setacks in the late 1980s. 
It was expected that the liberalisation process of 1985 
would be taken to a logical conclusion. But many political 
factors hindered its natural and conclusive development. One 
noticeable aspect was the sharp reaction made by Congress 
leaders at the All India Congress Committee meeting at 
Bombay in 1985 itself. This made the Government cautious and 
led to the adherence to the Nehruvian legacy — the 1958 
Industrial Policy Resolution and 'socialistic pattern' on 
the one side, and increasing the scope for monopoly and 
foreign capital on the other. It is worth mentioning that 
the Government had to adopt the "two-steps-forward, one-
17 
step-backward" approach of implementing the liberalisation 
measures. Moreover, the implementation of liberalisation in 
piecemeal fashion kept the discretionary powers of the 
Government largely intact. There had been other omissions 
and commissions on the policy front which slowed down the 
momentum of change. 
1.3.2 Liberalisation Process Initiated since July 1991 
The changes initiated in the policy packages towards 
liberalisation and opening up of the economy in 1985 and 
onwards were not systematic and did not integrate with an 
overall policy framework. The ultimate results of the 
various liberalisation measures varied from very effective 
to mixed response to being ineffective. Despite a 
significant improvement in the growth rate of the country --
an average growth rate of 5.5 per cent and above — in the 
post-1985 liberalisation period, there developed a consensus 
among policy makers in the late 1980s that the sustenance of 
this level of growth had become very tenuous as they had to 
be supported by a large chunk of foreign savings financed by 
measures which were proving to be unviable. 
Moreover, in the later half of the eighties, the policy 
makers -- under the compulsion of changing circumstances 
indiscriminately opted for loans on harder term basis, like 
commercial borrowings. Another folly was to use the 
commercial borrowings for financing Government's large 
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unproductive expenditure in deference to their repayment 
obligations. Besides, the Government financed imports 
through the foreign exchange reserves. The serious fiscal 
crisis that eventually resulted was largely due to the 
cumulative impact of Government's profligacy over the years. 
The situation aggravated by an exogenous factor — the Gulf 
War in August 1990 — which generated pressure on the 
balance of payments situation. And partly by a wrong 
decision taken by the Government to import and store oil in 
excess of immediate demand at the high prevailing 
international price. For such other reasons, the process of 
liberalisation was interrupted. The challenge of economic 
management in the nineties was, therefore, to put the 
economy back on a sustainable high growth path. 
The Harasimha Rao Goverment, which assumed office in June 
1991, realised the need to introduce substantial reforms in 
order to bring the economy back from the brink. On July 1, 
1991, the new Government devalued the rupee against the 
major currencies, marking the commencement of a series of 
reforms that continues to this day. If the changes brought 
about over the past 21 months are taken together, including 
those initiated in the recent 1993-94 Union Budget, the 
process of liberalisation is undoubtedly a bold 
restructuring of policies which was never attempted before. 
The policy changes have been extended to a wider horizon 
that includes industrial policy, public sector, taxation, 
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trade and exchange rate policy, foreign investment, banking 
sector and capital market, etc. 
As per the Statement on Industrial Policy of July 21, 1991, 
the Government visualised that the major objectives of the 
new industrial policy package would be to build on the.gains 
already made, correct the distortions or weaknesses that may 
have crept in, maintain a sustained growth in productivity 
and gainful employment, and attain international 
31 
competitiveness. In pursuit of the above objectives. 
Government decided to take a series of initiatives in 
respect of policies relating to the following areas: (1) 
Industrial Licensing (2) Foreign Investment (3) Foreign 
Technology Agreements (4) Public Sector Policy (5) HRTP 
Act.32 
Liberalisation in industrial, trade and financial sectors 
have provided for the first time, an opportunity for the 
private sector to take unhindered commercial decisions. With 
the role of bureaucratic and other controls being pruned, 
market forces have been given primacy to enable automatic 
and decentralised decision making. The objectives of 
modernising India's industrial base and making it 
competitive ' in terms of cost and quality has occupied a 
centre stage in the economic reforms that have been 
33 
undertaken. 
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The role of public sector has been reduced in the current 
phase of liberalisation. A concomitant increase in the role 
of private sector which can invest in almost any area with 
minimal procedural and licensing formalities has now been 
envisaged. Inflow of foreign investment for resource 
augmentation, technology build up and modern managerial 
input has been made another priority area. By providing 
automatic approval for foreign equity participation and 
collaborations, cutting down of time-consuming formalities 
and by making amendments in FERA, the Government have taken 
steps of far-reaching implications. 
The rationale for planing, too, has undergone a change. 
Planning, as envisaged in the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992-
97), has become indicative and Government's major resources 
would be utilised in providing social infrastructure and 
basic human needs. It is also for the first time that a 
long-term Export-Import Policy has been announced by the 
Government which is co-terminus with the Eighth Five Year 
Plan. In the 1993-94 Union Budget the Indian rupee was made 
100 per cent convertible. In short, the changes brought 
about by the present Government have touched almost every 
aspect of economic activity. 
With the help of the present process of liberalistion, the 
Government aims at achieving: 
a liberalised trade regime characterised by tariff 
rates comparable to other industrialising developing 
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countr ies and the absence of d iscre t ionary import 
l icens ing; 
an efficient and dynamic industrial sector subject only 
to regulations relating to environmental security, 
strategic concerns, industrial safety and unfair 
trading and monopolistic practices; 
a financial system operating in a competitive market 
environment and regulated by sound prudential norms and 
standards; 
an autonomous, competitive and streamlined public 
enterprise sector geared to the provision of essential 
infrastructure and goods; and 
an exchange rate system which is free of allocative 
restrictions for trade. 
These objectives are only indicative in nature. There are 
many other supporting changes, and more are expected to be 
implemented, along the above broad directions. 
The broad contents of the structured reform process are not 
new. They are an elaboration and intensification of the 
liberalisation process that began to be introduced in the 
eighties. These changes are aimed at increasing productive 
efficiency of the economy by creating a more open and 
competitive environment for both the public and the private 
sector. 
99 
1-4 LIBERALISATION MKASIIRKS 
The Government, in 1985, accepted the weaknesses, 
irrationalities, and rigidities of the regulatory system. As 
a result, it took various steps between 1985 and 1989 to 
ease the structure of controls. It also probably realised 
that the bureaucrat, the politician and --to some extent 
sections of the industry, which directly benefitted from the 
protective consequences of regulation, constituted a 
combined lobby in favour of maintaining the system. ^ In 
order to reduce the maleffects of controls, the Government 
announced a number of industrial policy changes starting 
from January, 1985. 
1.4.1 Major Libei-al i.'^ ntlnn Measures hftt.ween 1985 anri 1990 
Although several liberalisation measures were announced 
during the period, following formed the highlights of the 
liberalisation package. 
Dellf?ensing 
(1) To stimulate industrial growth and simplify industrial 
procedures, 25 broad categories of industries were 
delicensed in March 1985. Three months later, 82 bulk 
drugs and their formulations were delicensed. 
(2) In September 1986, delicensing was also extended to 
certain chemical industries. 
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(3) In 1988, all industries — except for a specified 
negative list of 26 industries —were delicensed. This 
exemption from licensing was, however, subject to a 
maximum of Rs 15 crore if the industry is located in a 
non-backward area, and Rs 50 crore if it is located in 
a centrally declared backward area. 
MinipuB Econonic Scales (MES) of Operations 
(1) Government specified minimum economic caacity for 73 
industries in 1988. 
<2) In 1987, existing units were allowed to expand their 
capacities automatically upto the specified limits. 
(3) These policies were continued in 1988. The number of 
specified industries went upto 84. 
(4) The number of industries for which minimum economic 
capacity was prescribed went upto 106 in 1990. 
Capacity Rft-endorseaent 
(1) In 1986, the scheme of re-endorsement of capacity was 
announced for undertakings which had achieved 80 per 
cent capacity utilisation. This scheme was also 
extended to MRTP companies. 
(2) It was announced in 1986 that when old plant was being 
replaced, additional capacity upto 90 per cent of the 
original licensed capacity could be endorsed. 
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(3) Government announced in 1988 that industrial licences 
will be automatically endorsed at the maximum 
production achieved by any industrial unit between 
April 1, 1988 and March 31, 1990. 
Rrnnd Banding 
(1) The scheme of broad banding was announced in 1985 for 
22 industries. 
(2) In stages, this facility was extended to 28 groups of 
industries in 1986. 
(3) The list of broad banded industries was further 
expanded covering 33 groups of industries in 1987. 
(4) In 1988, the scheme was extended to seven more groups 
of industres taking the total to 40. 
(5) The number of industries covered by the scheme went up 
to 48 in 1990. 
Industrial Approvals & Foreign Collaborations 
(1) For the delicensed industries, only registration with 
SIA (Secretariat of Industrial Approvals) was required. 
(2) To faciltate expeditious decisions, powers were 
delegated to the Administrative Ministries in a number 
of areas in 1986. 
(3) In 1986, undertakings which had obtained export orders 
were permitted to manufacture concerned item without 
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obtaining industrial licence, provided the entire 
production was exported. 
<4) The validity of registrations granted by technical 
authorities like DGTD (Director General, Technical 
Development) was increased from 2 to 3 years in 1987. 
Also, validity of Letters of Intent was increased to 3 
years. 
(5) Overseas companies were allowed, in 1987, to submit 
applications for foreign collaborations and other 
approvals in their own names. 
FanilJf.ieH to MRTP Rud FERA Companies 
(1) The minimum assets limit of MRTP companies was revised 
from Rs 20 crore to Rs 100 crore in 1985. 
(2) Certain industries were exempted from the provisions of 
Sections 21 and 22 of the HRTP Act in 1985. 
(3) MRTP and FERA companies were exempted from licensing 
provisions in 1986 in high priority items, except 
pharmaceuticals, subject to Government's locational 
policy. 
(4) Broad banding facility was extended to MRTP and FERA 
companies in certain items in 1988. 
(5) The scheme of delicensing was extended to MRTP and FERA 
companies in 1988 subject to the Government's 
locational policy. 
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1.4.2 Ma_ior Liberalisation Measures since Jnlv 19fll 
The liberalisation process initiated by the present 
Government are more broad-based and bold than the one 
initiated in inid-1980s. Following are the major 
liberalisation measures announced since July, 1991. 
f)f?1iofinsing 
(1) All industries delicensed in ' 1991 except for 18 
industries. These industries requiring a licence relate 
to defence production, strategic concerns, environ-
mental or ecologically sensitive areas. 
(2) Three more industries — passenger cars, white goods, 
and raw hides and skins, leather and patent leather 
were delicensed in April 1993. Now, only 15 industries 
require licence. 
Hinimum Economic Snales (MES) of Operations 
(1) The number of industries for which minimum economic 
capacity is prescribed increased to 120 in 1991. 
Capacity Re-endorsenent 
(1) All existing units are exempted from licensing for 
substantial expansion. 
BiLoad Bandinfi. 
(1) The facility has been expanded to existing and new 
industrial units. 
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Jpdnstrial Approvals & Foreign Collaborations 
(1) All existing registration schemes (delicensed 
registration, exempted industries registration, DGTD 
registration) have been abolished. 
(2) Entrepreneurs will henceforth only be required to file 
an information memorandum on new projects and 
substantial expansions. 
(3) The system of Phased Manufacturing Programme (PMP) will 
not be applicable to new projects. 
(4) Foreign equity participation raised to 51 per cent from 
40 per cent in 34 industries. 
(5) A foreign equity proposal now need not necessarily 
accompany technology transfers. 
(6) Automatic approval will be given for foreign technology 
agreements in high priority industries numbering 34. 
(7) No permission is required for hiring foreign 
technicians. 
(8) Capital goods committee in the SIA has been abolished. 
(9) Automatic clearance is granted for import of capital 
goods if foreign exchange requirement is ensured 
through foreign equity. 
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y^piljties to MRTP and FERA CnmDBni^s 
(1) The limits on the assets of MRTP companies and dominant 
companies have been removed. 
(2) Change in FERA carried out so as to facilitate foreign 
equity participation upto 51 per cent. 
(3) Companies with foreign equity upto 100 per cent will be 
encouraged to act as trading houses primarily engaged 
in export activities. 
Thus, the New Industrial Policy is one of the most far-
reaching policy initiatives undertaken by the Government 
which provides an augmented role for the private sector 
while at the same time gives autonomy to the enterprise to 
decide on the size, location and sector of investment. 
1.5 PRKSEHT SCEHARIQ 
The process of economic reforms for liberalisation of the 
economy is now a global phenomenon. The role of market 
forces for efficient resource allocation, higher economic 
growth, and greater productivity and efficiency is now well 
recognised. India, which has recently embarked on the 
process of liberalisation, has taken substantial measures to 
reduce the regime of controls and regulations. This process 
has also added an aspect of attitudinal change. Industry is 
gradually becoming aware of its enhanced responsibility 
towards the consumer which the market mechanism demands. 
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However, for the private sector to enhance productive 
capacity, it is essential to remove two major bottlenecks --
infrastructure and Government clearance at the state level. 
Moreover, delay in clearance of new project from various 
authorities at state level will cause cost escalation, if 
not the disbandment of projects. 
Undoubtedly, liberalisation is not a single stroke 
operation. It is the sum total of a variety of neasures 
intended to bring about a free play of market forces. That 
is because market is almost invariably the best place to 
decide what to produce or how to produce. Although the 
Government has acted almost decidedly towards liberalisation 
yet there is considerable scope for more consolidation in 
this regard. According to a survey conducted by the Center 
for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) -- a subsidiary 
institution of the Washington-based US Chamber of Commerce 
-- India ranks fifth in a group of seven countries which 
embarked on liberaliation process in the 1980s. Exhibit 1.1 
shows the rating of liberalising countries which is based on 
the market-orientation of each country. 
Compared to Korea, Indonesia or even China, India is till 
considered to be far more regulatory and its bureaucracy 
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more negative. Moreover, despite the liberalised exchange 
control mechanism, India has the most restrictive exchange 
control system except for China, when compared with the 
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newly-industrialising countries. However, when compared on 
the basis of two factors -- policy framework and regulatory 
environment, India is rated well. Exhibit 1.2 shows the 
comparative policy framework, and regulatory environment of 
India and seven other countries. 
Exhibit 1.1 : Market-orientation of Selected Countries (1991) 
COUNTRY LIBERALISATION INDEX (%) 
Malaysia 80 
Indonesia 75 
Thailand 66 
Poland 65 
India 57 
Hungary 53 
Czechoslovakia 50 
Source : "Survey of Economic Reforms", Economic Reforms 
Today. Center for International Private 
Enterprise, Washington, August, 1991, P.12. 
The success of India's liberalisation process depends 
crucially on exports growth. And the prerequisite to raising 
exports is to become more competitive. In the global market, 
Indian products are considered competitively priced, but rank 
low on critical factors like quality, creativity and 
technology. It is for these reasons, the perception of 
India in the post-liberalisation phase is not very 
encouraging. The World Competitiveness Report ranked 10 
countries in 1991 -- India was tenth. After the announcement 
of the current phase of liberalisation, the World 
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Competitiveness Report 1992 ranked 15 countries with India 
securing 11th rank. Such drawbacks in the economy and 
business will have to be eased out if liberalisation is 
supposed to take the country towards global integration. 
Exhibit 1.2 : Regulatory Environment & Policy 
Framework : A comparison 
BENERAL fiPPROVAL 
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E«PLOYM£NT 
INCENTIVES 
REPATRIATION 
OF CAPITAL 
Source : 
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Yes 
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No 
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Yes 
YES 
Yes 
Yes 
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Yesj 
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NESIA 
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except for 
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Yes 
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except for 
No 
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No 
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No 
Yes 
No 
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Yes 
No 
Yes 
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Hith app. 
remttance 
schedule 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
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No 
No 
Yes 
Ho, 
except i 
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Ii 
Notifi-
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required 
Yes 
Yes 
fi- Yes 
cation 
required 
ia, March 29 
jvels 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
PORE 
No 
No, 
except for 
TAIKAN 
Yes 
Yes 
fen industries 
No 
No 
No 
No 
bove 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
-April 11, 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
1993, 
THAILAND 
No, 
except for 
restricted 
industries 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
. P. 50. 
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The main consequence of the process of liberalisation is 
that the four-decade old obstacles which prevented firms 
from entering new business or increasing their size, and 
competing among themselves in the local market will be 
removed. As a result, business and industry will probably 
face the twin challenges of growth and competition. Indian 
industry will have no choice but to meet the progressively 
fierce local and international competition. This would 
require a change in perception and thinking of Indian 
business and industry. The emerging environment of the 
nineties would require strategic responses and sound 
business theory which is compatible with the present and 
future realities rather than with past rigidities. 
33 
REFEREHCES 
1. B. Chandra: The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism 
in India. People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1969, 
P.9. 
2. Sanjaya Baru, "State and Industrialisation in a Post-
Colonial Capitalist Economy: The Experience of India", 
Kconomic and Political Weekly. January 23, 1988, P.147. 
3. Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "From a Fractured Compromise to a 
Democratic Consensus: Planning and Political Economy in 
Post-Colonial India", Economic and Political Weekly. 
March 1991, P.612. 
4. Sanjaya Baru, op. cit.. P.145. 
5. D.N., "Political Economy of the Nehru Era", Economig 
and Political Weekly. November 1988, P.2459. 
6. C.P. Chandrasekhar, "Aspects of Growth and Structural 
Change in Indian Industry", Economic and Political 
Weekly. November 1988, P.2359. 
7. Report of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission, Government 
of India, New Delhi, 1965, P.45. 
8. C.P. Chandrasekhar.OP. cit.. P.2362. 
9. Jagdish N. Bhagwati, "India in the International 
Economy" in G.M. Meier (ed.): Leading Issues in 
Economic Development. Oxford University Press, New 
York, 1984, P.751. 
10. Jawaharlal Nehru: The Discovery of India. Oxford 
University Press, Delhi, 1981, P.398. 
11. Jamshed A. Siddiqui: Impact of Liberalisation Measures 
on Selected Industries (unpublished M.Phil. Dissert-
ation >. Department of Business Administration, Aligarh 
Muslim University, Aligarh, 1991, P.15. 
34 
12. Ashutosh Varshney, "Political'Economy of Slow Indus-
trial Growth in India", Economic and Politioal Weekly. 
September 1, 1984, P.1514. 
13. ibid. 
14. Sanjaya Baru, Qp. cit.. P.148, 
15. Sanjaya Baru, pp. cit. . P.144 
16. Rakesh Mohan, "Delicensing", Seminar. April 1991, 
P. 39. 
17. ibid. 
18. ibid. 
19. First Five Year Plan. Government of India, Delhi, 1952, 
P.432. 
20. Rakesh Mohan, OP. cit. . P.40. 
21. Amiya Kumar Bagchi, "Long Term Constraints to India's 
Industrial Growth" in E.A.G. Robinson and M. Kidron 
(eds.): Economic Development of South Asia. Hacmiilan, 
London, 1970, P.185. 
22. C.P. Chandrasekhar, op. cit. 
23. C.P. Chandrasekhar, OP. cit. 
24. C.P. Chandrasekhar, "Investment Behaviour, Economics of 
Scale and Efficiency under an Import-Substituting 
Regime", Economic and Political Weekly. march 1987, 
P.237. 
25. Eleanor M. Halley: Anti-Trust in Japan. Princeton 
University, Princeton, 1970, P.390. 
26. Isher J. Ahluwalia, "The tasks ahead". Seminar. April 
1991, P.54. 
35 
27. ihJA^, pp. 54-55 
28. B.R. Shenoy: Indian Planning and Ecgnogiic Development. 
Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963, pp.8-9. 
29. P. Streeten and H. Lipton: The Crisis of Indian 
Planning. Oxford University Press, London, 1988, P.5. 
30. C.P. Chandrasekhar, "Aspects of Growth and Structural 
change in Indian Industry", op. cit.. P.2367. 
31. StBtement nn Industrial PQIJCY 1321, Ministry of 
Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New 
Delhi, 1991, P.6. 
32. ibid. 
33. "Economic Reforms: Futuristic Scenario", (AGM Theme 
Paper), Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce & 
Industry. New Delhi, 1992, P.3. 
34. Montek S. Ahluwalia, "Policies for the nineties", 
Busines India. 15th Anniversary Issue, 1993, P.80. 
35. Sharad M. Harathe: Regulation and Development: India's 
Policy Experience af Controls over Industry. Sage 
Publications, New Delhi, 1989, P.96. 
36. D.H. Pai Panadiker, "How liberal is our policy?". The 
H-inHnstan Times. October 28, 1991, P. 15. 
37. Ashok Upadhyay, "Moving to a star status". Business 
India, March 29-April 11, 1993, P.50. 
38. Bibek Debroy, "An Elephant's Tale", Business Today. 
January 22, 1993, P.17. 
39. iiiid. 
36 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
2.1 Genesis of the Indian Automobile Industry 
2.2 Industry Structure 
2.3 Growth of the Industry 
2.4 Market Characteristics 
2.5 The State of Competition 
2.6 Resource Usage 
2.7 Modernisation and Upgradation of Technology 
2.8 Present Scenario and Future Prospects 
THK AUTnMORTT.K TWDUSTRY 
2.1 GENESIS OF THE INDIAN AllTOMOBTLE IHDUSTRY 
The dawn of automobile history dates back to 1770 when a 
French man, Nicholas Cugnot, built what is generally agreed 
to have been the first road vehicle propelled by its own 
power . The development of the present day automobile dates 
from about 1880 when German and French efforts to develop 
internal combustion engine began to bear fruit. By 1886, 
Gottlieb Daimler, a German engineer, patented an internal 
combustion engine , and in 1887 another German engineer, 
Carl Benz, built a tricycle propelled by an internal 
combustion engine . 
An important landmark in the history of the industry was the 
formation of a firm Rene Panhard & Enile Lavassor in Paris 
which developed a car after acquiring patents and rights of 
Daimler in 1894 . Thereafter the automobile industry began 
to flourish in all big towns of the world. However, it took 
five decades for an indigenous automobile company to be 
established in India. In the early 1940s, international 
automobile giants -- Ford and General Motors -- had their 
assembly plants in Bombay. Both the companies made enormous 
profits through imports, assembly, and sale. Both also 
opposed the moves of Indian entrepreneurs to indigenously 
manufacture cars . 
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It was Hindustan Motors Ltd (HML) which first set up a car 
manufacturing plant in 1942 at Uttarpara, on the outskirts 
of Calcuta^. Later, Premier Automobiles Ltd (PAL) 
established its plant in a suburb of Bombay. In the initial 
years, the two Indian companies did only assembly work but 
could not make any headway because of the stiff competition 
from foreign models that were easily available. 
In 1953, the Tariff Commission recommended that only those 
firms with proper phased manufacturing programme (PHP) would 
be allowed to operate and that others, which merely imported 
vehicles in completely knocked down (CKD) conditions and 
•7 
assembled them in India, must fold up . As a result, both 
the American companies winded up their business as they did 
Q 
not think the country had a proper industrial base and 
refused to go into indigenous production in India. The 
reservation of the domestic market for units with genuine 
programme of manufacture heralded the emergence of an 
indigenous automobile industry. 
TELCO (The Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. Ltd) entered 
into collaboration with Daimler Benz of Germany and started 
production in 1954 . Bajaj Auto Ltd (BAL) started the 
manufacture of scooters and three-wheelers in collaboration 
with Piaggio of Italy in•I960 . Earlier, the company acted 
as traders, importing CKD kits of scooters and three-
wheelers. Incorporated as a public limited company in 1948 
in collaboration with Standard Motor Co. (UK), the Standard 
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Motor Products of India Ltd (SMPIL) rolled out its first 
indigenously manufactured cars in 1955. It was the 
smallest among the three car manufacturers in the country . 
The Automobile Products of India Ltd (API) started 
13 production of scooters in 1954 ', Incidentally, API was the 
first company to manufacture three-wheelers in India 
indigenously. Earlier, Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M) was set up 
in 1945 to import steel jeeps. And Ashok Motors (now Ashok 
Leyland) was set up to assemble Austin cars in 1948. In 
1950, the company acquired the sole rights to distribute and 
assemble Leyland commercial vehicles of UK, and in 1953 
opted for starting indigenous automobile manufacture in 
15 
collaboration with Leyland . 
2.1,1 Present Status 
The automobile industry in India is more than forty years 
old now. From a production of merely 4,122 vehicles in 
1950^°, the automobile industry produced 2,273,709 vehicles 
in 1990-91 , and is expected to reach 55,00,000 mark in the 
year 2000 . Exhibit 2.1 shows the growth of automobile 
industry in India. 
Since the year 1950, India's share in world automobile 
output has increased from 0.1 per cent to 0.4 per cent . 
The industry recorded a growth of 318.5 percent during the 
period 1980-90 compared to 174.8 per cent during 1970-80. 
The total sales of 16 major companies amounted to Rs 7108.5 
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crore as on March 31, 1990 compared to 5739.1 crore in the 
on 
preceding year -- thus recording a growth of 22.2 per 
cent. 
Exhibit 2.1 : Automobile Production in India (1950-92) 
Year Coram. Cars Jeeps Two- Three- Total 
(Jan-Dec) Vehicles Wheelers Wheelers 
1950 
1960 
1970 
1980 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Source 
1891 
27518 
40972 
68311 
145628 
146152 
128095 
2221 
19097 
35305 
30538 
176821 
176995 
153357 
: Adapted from 
Profile 1985, 
Manufacturers 
Automotivft Tr 
-
5501 
9334 
15068 
41944 
30417 
38202 
-
16878 
113171 
417602 
1875522 
1601108 
1475379 
-
496 
4229 
26519 
95528 
79429 
65340 
The Automobile Industrv 
Association of 
(AIAM), Bombay, 
idustrv of India 
Indian 
1985, 
Facts 
4112 
69490 
203011 
558038 
2335443 
2034101 
1860373 
Statistical 
Automobile 
pp.2-3 and 
& Figures 
1991-92. Automobile Component Manufacturers 
Association of India (ACMA), New Delhi, 1993, P.l. 
As of present, the industry produces a whole range of 
vehicles -- buses, trucks, commerical vehicles, cars, jeeps, 
scooters, motorcycles, mopeds and three-wheeled vehicles. 
Although the industry is primarily a capital-intensive 
industry, raw materials constitute more than 60 per cent of 
21 the total manufactured price . As most of the raw materials 
are imported, the automobile industry is sensitive with 
regard to levying of excise duty on import of raw materials, 
and fluctuations in the value of international currencies 
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and prices. Moreover, the incidence of excise duty on end 
products within the industry has been considerably high 
depending upon the imported and indigenous content of 
components. 
Although fuel availability and its price is a major 
determinant of demand for certain category of vehicles, 
others like income levels, tax laws relating to depreciation 
etc., also play a significant role in influencing demand 
for vehicles. In 1991, the adverse combination of the 
factors viz., shortage and spurt in prices of petroleum 
products, inflationary pressures, changes in depreciation 
rules, etc., greatly affected the production and sales of 
22 
automobiles . 
After experiencing technological obsolescence for more than 
four decades, the automobile industry seems to be witnessing 
modernisation and upgradation of technology. Since the 
easing of procedural impediments, there has been a spate of 
foreign collaborations within the industry. 
2.2 IHDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
The Indian automobile industry, including the component 
sector, is fairly large though not big enough by 
international standards. India is the thirteenth biggest 
manufacturer of commercial vehicles with about 0.8 per cent 
of the world commercial vehicles of 12 million, and is 
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ranked seventeenth among car manufacturers with a worldwide 
output of nearly 34 million vehicles in 1991. It ranks 
second in the world in terms of number of two-wheelers 
produced . At present, India is the world's largest 
producer of three-wheelers. Thus, it seems that India is 
going to emerge as the largest market in the world for two 
and three-wheelers. 
2.2.1 Size of Industry 
The total licensed/registered capacity in automobile 
industry during 1991-92 stood at 55,43,000 numbers of all 
types of vehicles per annum while the installed capacity was 
25 the order of 36,80,500 numbers per annum . Capacity 
utilisation in the industry is about 55 per cent with 
production being 2,021,573 vehicles during the year 1991-92. 
Earlier, in 1990-91, the industry utilised 61.7 per cent of 
its installed capacity with production being 2,273,709 
vehicles. In all there are 42 units engaged in the 
po 
production of different types of vehicles . Exhibit 2.2 
shows the aggregate installed production capacity of 
automobile industry. 
Out of the total installed production capacity of automobile 
products, two-wheelers segment alone account for 32,00,000 
numbers per annum — that is, 86.9 per cent of the installed 
capacity. The licensed capacity for two-wheelers in 
50,00,000 numbers per annum. Exhibit 2.3 shows a broad 
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segment-wise break-up of licensed and installed capacity of 
automobile industry for the year 1991-92. 
Exhibit 2.2 : Installed Production Capacity of Automobile 
Industry (in numbers) 
Year Number of Units Installed Capacity 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
41 
41 
42 
42 
42 
42 
25,96,100 
27,35,100 
28,35,100 
36,80,500 
36,80,500 
36,80,500 
Source : Adapted from Annual Reports (1986-87 to 1991-92'>. 
Department of Industrial Development. Ministry of 
Industry, Government of India, New Delhi. 
It is evinced from the exhibit that commercial vehicles 
segment has installed only 84.5 per cent of the licensed 
capacity while the two-wheelers segment has installed merely 
64 per cent of its licensed capacity. The car manufacturers 
have installed 93.9 per cent of the licensed capacity. Thus, 
from being a chronic excess demand industry, the Indian 
automobile industry is now showing distinct signs of excess 
capacity. 
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Exhibit 2.3 : Break-up of Licensed and Installed Capacity 
of Automobile Industry (in numbers) 
Segment Number of Licensed Installed % Share in 
Units Capacity Capacity Total Ins.Cap. 
Comm. 
Vehicles 
Cars 
Two-
Wheelers 
13 
5 
24 
3,13,000 
2,30,000 
50,00,000 
2,64,500 
2,16,000 
32,00,000 
7.2 
5.9 
86.9 
TOTAL 42 55,43,000 36,80,500 100.0 
Source : Adapted from Annual Reports 1991-92. Department of 
Industrial Development. Ministry of Industry, 
Government: of India, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 104-105. 
2.2.2 Sectoral Structure 
In the 1950s, there were just eight companies in the 
automobile industry — all of them in the private sector. 
The industry, comprising of 42 manufacturers at present, is 
still dominated by the private sector. However, the presence 
of Maruti Udyog Ltd (MUL) — the only public sector car and 
jeep manufacturing unit — is more pronounced. Ever since it 
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commenced production in 1983 with 175 cars, MUL has been 
steadily increasing its market share in the passenger car 
category. Exhibit 2.4 shows the sectoral structure of the 
industry. 
Out of the 42 companies producing different types of 
vehicles, 38 belong to the private sector. Besides MUL, 
Gujarat Narmada Auto Ltd (GNAL) — a manufacturer of 
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scooters — is also in the public sector. Another public 
sector undertaking. Scooters India Ltd (SIL), had 
accumulated huge losses and is now a sick company. Unlike 
the early 1950s, there are no multinational companies. 
However, among the 42 automobile manufacturers, twenty-eight 
have foreign collaborations -- technical or financial, or 
both. 
Exhibit 2.4 : Sectoral Structure of Automobile Industry 
Category Private Public Total 
Sector Sector 
Units Units 
(A) Commercial Vehicles 
Heavy and Medium 
Commercial Vehicles 2 - 2 
Light Commercial 
Vehicles 10 - 10 
(B) Light Hotgr Vehicles 
Passenger Cars 4 1 5 
Jeeps 1 1 2 
(C) Three-wheelers 2 - 2 
(D) TwQ-wheelers 
Scooters 6 2 8 
Motorcycles 6 - 6 
Mopeds 7 - 7 
TOTAL 38 4 42 
Source : Adapted from Automotive Industry of India. Facts & 
Figures. 1991-92. Automotive Component Manufac-
turers Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, 
pp.3-4 
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2.3 GROWTH OF THE IHDUSTRY 
The automobile industry had grown in a sheltered environment 
since independence. Ever since the policy of liberalisation 
was adopted by the Government at the commencement of the 
Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-89), the industry has shown 
signs of accelerated growth. Manufacturing of all types of 
vehicles more than quadrupled between 1980 and 1990. From a 
mere production of 69,490 vehicles in 1980, automobile 
production increased to 5,58,038 vehicles in 1980, and to 
14,05,433 vehicles in 1985. Exhibit 2.5 shows the growth of 
automobile production since 1980. 
As is evinced from the exhibit, the automobile production 
increased from 1472081 vehicles in 1985-88 to 2273709 in 
1990-91. Further, the Automobile Production Index (A.P.I.) 
has constantly been increasing with the base year being 
1980-81. However, due to recessionary conditions, automobile 
production decreased in 1991-92. 
2.3.1 Phases of growth 
The growth of automobile industry can be distinctly 
classified into two phases — Pre-liberalisation Period 
(1951-1984) and Post-liberalisation Period (1985-onwards). 
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Exhibit 2.5 : Growth of Automobile Production (in numbers) 
Year Two- Three- Four- Total % Automobile 
Wheelers Wheelers Wheelers Vehicles Change Prod.Index 
over (API) 
Pr.Year 
1980-81 
1881-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Source 
440310 
548076 
632485 
779604 
897948 
1190917 
1394246 
1437112 
1636323 
1731686 
1820766 
1603736 
26930 
25801 
31881 
38575 
43508 
49947 
54566 
61112 
79361 
83752 
89162 
76750 
121116 
153707 
151550 
158651 
195302 
231217 
253803 
294011 
317999 
348638 
363781 
341087 
588356 
725584 
815896 
976830 
1136758 
1472081 
1702615 
1792235 
2033683 
2164076 
2273709 
2021573 
33.23 
23.32 
12.45 
19.72 
16.37 
29.50 
15.66 
5.26 
13.47 
6.41 
5.09 
11.09 
100 
123 
138 
165 
192 
248 
286 
301 
341 
362 
380 
337 
Adapted from Automotive Industry of India. Facts & 
Figures. 1991-92. Automotive Component Manufac-
turers Association of India, Hew Delhi, 1993, P.l. 
Prft-liberalisation Period : During this phase, there were 
primarily eight manufacturers in the industry. Hindustan 
Motors Ltd (HML) and Premier Automobiles Ltd (PAL) dominated 
the car segment, Bajaj Auto Ltd and API were the leaders in 
scooters, Enfield India and Escorts Ltd in motorcycles, API 
and Bajaj Auto Ltd in three-wheelers, and TELCO in heavy and 
medium commercial vehicles category. Mahindra & Mahindra 
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(M&M) was the only jeep manufacturer. Exhibit 2.6 shows-
automobile production during pre-liberalisation period. 
Exhibit 2.6 : Automobile Production (1951-84) 
Category Production (in'OOO nos.) Increase 
Annual 
Rate % 
1951 1984 
Mopeds 0.5* 386.6 35.3 
Scooters 0.5 303.4 21.4 
Motorcycles 0.4 173.3 20.2 
Com. Vehicles 9.5 93.2 7.2 
Cars 12.4 64,0 5.1 
* - 1962 
Source : Adapted from Indian Economy since 1950-51. Centre 
for Monitoring Indian Economy, Bombay, February 
1986, P.2.1 (ii). 
In the pre-liberalisation period, mopeds recorded the 
highest annual growth rate followed by scooters and 
motorcycles. During the same period, cars and commercial 
vehicles grew moderately. 
Post-lihRrnlisation Period : The policy reforms introduced 
in small doses in 1983 and 1984, but mainly in 1985, 
accelerated the growth of automobile industry. Government 
policies like easing the entry of firms, allowing capacity 
expansion, permitting foreign collaboration, prescribing 
minimum economies of scale of production, and reducing 
constraints on growth and competition by broad banding 
(product-mix), etc. made a positive impact on the growth of 
the automobile industry in India. 
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Although automobile industry was one of the nine industry 
groups chosen for the purpose of prescribing minimum 
economic capacities (as the growth of the industry was 
adversely affected by fragmentation of capacity), yet the 
liberalisation policy has had a paradoxical impact on the 
industry. On the one hand, many companies achieved economies 
of scale of production while on the other, some companies 
suffered on account of fragmentation of capacity. The reason 
being that the Government granted licences to too many 
manufacturers without taking into consideration the market 
demand. However, despite such handicaps, the automobile 
industry has shown remarkable growth in the post-
liberalisation period. 
Due to the broader economic malaise in 1991, the automobile 
industry had to face recessionary trends. Many producers 
were forced to cut down production. As a result, production 
of vehicles declined in 1991-92. 
2.3.2 Rate and Pattern of Growth 
The production of all types of automobile vehicles grew at 
an annual rate of about 18 per cent between 1951 and 1984. 
The industry experienced a rising trend during the period 
1985-91. Considerable growth is being witnessed by almost 
all the segments of the industry. Exhibit 2.7 shows the 
production and annual rate of growth of automobile 
products. 
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Two-wheelers recorded an average annualised growth rate of 
8.8 per cent during the period 1985-92 while the four-
wheelers grew at an average rate of 10.8 per cent during the 
same period. As is evinced from Exhibit 2.7, there are wide 
variations in annual growth rate in various segments as well 
as within a particular segment. 
Exhibit 2.7 : Automobile Production during 1985-92 
(in '000 nos. ) 
YEAR I 198f. ! 1986 ! 1987 I 1 9 ^ I 1939 ! 1990 ; 1991 i 1992 
CATESORY i Out- Rate of ! Out- Rate of ; Out- Rate of ; Out- Rate o f ! Out- Rate of ; Out- Rate of ; Out- Rate o f ; Out- Rate of 
; put Growth ; put Growth ! put Growth ; put Growth ; put Growth ', put Growth I put Growth I put Growth 
HopedB 455.3 11.4 449.8 -1.2 475,& 5.4 477.3 0.4 431.1 0.8 428.5-10,9 397.4 -7.3 405.8 2.1 
Scooters 422.3 42.1 595.1 29.0 625.5 4.8 659,0 5.1 848.5 28.7 968,4 14.1 778.5-19.6 682.4 -12.3 
Motorcycles 248.0 41.7 314.7 21.2 300.6 -4.6 411.6 26,9 420.8 2.3 478.5 13,7 425.1 -11.2 387.0 -6,9 
AH Tw>-
Wheelers 1125.6 31.8 1359.6 17.2 1401.8 3.01 1547.9 8.3 1750.4 11.2 1875.5 7.1 1601.1 -14.6 1475.3 -7,8 
Jeeps 26.8 20,8 27.7 3.2 32.3 14.2 35.1 9.2 42.3 17,2 41.9 -0.9 30,4 -27,4 38.2 25,6 
Cars 102.4 60.1 116,0 11,7 148.5 21.8 159.9 7,0 177,1 10,2 176,8 -0,16 177.0 0.11 153,3 -13,3 
Co9,Vehi. 99,7 5.1 101.2 1.5 103.0 0.7 117.3 8.6 117.5 0.17 145.6 23.9 146.1 0.34 123,0 -12,3 
AH Four-
wtelers 228,9 20.9 244.9 6.9 288,8 17,9 312,3 8,1 336,9 7,8 364,3 8,1 353,5-2,9 319,0 -9,7 
Source : Adapted from Automotive Industry of India. Facets & 
Figures 1991-92. Automotive Component Manufac-
turers Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, P.l. 
The share of two and three-wheelers in the whole of 
automobile production was 71 per cent in 1980-81 which 
increased to 81 per cent in 1986-87 but later declined to 77 
50 
p e r c e n t in 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 . The s h a r e of v a r i o u s s egmen t s in 
a u t o m o b i l e p r o d u c t i o n i s shown in E x h i b i t 2 . 8 . 
The s h a r e of a i l t y p e s of f o u r - w h e e l e r s i n t h e t o t a l o u t p u t 
of i n d u s t r y d e c l i n e d t o 19 p e r c e n t in 1986-87 from 29 p e r 
c e n t i n 1 9 8 0 - 8 1 . However, i t s s h a r e g r a d u a l l y went 
up t h e r e a f t e r and now s t a n d s a t 23 p e r c e n t . 
E x h i b i t 2 . 8 : P r o d u c t i o n Trend of Automobi le P r o d u c t s 
In t^ie Mil 
ftjtput of 
Vehicles, Share 
(in per cent} of 
1980-81 1984-85 198^.-86 198i-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 
Scooters 
Motorcycles 
Hopeds 
Three-wtieelers 
34 
16 
17 
4 
26 
15 
32 
30 
17 
30 
3 
36 
17 
25 
3 
31 
13 
27 
4 
34 
20 
22 
4 
33 
18 
19 
4 
38 
19 
18 
4 
35 
20 
19 
3 
TOTAL (A! 71 77 80 81 79 79 77 
Cars 
Jeeps 
Buses/Tructs 
LCTs 
Otters 11 
8 
2 
•y 
2 
5 
8 
2 
3 
2 
5 
8 
2 
4 
2 
5 
7 
2 
4 
2 
6 
8 
1 
4 
3 
7 
TOTAL (B) 
A + B 
29 
100 
23 
100 
20 
100 
19 
100 
20 
100 
20 
lOO 
21 
100 
21 
100 
23 
100 
Source : Adapted from Automotive Industry of India. Facts & 
Figures 1991-92. Automotive Component Manufac-
turers Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, P.3. 
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2.3.3 Capacity Ul-.i 1 ip;«t.if>n 
The automobile industry has experienced poor capacity 
utilisation after the announcement of liberalisation 
measures in 1985. Prior to the declaration of various policy 
measures regarding automobile industry, the average 
utilisation of production capacity was about 85 per cent. 
Exhibit 2.9 shows the utilisation of production capacity 
during 1983-92. 
Exhibit 2.9 Capacity Utilisation by Automobile 
Industry (in per cent) 
YEAR CAPACITY UTILISATION 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
86.7 
83.3 
80.3 
61.5 
62.0 
66.5 
58.8 
61.7 
54.9 
Source : Adapted from The Handbook of Industrial Statistics 
1988. Ministry of Industry, Government of India, 
New Delhi, 1989; Annual Reports (various issues'). 
Department of Industrial Development. Ministry of 
Industry, Government of India, New Delhi; and 
Automotive Industry of India. Facts & Figures. 
1991-92, Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India, New Delhi, 1993. 
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Apart froai low capacity utilisation during the second half 
of 1980s and early 1990s in general, there are variations in 
capacity utilisation among the various automobile units. A 
large number of small units -- especially in the two-wheeler 
segment -- has led to the unnecessary fragmentation of 
capacity. Thus, the automobile industry has experienced 
major problems with regard to the utilisation of capacity 
which is vastly in excess of immediate requirements. One 
simple reason being that the Government have been 
sanctioning production capacities in excess of the 
officially projected demand for products. However, there are 
other reasons as well which have led to low capacity 
utilisation. 
2.4 MARKET CHARACTKRTSTTCS 
In Indian society, a motor car is looked upon as a symbol of 
luxury. Government policy with regard to the automotive 
industry has for many years reflected this ambivalence . 
Strangulating Government controls over the last four decades 
had made sure that its true potential is never realised. 
However, the industry was assigned a priority status in the 
economic policy announced in 1985. The process began in 1982 
with the lone public sector undertaking -- (Maruti Udyog 
Ltd) -- entering into technical and financial collaboration 
with the well-known Japanese automobile giant, Suzuki Motor 
Co. In January 1985, the scheme of 'broad banding' was 
introduced whereby existing manufacturers were allowed to go 
for product-mix. Due to these, and other more such reasons, 
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the 1980s have witnessed a significant growth in the 
automobile industry, especially in the two-wheeler, car, 
jeep and light commercial vehicle segments. 
2.4.1 Products and their Demand 
The automobile industry roughly constitutes of nine types of 
vehicles, under four broad categories, for the Indian 
market. Exhibit 2.10 shows the different products of the 
industry. 
Exhibit 2.10 : Automobile Products 
I : COMMERCIAL VEHICLES 
1. Light Commercial Vehicle (LCV) 
2. Medium Commercial Vehicle (HCV) 
3. Heavy Commercial Vehicle (HCV) 
II : CARS & JEEPS 
4. Passenger Cars 
5. Jeeps 
III : TWO-WHEELERS 
6. Scooters 
7. Motorcycles 
8. Mopeds 
IV : THREE-WHEELERS 
The demand projection for various types of vehicles is 
estimated to be 3,445,000 numbers for 1994-95 and the total 
vehicle production would increase by about 74 per cent over 
that of 1991-92. During the 1990s, the rate of growth of all 
types of vehicles is expected to be 11 per cent. Exhibit 
2.11 shows the demand projections for the period 1993-2000 
A.D. 
In terms of sales, medium and heavy commercial vehicles 
account for 61.3 per cent of the market share of commercial 
vehicles segment and light commercial vehicles for the 
remaining 38.7 per cent. It is expected that the demand for 
this segment vfill increase by 10 per cent during the 1990s. 
At present (1991-92), passenger cars account for 82.6 per 
cent of total four-wheeler sales while jeeps account for 
17.4 per cent. The demand for this segment is expected to be 
of the order of 9 per cent and 14 per cent respectively 
during the 1990s. 
Exhibit 2.11 : Demand Estimates for Automobile Vehicles 
1993-2000 A.D. (in '000 numbers) 
CATEGORY Comm. Vehicles 
Cars Jeeps Two- Three-
YEAR LCVs M/HCVs TOTAL wheelers Wheelers 
1993-94 105 95 200 260 70 2500 150 
1994-95 115 100 215 280 80 2700 170 
2000 A.D. 175 125 300 450 120 4500 250 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (PER CENT) DURING 1990s 
15.0 5,8 10.0 9.0 14.0 9.0 14.5 
Source : Adapted from The 29th Report of the Association of 
Indian Automobile Manufacturers (AIAMl, Bombay, 
1989, P.27 (These demand projections have been 
made by the sub-group appointed by the Eighth Plan 
Working Group on Road Transport for the Eighth 
Five Year Plan). 
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The product-mix of the Indian automobile industry has 
changed significantly over the years. Until the early 1970s, 
commercial vehicles constituted one-third of the private 
transport vehicles and the market was small and stagnant. By 
the end of the seventies, personal transport vehicles 
increased to nearly six times the commercial vehicles. 
During the 1980s, further diversification took place. 
Personal transport vehicles, especially two-wheelers, became 
increasingly available. As a result, by the end of 1980s, 
personal transport vehicles constituted more than 15 times 
30 
of the commercial vehicles . 
During 1991-92, there was a decline in demand for automobile 
o •t 
products resulting in 11 per cent decline in sales . 
Various factors were responsible for the drop in sales, 
inflation being one reason for the decline in sales of 
personal vehicles. Another major reason was the reduction of 
rate of depreciation admissible on vehicles from 33 per cent 
to 20 per cent. Further, this rate can be charged on a pro 
rata basis, depending on the date of purchase. This meant 
losing out on the year-end sales of vehicles, especially to 
the corporate clients. Moreover, the high operating cost due 
to rise in petrol prices was a deterrent for postponing 
32 fresh purchase of vehicles . However, the excise relief 
provided to the automobile industry in the 1993-94 Union 
Budget is expected to boost sales of automobile products. 
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2.4.2 Prining 
The pricing of vehicles in the automobile industry seems to 
have become the bone of contention between the manufacturer 
and the consumer. Although all types of vehicles experienced 
rise in prices in 1985 -- when vehicles produced by Japanese 
collaborations came on the roads -- yet it is the light 
commercial vehicles segment in the industry which seems to 
be drawing flaks from all quarters. 
Ever since the LCVs were first introduced in the market in 
December 1986 with Japanese collaboration, LCV manufacturers 
have increased the price of their product 24 times. Besides, 
in December 1990, several manufacturers raised the prices of 
their vehicles thrice in a period of less than a 
fortnight . Consequently, over the last three years the 
prices of these vehicles have gone up by more than Rs 1.5 
lakh. Similarly, the car manufacturers too have increased 
their prices quite invariably. The public sector 
undertaking, MUL, has created a record of sorts by raising 
the prices of its products three times in the course of 
single 12-month period . The two-wheeler^ segment has also 
been witnessing price hikes more often than not in the past 
five years. 
The industry puts the blame of constant price hikes on the 
'misbehaviour' of the yen-rupee exchange rate. In line with 
the Government's liberalisation policy, the import pricing 
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was fixed in yen instead of the dollar. But the unrelenting 
appreciation of yen against the rupee since 1982 increased 
the cost of imported components by at least three times. 
Other reasons assigned for constant rise in prices of 
vehicles include non-availability of raw materials from 
within the country, and incidence of high excise and customs 
duties. By the estimates of their own phased manufacturing 
programmes submitted to the Government, several 
manufacturers should have brought the level of 
indigenisation to 95 per cent by 1991. But, as things stand, 
about 20 per cent of components is still imported . 
The raw materials constitute a major proportion of vehicle 
cost. Since most of the raw materials have to be imported, 
the cost of vehicle keeps rising when the procurement of raw 
materials is costlier. The increase in prices of steel and 
aluminium is another reason for rise in prices of vehicles. 
Imposition of higher excise duty on fuel-efficient vehicles 
in 1988-89 budget too increased the price of automobile 
products. The increase in freight charges on pig iron, etc. 
and hike in tyre prices are some other reasons of price hike 
in the automobile industry. Ancillary units have also raised 
prices after their raw material costs went up. Moreover, 
lack of economies of scale and poor capacity utilisation 
have contributed in their own way in pushing up the prices. 
During the current recessionary phase, many manufacturers 
absorbed a part of the increased costs to attract buyers. 
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This, however, led to decline in profitability. The excise 
relief in the 1993-94 Union Budget was passed on to the 
consumers to boost sagging sales. Notwithstanding the 
frequent price increases, at present, the Indian automobile 
products are highly price competitive. 
2.4.3 Product Proaotion 
Different promotional activities are undertaken in the 
automobile industry to cater to the needs of different 
segments. A specific promotional mix is designed to the 
needs of the user in each segment. For the promotion of its 
products, the automobile industry has been adopting a 
permutation and combination of various promotional 
strategies. 
For trucks and buses, the pay-load capacity of the vehicle 
is important. Usually, the manufacturers produce trucks 
which can carry a load of 8-16 tonne. The promotional 
activity in such a case is adopting sales promotion through 
sales teams to bulk consumers like state road transport 
corporations, large private transport companies, heavy 
vehicle fleet operators, and other institutional buyers. 
To the car user fuel-efficiency, utility of the vehicle, and 
style is important. The luxury car user prefers 
sophisticated design and comfort. As a result, producers of 
passenger cars have either changed their design to suit 
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consumer choice or have collaborated with overseas car 
manufacturers to increase fuel-efficiency of the vehicle, or 
have combined both. 
The promotional strategy for two-wheelers has been in the 
form of improved fuel-efficiency, adaptability to local 
conditions, and better look. Companies operating in this 
segment usually promote their product and its qualities 
through electronic and print media- similar to the car and 
jeep manufacturers. However, Enfield India -- the maker of 
heavy duty and rugged motorcycles -- has also relied on 
institutional sales by selling their product to armed 
forces, paramilitary forces, and the police. 
Product promotion has gained considerable importance in the 
post-liberalisation period. Due to the increased competition 
especially in the two-wheeler segment — there is a 
noticeable shift in the promotional strategies since 1985. 
Several companies have embarked upon aggressive methods for 
sales promotion. One strategy is to set up auto financing 
subsidiaries to help the prospective buyers. Almost all 
major companies have introduced hire-purchase scheme with 
the specific objective of boosting sales of its products. 
Noteworthy is the fact that except for a few, all such 
subsidiaries have come into existence in the post-
liberalisation period. 
Moreover, many banks and financing agencies have come 
forward to offer consumer finance on attractive terms. The 
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prevailing interest rates vary from 10 to 14 per cent flat. 
Many banks provide upto 100 per cent finance including cost 
op 
of accessories, taxes, etc. Apart from group finance 
schemes, they also offer individual finance with small down 
payments. As customers would like to own their vehicles 
today and pay for the same in convenient instalments, such 
a promotional strategy has largely been successful. 
In order to promote their products during the current 
recession, some companies provided special dealer incentives 
while others launched economy models which were priced lower 
for example, MUL's Omni brand of passenger vans are 
cheaper by about Rs 25,000. Premier Automobiles Ltd started 
offering a three-year warranty to boost its sales . 
Further, with demand saturating in the urban market, 
manufacturers started promoting their products in the rural 
areas. An interesting shift witnessed during recession was 
that instead of marketing products, manufacturers were 
marketing their finance schemes. 
2.4.4 Distribution 
There exists an elaborate distributio in network through 
which various types of automobile products are supplied to 
the consumer. More than 5,000 dealers of automobile vehicles 
in the country stock and market the various kinds of 
vehicles. It must be mentioned that an automobile dealer is 
the vital link between the manufacturer and the customer, 
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and most important of all between the customer and product. 
It is his role that promotes the sales first, and it is his 
service that promotes it again and again . The dealers 
have a unified organisation at the national level which is 
known as the Federation of Automobile Dealers Association 
(FADA). 
With the energence of new market conditions, the role of 
dealers is changing rapidly. Manufacturers are looking for 
small, eager but performing dealers with a sound financial 
base. They are also extending their own field force to 
support dealers' activities. Manufacturers are also taking 
up campaigns of customer contacts to build up brand and 
customer loyalty. After sales service is becoming as 
important as the distribution network itself. Dealers are 
expected to invest in this area and extent exclusive 
services . 
In the post-liberalisation period, some companies have 
themselves opened their own subsidiaries for distribution 
facilities. These subsidiaries of automobile producers sell 
their product either under hire-purchase scheme or by giving 
other liberal incentives. As regards the institutional 
buyers, the companies themselves negotiate and directly 
distribute the products to the customer. 
Due to increased competition during the past few years, 
companies have started distribution facilities on a country-
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wide basis, rather than concentrating on demographic 
distribution, in order to explore newer markets. These 
facilities are now also being extended to semi-urban, 
mufassil and rural areas to locate new buyers of their 
products. 
2.5 THE STATE QF CQMPETITIQH 
The Indian automobile industry is more than four decades old 
now. Earlier, in the 1940s, only overseas companies like 
General Motors and Ford used to assemble vehicles by CKD 
kits. But due to change of governmental policy, they were 
forced to wind up their business. Till early 1980s only two 
companies -- HML and PAL -- shared the total output of about 
60,000 passenger cars. The rest of the requirement were met 
by six other companies. 
The year 1983 marked an important watershed in the history 
of the Indian automobile industry. The advent of the public 
sector Maruti Udyog Ltd, and its entering into technical and 
financial collaboration with Suzuki Motor Co. of Japan, to 
produce 800 cc cars opened the floodgates of contemporary 
Japanese technology into the Indian market. The Indian 
Government's liberalisation of industrial policy in 1985 set 
in motion a near total transformation of the industry 
through modernisation and upgradation of technology which 
had for decades experienced obsolescence. 
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2.5.1 Major Players 
After the announcement of liberalisation measures, a new 
generation of companies have come up in Indian automobile 
market. The new generation companies can be classified into 
two groups -- the older ones which have gone for foreign 
tie-ups, and the new starters in the market. Exhibit 2.12 
lists the major automobile companies in India. 
Exhibit 2.12 : Major Automobile Manufacturers 
CATEGORY MANUFACTURERS CATEGORY MANUFACTURERS 
M & HCVs Ashok Leyland Ltd Jeeps 
TELCO 
LCVs Bajaj Tempo Ltd Scooters 
DCH Toyota Ltd 
Eicher Motors Ltd 
Mahindra & Mahindra 
Swaraj Mazda Ltd 
TELCO 
Cars Hindustan Motors 
Maruti Udyog Ltd 
Premier Automobiles 
Motor-
cycles 
Three- Bajaj Auto Ltd Mopeds 
Wheelers API Ltd 
Mahindra & Mahindra 
Maruti Udyog Ltd 
Bajaj Auto Ltd 
Kinetic Honda Motors 
LML Ltd 
Maharashtra Scooters 
Bajaj Auto Ltd 
Enfield India Ltd 
Escorts Ltd 
Hero Honda Motor Ltd 
TVS-Su2uki Ltd 
Bajaj Auto Ltd 
Kinetic Engg Ltd 
Majestic Auto Ltd 
TVS-Su2uki Ltd 
As of now, there are just two companies manufacturing medium 
and heavy commercial vehicles (MCVs and HCVs), eight 
companies manufacture light commercial vehicles (LCVs), four 
companies are actively engaged in the manufacturing of 
passenger cars, two are manufacturing jeeps, four companies 
are producing scooters, five manufacture motorcycles, six 
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are engaged in the manufacture of mopeds and two companies 
are manufacturing three-wheelers . Out of the 26 active 
manufacturers of automobile products, ten have come up in 
the post-liberalisation period. As a result, competitiveness 
within the industry has increased in the last eight years. 
2.5.2 Market Share 
A spate of foreign collaborations in the last decade, the 
introduction of newer types of vehicles produced by better 
technology and the prescribing of minimum economic scales of 
operations are some of the reasons which have increased the 
level of- competition within the industry. As a result, the 
market' share of various companies too have been undergoing 
rapid changes. Exhibit 2.13 shows the market share of major 
automobile companies. 
TELCO has the largest share of 73 per cent in the medium and 
heavy commercial vehicles category, followed by Ashok 
Leyland which holds 27 per cent of the market share. In the 
light commercial vehicle segment, TELCO leads with a market 
share of 46 per cent followed by Bajaj Tempo which has 26 
per cent of the LCV market share. Among the passenger car 
manufacturers, Maruti Udyog Ltd is a formidable market 
leader with a market share of 70 per cent. In case of jeeps, 
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd has a whooping 83 per cent of the 
market share. The only other jeep manufacturer besides M & M 
is Maruti Udyog Ltd which commands 17 per cent of the market 
share. With Scooter India Ltd ceasing production due to 
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accumulated losses, the three-wheeler segment too has just 
two manufacturers. Bajaj Auto Ltd has a formidable market 
share of 91 per cent while API accounts for the rest 9 per 
cent. 
Exhibit 2.13 : Market Share of Automobile Companies (1991-92) 
MANUFACTURER 
M & HCVs 
TELCO 
Ashok Leyland 
LCYs 
TELCO 
Bajaj Tempo 
Eicher Motors 
DCM Toyota 
Mahindra & Mah: 
Swaraj Mazda 
Others 
Caxa 
MARKET 
SHARE (%) 
73 
27 
46 
26 
8 
5 
Lndra 5 
4 
6 
MANUFACTURER MARKET 
SHARE (%) 
Jeeps 
Mahindra & Mahindra 
Maruti Udyog Ltd 
Scooters 
83 
17 
Bajaj Auto 64 
Maharashtra Scooters 13 
Kinetic Honda 12 
LML 11 
Maruti Udyog Ltd 70 
Premier Automobiles 20 
Hindustan Motors 10 
Three-Wheelecs 
Bajaj Auto 
API 
91 
9 
Motorcycles 
Hero Honda 
Bajaj Auto 
Escorts 
TVS-Su2uki 
Enfield India 
Mopeds 
Kinetic Engg 
TVS-Su2uki 
Majestic Auto 
Bajaj Auto 
Others 
31 
27 
27 
9 
6 
31 
33 
18 
9 
9 
Source : Automotive Industry of India. Facts & Figures. 
1991-92. Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, pp.3-4. 
Bajaj Auto has the largest market share (64 per cent) in the 
scooters category of two-wheelers segment followed by 
Maharashtra Scooters (13 per cent) and Kinetic Honda (12 per 
cent). The scenario related to market share in the 
motorcycle category is, however, different where Bajaj Auto 
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has a market share of just 27 per cent. The market leader is 
Hero Honda with a share of 31 per cent. The share of 
motorcycle produced by Japanese collaborations in the total 
motorcycle market is 94 per cent. TVS-Suzuki has 33 per cent 
of the mopeds market followed by Kinetic Engineering (31 per 
cent) and Majestic Auto (18 per cent). 
2.5.3 Export Market 
A major advantage of the automobile industry's growth is the 
fact that for the first time the country has been able to 
export cars not only to African, Australian and Asian 
markets but even to the rigidly quality - conscious 
European market. This success on the export front, however, 
has largely been confined to Maruti Udyog Ltd. Other 
exporters of automobile products include Mahindra & Mahindra 
(jeeps), TELCO (commercial vehicles), and Bajaj Auto 
(scooters and three-wheelers). The value of total automobile 
exports from India is placed at around Rs 619 crore . 
Exhibit 2.14 shows automobile exports since 1985-86. 
Exhibit 2.14 : Automobile Exports 
YEAR TOTAL EXPORTS (in Rs crore) 
1985-86 67 
1988-89 210 
1989-90 270 
1990-91 312 
1991-92 619 
Source : Automotive Industry of India. Facts & Figures. 
1991-92. Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, P.75. 
67 
Although, at present, exports constitute a small part of the 
market yet many manufacturers are trying to carve a niche 
for themselves as it is a highly significant area for 
potential growth. Since many countries are dependent on 
import of automobile products and the domestic market v?ill 
be saturated in future, many companies are taking steps to 
consolidate and increase the recent growth in exports. These 
include homologation of products exportable to major 
developed countries, further upgradation of manufacturing 
technology and productivity for achieving quality/price 
competitiveness, closer contact with overseas markets, and 
the induction of innovative product technology. During the 
pre-liberalisation period factors like obsolete technology, 
high product costs, lack of competition and a starved 
domestic market had hampered the automobile industry's 
export performance. 
At present, India exports . its vehicles to Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman, Poland, Qatar, Spain, Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, UAE, UK, Yugoslavia, Zambia, etc. 
and some other Asian and African countries. Exports to West 
European countries is a recent phenomenon. MUL has entered 
the French market quite strategically as the country is 
considered to be the gateway to European Community. 
2.5.4 )in^or Suppliera 
The automobile component industry is an integral part of the 
main industry and the fortunes of the two are closely 
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interlinked'*'^. An average automobile is constituted of near 
about 14,000 parts, the total body being divided into a 
number of systems and sub-systems . Suppliers of automobile 
components considerably influence the industry as it is 
critically dependent on the auto parts suppliers. To meet 
the demand for the growing vehicle industry, a number of new 
projects with foreign technical collaborations have come up 
in the component industry. This is in addition to the steps 
taken by manufacturers to upgrade technology either through 
in-house research and development, or through technical 
45 
collaborations for specific products . 
The component manufacturers have improved the quality of 
products and process control equipments because unless the 
components supplied match specifications in all respects, 
they are not accepted by automobile producers . Earlier, 
Indian auto ancillary sector had only outdated production 
technology and unreliable product quality. However, the last 
few years have witnessed quite a number of joint ventures 
for the production of various components and accessories. 
Government policy also gave a fillip to the growth of auto 
ancillaries sector. Stipulation of a minimum indigenous 
content at the commencement of production, and fixation of 
rate and period of indigenisation helped in the development 
of component sector. Another major step was broad banding of 
component industry enabling the existing manufacturers to 
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extend the product range and benefit from the optimum use of 
resources and economies of scale . The automotive component 
industry was delicensed in 1985. 
Presently, there are more than 250 units in the organised 
sector and over 5,000 units in the small scale sector. The 
current turnover by the automobile component units in the 
organised sector is Rs 2568 crore . In 1981-82, there were 
about 50 units in operation in the organised sector with 
4Q production worth Rs 18 crore . Thus, alongside of the 
growth in the manufacture of vehicles, the component 
industry has not only grown in size but has also acquired 
the expertise and capability to produce a majority of the 
components required by the vehicle manufacturers. Exhibit 
2.15 shows the value of production by the automobile 
component industry. 
The development of an indigenous automobile component 
industry is very significant as in its absence the 
automobile industry would not be able to resist price 
increase in the end-product. A quality automobile component 
industry would also help in bringing down the country's 
import bill and earn foreign exchange. At present, India 
exports automobile components worth Rs 380 crore^. 
Besides the immense contribution of the vendors to the 
automobile industry, there exists a darker side too. 
Spurious and sub-standard automobile spares, which dominate 
the replacement market pose a serious threat to original 
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equipment manufacturers (OEMs). The replacement market 
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accounts for one-third of the OEMs turnover . Spurious 
parts, which are either reconditioned, scrapped or rejected 
genuine parts, or duplicates, thrive in the replacement 
market because of their low price and easy availability to 
consumers, while at the same time they ensure the dealers a 
higher profit margin, better credit facilities and 
uninterrupted supplies. 
Exhibit 2.15: Production Value of Auto Components 
Year Value 
(Rs 
133 
252 
532 
975 
945 
crore) 
Year 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
Value 
(Rs crore) 
1970-71 
1975-78 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1988-87 
Source : 
1180 
1543 
1790 
2156 
2568 
Adapted from Automotive Industry of India. Facts & 
Fixtures. 1991-92. Automotive Component Manufac-
turers Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, 
P.27. 
2.5.5 Major Buyers 
The large scale buyers of automobile products -- especially 
all types of commercial vehicles -- are state road transport 
undertakings (SRTUs) which own a fleet of over one lakh 
buses , private transport companies, fleet operators, 
defence, airways, large public and private sector companies. 
Institutional buyers are primarily organised in the form of 
dealers, and buses and truck operators' associations. 
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However, there is absence of any buyers' association at the 
national level. Interestingly, despite stiff competition in 
the automobile industry, buyers have no power to exert 
influence on the price of automobile products. 
Not in the too distant past, only the heavy and medium 
commercial vehicles found institutional buyers. But as of 
now, even passenger cars are bought by defence, government 
ministries, multinational companies, and other public and 
private sector enterprises. Jeeps have always been sold to 
the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and the 
forest departments. Three-wheelers too find institutional 
buyers but their number is considerably less. After the 
introduction of LCVs in 1985, many buyers of medium 
commercial vehicles are switching over to LCVs. Since LCVs 
are available in different pay-load capacities -- ranging 
from 2 to 6 tonne pay-load -- it is more convenient and fuel 
efficient. 
However, with the advent of pick-up vans, the LCV 
manufacturers are bound to face stiff competition. Pick-up 
vans are capable of multi-faceted operations, doubling as 
carriers of goods as well as personal transport vehicles. 
Moreover, the fast growing services — from courier to 
repairment — find them more useful and convenient than 
heavier and conventional commercial vehicles. It can even be 
used as substitutes for the jeep, especially in the rural 
markets^"^ . 
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Among the two-wheelers, it is Enfield India whose 
motorcycles are sold to defence and other armed forces 
because of their sturdiness, adaptability to different road 
conditions, and greater horse power. Of late, the two-
wheeler segment has been witnessing changing buyer 
preferences. In the period immediately following 
Government's liberalisation policy, the preference for 
motorcycles produced by Japanese collaborations were on the 
rise, and scooters accounted for just 37 per cent of two-
wheeler sales compared to 30 per cent of motorcycles. 
However, the preferences ' of buyers are reverting to 
scooters. Motorcycles now account for 26 per cent of the 
sales while scooters are accounting for 50 per cent. The 
market segment for mopeds is also shrinking. In 1987-88 
mopeds accounted for 35.6 per cent of total two-wheeler 
sales which has now come down to 24 per cent. 
2.6 RESOURCE USAGE 
The Indian automobile industry -- which is a material-
intensive industry -- has perennially suffered due to lack 
of raw materials despite the availability of cheap labour-. 
Moreover, since the announcement of liberalised policies in 
1985, the industry has also witnessed fragmentation of 
capacity due to the presence of several manufacturers which 
have capacities far too small for any meaningful scale of 
economies. 
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Lack of long-term planning with regard to the industry and 
provision of a protective cover to it off-set competition 
among the automobile manufacturers in the initial decades. 
With excise duties on final products and customs duty on 
imported components fluctuating almost every year, the 
Government policy towards the Indian automobile industry 
seems to be that of devising variations on a central theme. 
The growth of trade unionism in India, too, has had its 
impact on the industry. It is worth mentioning here that 
the first "bandh" organised in the country was in support of 
the workers' demand of Premier Automobiles Ltd in 1954. 
2.6.1 Raw Materials 
Automobile manufacturing is a material-intensive process. A 
number of raw materials are used by the industry, the supply 
of which exerts considerable influence on production. Thus, 
materials management is an important managerial task in the 
automobile industry. 
The primary raw materials used by the automobile industry 
are: steel, aluminium, lead coated sheets, aluminium 
forgings, cold-rolled coils and sheets, etc. Modern 
automotive applications, especially for fuel-efficient 
vehicles, increasingly use raw materials like alloy and 
higher grade steels, aluminium grades, engineered plastics. 
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and rubber components. Most of these materials are imported 
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as these are not indigenously available . 
Hon-availability of cold-rolled (CR) coils and sheets 
threatens the production schedule of automobile 
manufacturers as these are imported and industry is heavily 
dependent on them. Moreover, there is a severe shortage of 
CR coils and sheets in the world market because of heavy 
demand by other major automobile manufacturing countries. 
Deliveries of these coils are usually made only six to nine 
months after the orders are placed . Similarly, the Indian 
steel makers do not supply extra deep draw (EDD) quality 
steel sheets, lead coated sheets used in petrol tanks, and 
aluminium forgings. 
» 
Most of the advanced raw materials such as engineered 
plastics, sine alloys and other non-ferrous metals are 
imported through canalising agencies like MMTC and STC 
through a long and tedious process. Moreover, there are wide 
variations in the prices of raw materials in the 
international market. Further, the quality of components and 
equipments is not consistent as the quality of basic inputs 
is inconsistent in the world market. The cost of imports 
C O 
fluctuate with changes in import duties . 
While the industry is improving production and sales in the 
domestic and overseas markets, the manufacturing costs have 
been increasing steadily on account of dearer inputs and 
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upwards adjustments in the prices of aluminium and steel , 
as also of coal, nickel, and automotive tyres. A comparative 
analysis of select steel prices reveals that the 
differential between domestic and international prices 
ranges upto 126 per cent to the disadvantage of the domestic 
C O 
economy . Prices of steel and aluminium have risen to more 
than 40 per cent in the past few years . Even the 
specialised paints used by the automobile sector has 
recorded a steep rise in prices. There are also obstacles 
like the non-availability of power and other inputs at 
fin 
reasonable cost for the industry to remain competitive . As 
a result, the automobile industry is facing a constant 
fi 1 
threat of declining profitability . 
In view of the rising operational costs, the margin of 
manoeuvre before the automobile producers has narrowed down. 
Many are improving the norms of production by optimising the 
consumption of raw materials. As it is, the wastage of raw 
materials in the production process, is rather high -- in 
some cases as high as 30 to 40 per cent . 
2.6.2 Cost St.ructnre 
Raw material costs constitute about 50 to 60 per cent of the 
total manufactured price of a vehicle, though in some 
cases it is 65 per cent or even more. Therefore, the 
industry needs advanced raw materials at low cost to combat 
the ever increasing competition. Contrarily, there is a 
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marked rise in manufacturing cost of automobile products due 
to the sharp appreciation of the Japanese currency Yen and 
slow progress of indigenisation "*. Coupled with inflated 
cost of imports, the industry is facing losses, mounting 
debts and declining profitability. In 1991-92, increases in 
the administered prices of steel, aluminium, other alloys, 
power, fuel, etc. led to high costs of indigenous inputs. On 
the other hand, import compression measures combined with 
continuous depreciation of the rupee hiked the cost of 
imported components which in the case of LCVs 
is as high as 45 to 50 per cent. 
Taxes and duties constitute as much as 70 
ft c 
the price of a vehicle . And with Government policy with 
regard to excise and customs duties changing almost every 
year, the manufacturers have linked the prices of vehicles 
with evey budget. The high rates of customs and excise 
duties have led to price escalations all round, and 
utimately it is the buyer to whom the additional burden is 
passed on. 
However, the presently recession-hit automobile industry 
heaved a sigh of relief when excise duty was cut in the 
1993-94 Union Budget. Excise duty on passenger cars has been 
brought down to 40 per cent as against the earlier duty of 
RR 55 per cent . Similarly, excise duty on buses, trucks and 
three-wheelers has also been lowered from 23 per cent to 15 
77 
per cent. This benefit is also applicable to diesel LCVs as 
well . Due to falling volume of sales in the recent past, 
almost the entire excise relief has been passed on to the 
consumers by most manufacturers. As a result, prices of 
automobile products have come down. 
Otherwise also. Government policy have had a direct impact 
on the cost structure of the industry in the past. For 
instance, in the Finance Act 1989, the Government changed 
the structure of excise duty applicable to different types 
of vehicles. This duty, ranging from 15 to 25 per cent, was 
applied on the basis of cubic capacity of the engine. In 
addition to this, a special excise duty of 5 per cent was 
also levied. Such a duty structure meant a substantial 
increase in consumer prices -- especially for vehicles above 
Rfl 2000 cc . Cumulatively, at times, there is as much as 198 
69 per cent duty on imports . Labour costs, however, is barely 
10-15 per cent of the price of a vehicle. In case of a 
passenger car, labour cost is just 2 per cent of its cost . 
Despite all such constraints, the growth in production of 
automobiles has rems-ined unhampered except for the recent 
recession in the industry. However, due to the high 
incidence of customs and excise duties, and the heavy 
depreciation charges on the manufacturing facilities, the 
profitability of companies is not as high as one would 
expect from its impressive turnover. 
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2.6.3 Econonies of Scale 
The earnings of Indian car makers under the controlled price 
regime and low licensed capacity of the past three decades 
were so poor that they could hardly meet the investment 
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needs of development from internal resources •^. The 
experience of the early 1930s showed clearly the benefits 
that large volume production could bring for the consumer in 
T? terms of low cost and product reliability . 
To counter the uneconomic scale of operation, the scheme of 
Minimum Economic Scale (MES) of operations was introduced in 
1986-87 to enable industrial undertakings to expand their 
installed capacities to economically viable scales of 
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operations . Earlier, the scheme of re-endorsement of 
licensed capacity was announced in January, 1986 in order to 
encourage fuller utilisation of capacity and maximisation of 
production . The minimum licensed capacity per annum for 
different categories of vehicles is shown in Exhibit 2.16. 
Exhibit 2.16 : Minimum Economic Scale of Operations 
(in '000 nos) 
TYPE OF VEHICLE MINIMUM LICENSED CAPACITY PER ANNUM 
Passenger Cars 50 (30 for cars above 2,000 cc) 
Two-wheelers 200 (500 for units expected to export) 
Commercial Vehicles 25 
Source : AmiiiaJ Report 1990-91 . Department of Industrial 
Development. Ministry of Industry, Government of 
India, New Delhi, 1991, P.151. 
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Uneconomic scales of operation no longer apply to many 
segments of the Indian automobile industry. Economies of 
scale have been made possible by the burgeoning domestic 
market, especially in the case of two and three-wheelers, 
jeeps and commercial vehicles. 
However, with liberalisation of policy for foreign 
technology induction and production, there was over-
licensing of capacity and many new units invested heavily in 
the creation of new facilities. These developments led to 
underutilisation of capacity as the licensed and installed 
capacity exceeded the growing demand -- in some segments to 
the extent of 100 per cent"^. 
Exhibit 2.17 : Registered and Installed Capacity Variations 
(1991-92) 
CATEGORY UNITS REGISTERED 
CAPACITY 
INSTALLED 
CAPACITY 
% LESS THAN 
REGIS.CAP. 
CVs 
Cars 
Two-
Wheelers 
TOTAL 
Source : 
13 
5 
24 
42 
Adaptec 
Indust] 
3,13,000 
2,30,000 
50,00,000 
55,43,000 
i from Anim. 
rial Devel 
al 
2,64,500 
2,16,000 
32,00,000 
36,80,500 
Report 1991-
opment. Minist 
•d?,. 
;ry 
15.5 
6.1 
36.0 
33.8 
Department of 
of Industry, 
Government of India, New Delhi, 1992, P.149. 
It is evinced from the exhibit that installed capacity is 
far less than the registered capacity. Most of the 
manufacturers are using about 60 per cent of their capacity. 
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They have not been able to implement the subsequent phases 
of expansion because of delay in implementing the 
indigenisation programme, rising cost of components and, 
more recently, due to inadequate growth in demand. 
Government's earlier policy to locate new units in backward 
areas also thwarted potential economies of scale. 
2.6.4 T.fihonr and Ind»f?tri»l Relations 
The automobile industry is a significant generator of 
employment. At present, it employs about 2,50,000 persons in 
the vehicle and component sectors. The automobile sector 
directly accounts for 3.5 per cent of manpower engaged in 
manufacturing activities'". In India, the automobile 
industry directly employs 0.01 per cent of the total 
77 population as against 6 per cent in Japan . The labour 
costs too are lower in India. However, with increasing 
competition, India's advantage on account of cheap labour 
7fl has more or less been wiped out . 
Automotive sector is a key element of engineering industry, 
and there is an unending supply of skilled engineering 
labour. Therefore, a resurgent auto industry in India has 
provided an impetus to a very wide range of economic 
activity. The production of a single car under Indian 
conditions results in over three jobs being created (both 
directly and indirectly), and an additional five jobs are 
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created in the operation and maintenance of each vehicle 
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Employment apart, the spread of an automobile revolution 
after 1985 has also transferred industrial skills into less 
developed and remote areas and hence accelerated the 
overall qualitative development of the nation's manpower 
base. 
Out of the total workforce of 250 million, only 40 million 
of these workers are in the organised sector. And only 30 
per cent of the workforce in the organised sector is 
unionised. Even the industrial relations within the 
automobile industry has not been very cordial. The disturbed 
industrial relations has been mainly due to technology 
upgradation and increased automation which has either 
increased the workload on workers or has rendered them 
jobless with closure of some units that could not compete in 
the market place despite modernisation. Moreover, the 
manufacturers have done little with respect to creation of 
alternative jobs, retraining, and redeployment. The science 
of ergonomics -- which revolves around the principle of 
changing jobs to suit the convenience of human beings -- has 
not been applied in the automobile industry. As a result, 
many prominent companies were hit by labour strife. 
During recession in 1991-92, many companies retrenched their 
casual workers. In some companies, like Haruti Udyog Ltd, 
employees have been carrying lesser pay packets as the drop 
fin in production has hit productivity-linked salary schemes . 
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2.7 HQDERWTSATIQH AND UPGRADATTOR OF TECHHOLnflY 
The spate of foreign collaborations have somewhat bridged 
the massive technology gap that divides Indian vehicles from 
their international counterparts. Outdated design and 
manufacturing processes are being replaced by more modern 
ones. The primitive technology of ancillaries and units 
supplying raw materials and consumables (which includes 
engine oil, grease, paint, solder, connecting wire, etc.) is 
also changing. 
2.7.1 Improvements in Product Technology 
The automobile industry is predominantly a borrower of new 
technology developed elsewhere. These technologies are 
developed in other industries for applications hardly 
connected to automobiles. However, there has been 
considerable improvement in the product technology of 
vehicles since the announcement of liberalisation policies. 
Product technology can be decomposed into certain clearly 
identifiable sub-sections -- the power unit, transmission 
mechanism, brakes, suspension, windshield wiping, etc. 
With the introduction of new generation vehicles and 
indigenisation programmes, the product technology has been 
an 
upgraded . A host of overseas companies have transferred 
assistance to units engaged in the manufacturing of sub-
systems. Considerable advances have been made in the areas 
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of carburettors, ignition systems, pneumatic suspensions, 
magnetos, etc'. Similarly, with the influx of foreign 
technology, quality of other components such as contact 
breakers, ignition coils, horns, bulbs, etc. have now come 
upto international standards. 
In the area of finishing technology such as plastics, 
paints, rubber products, etc., Indian products compare 
favourably with manufacturers the world over. Electroplating 
technology is now virtually outdated. Besides, the industry 
now uses the more corrosion-resistant cathodic painting. 
Plastic suppliers, too, have improved their methods of 
reaction injection moulding to the stage where plastic 
panels for some limited applications in automobile industry 
are now possible at competitive cost. 
2.7.2 Upgradation of Design Technolofiv 
Sleeker streamlined bodies, lighter but powerful engines, 
fuel-efficiency and aerodynamics of the vehicles, etc. have 
witnessed an upgradation in their standards during the past 
few years. Primarily, design technology is supposed to 
coordinate these systems, and the prod-act technology, to 
work together harmoniously. 
Considerable breakthrough has been made in the use of high 
strength low-weight materials for various components. Since 
the fuel consumption of the vehicles depend on the weight it 
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carries, reducing the weight to the maximum extent possible 
is most advantageous. As a result, steel is being replaced 
by polymer-based products. But Indian automobile 
manufacturers are still using sheet metal instead of 
plastics used by leading manufacturers all over the world. 
However, in India, vehicles need to have a longer life than 
required overseas, and therefore an across-the-board 
replacement of sheet metal parts has not been very 
successful. Consequently, emphasis is being carried out on 
the 'optimisation of components'. Besides, certain design 
modifications in components are also being undertaken in 
order to bring down the price of the vehicles. 
With petrol becoming costlier, manufacturers are unable to 
ignore fuel-efficiency of the vehicles. Efforts have been 
made with regard to design improvements and an engine which 
can use a cheaper fuel -- namely diesel. The greatest 
advantage of diesel engine is that it uses less fuel than 
the petrol engine when the same power and torque output is 
applied. Besides, the financial saving that can be gained 
through lower fuel consumption, the substantial price 
difference between petrol and diesel is the additional gain. 
The Government of India, with funds from UNDP and the R & D 
cess of the Indian automobile industry, has set up a 
separate Engines Laboratory at the Automotive Research 
Association of India (ARAI), Pune, for diesel engine 
development . 
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There has also been tremendous improvement in fuel-
efficiency of vehicles with petrol engines. The nev? 
vehicles, while delivering more power, use lesser fuel. It 
is estimated that a weight reduction to the extent of 10 per 
cent would reduce fuel consumption to the extent of 5 per 
cent. Moreover, the industry is now developed enough to 
replace two-stroke engines by four-stroke ones as they save 
15 to 25 per cent on fuel. Some sections of the industry are 
also trying to develop alcohol gasohol based engines to cope 
with the increased outflow of foreign exchange in fuel 
import . Already, the use of compressed natural gas (CNG) 
has been introduced recently. Moreover, the aerodynanics of 
the vehicle are being improved to reduce wind resistance at 
higher speeds as air resistance also has a direct relevance 
to fuel consumption. 
2.7.3 Modernisation of Prodnotion Teohnologv 
The quality, cost and competitiveness of automobile product 
depends on as much as production technology as on product 
technology. Manufacturing or production technology has 
always been the mainstay of automobile technology ever since 
it became a mass production item from the earlier custom-
built product. Cost-reduction technological advances are 
mostly achieved through new production technology . 
Automatic and CNC (computerised numerically controlled) 
machines are replacing the older ones in automobile plants 
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to improve quality, productivity and output per man. 
Therefore, automation and flexible machines are becoming the 
order of the day. And efforts are being made to eliminate 
non-value added systems of operations. 
Since automobile industry is an user industry of machine 
tools industry, the demand for machine tools is shifting 
from traditional general purpose machines to specific, high 
technology ones. For accelerated automation, the machine 
tools user industries -- especially the automotive industry 
-- are importing machine tools to meet their requirements of 
high precision and advanced technology machines. The 
imported machines include tool room machines with 
sophisticated technology, and NC (numerically controlled) 
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and CNC machines . Moreover, the introduction of "flexible 
manufacturing" has enabled assembly work to be more 
economical. 
The Influx of foreign technologies in the automotive sector 
has enabled the forging industry to induct necessary forging 
technology so as to meet the requirements of closer 
tolerance forgings. The benefits of technology upgradation 
in forging industry has resulted in improvement in quality 
and productivity, saving of scarce raw materials and input 
B8 
energy . However, the area of tooling and testing has been 
a contentious one for the automobile industry. High costs 
deter the Government from establishing a public facility 
while industry, on its part, shied-away because of fear of 
controls and lack of confidentiality . 
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2.7.4 Research and Development. (R & D> 
The Indian automobile industry is still in its infancy in 
the area of research and development (R & D). The R & D so 
far carried out by most manufacturers has only been in the 
areas of tooling, testing, and product development. The 
industry has yet not developed the ability to design a 
vehicle which meets international standards, except for the 
Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company (TELCO) which has 
indigenously designed and is producing cars. Even available 
R & D institutions like ARM are not exploited to their full 
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capabilities by auto manufacturers . 
The Indian automobile industry's total in-house R & D 
expenditure is about Rs 135 crore. Even after making 
allowances for much lower wage levels in India, the R & D 
expenditure of leading automobile manufacturing countries 
are over 75 to 100 times that of India . 
However, there exists a formidable R & D centre for use of 
the automobile manufacturers. The Automobile Research 
Association of India, established in 1966, is a non-
commercial cooperative industrial research organisation set 
up by the Indian automobile industry in association with 
Government of India. It provides services to the Indian 
automobile manufacturers in the field of research in 
automotive engineering, design, development and evaluation 
of vehicles, engines, equipments, and ancillary items; and 
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standardisation and technical information. At present, the 
efforts of the industry are directed towards vehicular 
emission control, design and engine development. 
2.8 PRESENT SCEHARIO AHD FUTURE PROSPECTS 
The process of liberalisation has unshackled the Indian 
automobile industry. Manufacturing of vehicles had been 
delicensed, though production of the vitally important 
passenger cars continued to be as tightly regulated as 
before. Finally, on April 15, 1993 the passenger car segment 
was delicensed. When the Government had removed LCV 
production from the purview of licensing, it was ridiculous 
continuing with the licensing system for manufacture of cars 
as broad banding of items were permitted in the automobile 
industry. Removal of passenger cars from the licensing list 
would help newcomers in entering the market. Already some 
overseas automobile manufacturers have shown an interest in 
producing cars for exports because of the availability of 
cheap labour, and well-developed vendors for sourcing their 
or? 
component supplies, in the country . 
Taking the automobile industry as a whole, it is expected 
that at least in the short run auto companies will not 
perform too well. A number of factors, since mid-1990 have 
adversely affected the industry with some of its segments 
taking most of the brunt. The growth of the industry 
suffered a set-back firstly due to the Gulf crisis of August 
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1990 and to some degree due to the impact of fiscal and 
monetary constraints placed by Government in trying to 
balance the Indian economy. Curbs on imports, devaluation, 
restrictive and costlier credit policy etc. have all 
contributed to this slow-down. The effect on different 
segments and companies has varied depending on the extent to 
which they were dependent on these factors. The situation 
was compounded following disturbances due to political and 
religious factors. 
Accustomed to a highly-protective regime, the current 
strengths and weaknesses of the automobile industry are a 
direct result of past Government policies . A 'partial 
liberalisation' in the licensing policy led to the entry of 
45 two-wheeler companies. The intense competition that 
resulted led to the closure of many units. Now barely ten 
companies and groups are active in this segment. And four 
companies among these active players -- Enfield India, 
Kelvinator India, Gujarat Narmada and Ideal Jawa — may not 
remain in business for too long. Nonetheless, by the mid-
1990s, India may become the largest two-wheeler manufacturer 
in the world. This segment is also expected to show the 
biggest export-led growth. 
An unexplored niche that may come up in future is that of 
the 'miniped' -- or moped with engines less than 3.5 cc. 
These 'motorised bicycles' do not come within the purview of 
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the Motor Vehicles Act and therefore do not need a driving 
licence. As these are cheaper and more fuel-efficient, they 
can gain acceptance among school-going youngsters, the 
elderly and the low-income group who want to graduate beyond 
a bicycle but cannot afford a moped. Enfield India has 
already launched its 24 cc Mofa in this emerging segment. 
In the higher engine capacity in two-wheeler segment, there 
is hardly any scope for creation of new products. At best, 
the engine capacity of motorcycles may go upto 200-225 cc. 
However, there is a possibility of upgradation of technology 
and wider model choices. Besides, the diminishing attraction 
for mopeds may lead to newer types of mopeds and other 
alternatives such as scooterettes. Qualitative and 
technological product upgradation may see the emergence of 
mini-motorcycle segment in the coming years. Moreover, the 
two-wheeler segment is expected to witness some realignment 
of forces, strategic alliances and friendly-takeovers. As 
regards motorcycles, economy and performance of the vehicles 
will gain importance in the near future. A new segment that 
has the potential to emerge is that of electric vehicles 
especially mopeds and scooters -- with electric starters as 
standard features. 
The optimism for new and advanced products is, however, 
restricted by the fact that per capita purchasing power is 
still limited although about one-third of the" country's 
population is the burgeoning middle-class. Therefore, easier 
91 
credit facilities would enhance demand for, and growth of, 
passenger vehicles. 
As past experience of the industry has shown, to what extent 
the introduction of newer concepts for passenger vehicles 
would galvanise overall demand is doubtful. However, an 
appropriate rural vehicle or a 'tractor car', or an all-
terrain vehicle (ATV), or an inexpensive three-wheeler for 
personal transport, or any other non-derivative but original 
vehicle may open up new niches . This, of course, requires 
innovativeness, entrepreneurship, and design and 
developmental capabilities. 
The policies of the Indian Government certainly did not 
favour vehicle manufacturers in the formative years. While 
automotive technology worldwide achieved newer heights, 
Indian automobile technology remained stagnant. The lack of 
any real competitive threat gave local manufacturers, 
particularly of passenger cars, little incentive to improve 
production techniques or even engage in active technology 
absorption. The eighties proved to be a watershed in the 
Indian automobile industry and saw a marked change in the 
Government's stance. This came with a growing realisation of 
the strategic importance of the automobile industry. And in 
early 1985, one of the late Rajiv Gandhi's first move 
towards liberalisation was to broad band the four-wheeler 
segment for existing car and truck manufacturers to 
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manufacture any four-wheeler without fresh licensing. As 
indigenous capabilities were limited, most manufacturers 
needed a foreign collaboration to be able to make any new 
kind of vehicle. Thereafter, the industry was injected with 
new technology as never before. 
With the spurt in competition brought about by 
liberalisation, Indian vehicle manufacturers have been 
forced into improving their products. Unfortunately, our 
indigenous R & D capabilities are still obsolete. Except 
for undertaking minor modifications to existing models born 
out of foreign collaborations, Indian manufacturers, except 
TELCO, are still incapable of designing a new vehicle. 
The technological status of the Indian automobile industry 
is far behind international standards. R & D, vital for 
technological self-sufficiency is still being neglected. 
Indian manufacturers, on an average, allocate less than 1 
per cent of their turnover to R & D as against 3 to 6 per 
Q C 
cent in the case of leading international manufacturers . 
The recent changes announced, and directions set by the new 
industrial policy, will in future affect the way automobile 
manufacturers conduct their business. These policies have 
far-reaching implications and there are several dimensions 
that manufacturers will have to address to remain 
competitive and viable. Already many companies have started 
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finding ways and means of cost control -- something unheard 
of till recently. Many manufacturers now talk of 
organisational restructuring to cut cost while others have 
introduced voluntary retirement schemes (VRS) for their 
employees, and reduced workforce strength. Besides, 
technology, quality, marketing and customer service have 
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assumed much greater significance 
The accent on technology will simultaneously bring about an 
awareness for increased levels of quality. The industry will 
have to direct its efforts in a manner that the philosophy 
of Total Quality Management (TQM) is embedded in every 
aspect of its business operations. It is believed that this 
decade will ensure technology, marketing and customer 
service as being of prime managerial concern in the country. 
Technological innovation and investment in modernisation of 
processes will result in more fuel-efficient and 
environment-friendly vehicles. In short, the Indian 
automobile industry will have to match international 
standards in the long term. 
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METHnnnT.oflY OF RESEARCH 
The various aspects related to the methodology of research 
for the purposes of the present study are discussed in this 
chapter. In order to justify the need for research, the 
chapter begins with a review of contemporary literature. 
Later, research problem has been stated, the scope of study 
defined, and operational definitions have been highlighted. 
The formulation of research propositions, research design, 
sample design, methods of data collection and their 
accompanying problems are stated next. Finally, the pattern 
adopted for qualitative analysis and interpretation, and the 
limitations of the present study have been outlined. 
3.1 REVTEW OF LITERATURE 
The growth and development of Indian business and industry 
have always been characterised by the Governmental policy of 
'managing by controls'. The adoption of the concept of 
'socialistic pattern of society' was considered as a 
desirable strategy for the development of an egalitarian 
society which in turn led to an increase of controls on the 
industrial sector. It was, however, realised that the 
plethora of controls and regulations were not only an 
obstacle in achieving the envisaged goals but also proved 
counter-productive in many cases. Consequently, the 
Government introduced infinitesimally small changes in the 
control mechanism between 1975 and 1984. The strategic 
responses of business and industry, however, failed to 
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elicit the performance that was expected of them. Indian 
industries maintained a status quo also probably due to the 
initial hesitancy on the part of the Government and the lack 
of political will. 
However, the 'inward-looking' economy witnessed visible 
changes in industrial regulations when the process of 
liberalisation was initiated in January, 1985. The changes 
that were introduced led to a polemical debate on the merits 
and demerits of loosening the controls. The liberalisation 
process later slowed down due to numerous reasons. 
The coming to power of the Narasimha Rao Government in June 
1991 brought with it extensive changes in the industrial 
regulations. The Government's Statement on Industrial Policy 
altered the industrial scenario in India. The new policy 
consisted of several fundamental departures from the past. 
However, the changes were caught between the proponents and 
detractors of liberalisation process which is clear from the 
series of articles and studies that have appeared 
thereafter. 
In order to identify the research gaps, the researcher 
conducted a review of existing literature in the subject. 
The review was not confined only to subjects like business 
management/administration or economics, but also extended to 
the disciplines of commerce and public administration. The 
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various aspects covered in the review includes the 
industrial liberalisation policy and its accompanying 
issues. In presenting the review of literature, a 
chronological order as been followed except few deviations. 
From a preliminary survey of literature, it seems that it is 
the liberalisation of industrial policy that has attracted 
the maximum number of people towards it which cut across 
professional boundaries and includes economists, managers, 
industrialists, academics, policy makers, sociologists, 
politicians, journalists, and several others. 
K. V. Iyer has explained the liberalisation measures 
undertaken during 1973-80 but his discussion lacks any in-
depth analysis. The same task has been done more 
exhaustively by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy 
9 
(CMIE) . In its review of the liberalisation process, CMIE 
has given details regarding the evolution of industrial 
policy and the changes brought about till 1985. Later, in 
1990, CMIE came out with another issue on the same pattern 
which is, however, an updated version of its previous work. 
Isher J. Ahluwalia has analysed industrial growth in 
independent India and has suggested measures to renove the 
anamolies in industrial development policy. Pradip Bose is 
of the view that the Government should proceed for 
'selective liberalisation' as there stil exists disparities 
among India's populace. According to Prabhat Patnaik , the 
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growth strategy being pursued by the Government does not 
promise any great achievements, apart from its other 
economic, social and political consequences, Yoginder K. 
Alagh proposes the adoption of vigorous policies in order 
to bring about a structural transformation of the economy. 
On the other hand, H. K. Paranjape is critical of the 
Government's liberalisation policy and contends that the 
changes would not mean much if the MRTP Act is not suitably 
Q 
amended. Sharad M. Marathe advocates the abolition of all 
controls and proposes the enunciation of a coherent policy 
in this regard. 
Amiya Kumar Bagchi is suspicious about the success of 
restructuring the industrial policy while elaborating on the 
major policies of the Government. Contrarily, S. S. 
Nadkarni enumerates the policy changes brought about by 
the Government and shows optimism about their success. 
The specific point that Praful Bidwai sets out to prove is 
that the "policy orientation has failed to deliver growth it 
had promised", and that nowhere is this failure more glaring 
than in the area of "Indian industry [which] remains trapped 
in a low-growth orbit". While Fredie A. Mehta is of the 
view that the response of Indian industry to the policies of 
liberalisation has been so overwhelming that, in industry 
after industry, there has been so much extra investment, 
over-crowding, and excess capacity as to cause severe demand 
recession. 
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H. K. Paranjape , in another article, emphasises that the 
economy needs liberalisation from the vice-like grip of 
parasitic 'rent seeking behaviour' of the politicians and 
bureaucrats. The author takes a retrospective look at the 
development of economic policy, in particular industrial 
licensing and monopolies legislation, and practices over the 
last two decades. 
1 'i 
In a case study, Padmmi Swaminathan emphasises that 
liberalisation of import of technology has enabled the TVS 
group of companies to dominate the market for automotive 
ancillaries and components; liberalisation of licensing 
policy has enabled the Group to expand its hold over the 
market; and liberal import of technology has substituted for 
local R & D. C. P. Chandrasekhar"^° has studied some major 
aspects of growth and structural change in Indian industry 
1 7 
over the last four decades. S.S.M. Desai has traced the 
history of industrial sector and enumerated the changes made 
1 ft in 1985 and thereafter. P. D. Malgavkar^° has made an 
attempt to analyse the prospects of industrial development 
by the turn of this century. 
1 ^  Arvind N. Das"^^ is critical of Indian industry for not being 
able to earn adequate foreign exchange and contends that 
liberalisation will start pinching Indian industry. While on 
on 
the other hand, Dileep Padgaonkar advocates the cause of 
liberalisation and suggests that its focus has to undergo a 
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change. K. S. Ramachandran is of the view that promotion 
of a competitive environment -- the ultimate goal of various 
liberalisation measures -- will remain elusive as long as 
there is no control over the wage bill of the manufacturing 
nn 
sector. C. T. Kurien , in his paper, seeks to arrive at 
some inferences about the manner in which the economy has 
been responding to the liberalisation measures and 
enumerates the shape of things to come. 
Ashok Guha's partial compilation of papers, presented at a 
seminar on liberalisation and its impact on the Indian 
economy, deals with a broad cross-section of the issues and 
the debate on liberalisation with considerable empirical 
analysis of liberalisation of international trade and 
capital movements. A study conducted by B.S. Goldar and V.S. 
Ranganathan for National Institute of Public Finance and 
Policy (NIPFP) found no evidence of accelerated growth in 
sub-sectors of industry where licensing restrictions had 
been relaxed. M. S. Patwardhan is of the view that higher 
industrial productivity and competitiveness require a 
package of economic reforms and goes on to emphasise that 
"ideally there should be no industrial licensing at all". 
Ajit Mozoomdar'^", while criticising liberalisation, is of 
the view that the net impact of liberalisation was negative. 
M.H. Panini says that given the social infrastructure of 
the economy and the political state in the country. 
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liberalisation cannot be affected overnight. It is likely 
that efforts to liberalise the economy will result in 
unanticipated social and political tensions. Amit Mitra 
argues that the Green Revolution was successful because it 
was private and Government only provided infrastructure, 
know-how, and market information. He suggests that this 
approach could have been adopted in non-agricultural sector 
as well. J. Rao*^  , too, advocates a" non-interventionist 
state policy as in agriculture. 
on 
Isher J. Ahluwalia , while enumerating the development of 
liberalisation, points out that policy reforms have been 
conspicuous by their absence in two areas -- the exit policy 
for non-viable units and reforms of the public sector which 
is bogged down in a high-cost, low-quality trap. Vinay 
31 Bharat-Ram enumerates how quasi-commercial PSUs should 
shed equity to public. In an insightful analysis of the 
oo 
economic policy in the eighties, I.G. Patel states that 
although stability and social justice are important but they 
are inevitably linked with efficiency and growth. He 
proposes a safety net for the poor section of the society, 
33 Manjul Bajao advocates opening of the economy in a manner 
that can integrate India with the global economy. 
Vijay L. Kelkar proposes the creation of an 
internationally competitive industrial structure for future 
industrial growth strategy. A. Vaidyanathan^^ is of the view 
that there are serious systemic problems in the Indian 
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economy for which there is no single panacea such as 
liberalisation. Deena Khatkhate argues a case for 
substantially curtailing the domain of Planning Commission 
before liberalising the economy so as to remove the 
philosphical dualism. In a brief but argumentative article, 
37 Swaminathan S. Ankiesaria Aiyar^ draws a line between 
policies that eliminate the most inefficient firms in each 
industry and policies that eliminate entire industries. 
Pulin B. Nayak states that liberalisation is not geared to 
address the fundamental problems of the country. 
oa 
T.C.A. Srinivasa-Raghavan , while citing the examples of 
other liberalising economies, concludes that liberalisation 
works only as an exception and much depends on the phasing 
and sequencing. R. Srinivasan doubts the survival of small 
scale units in the wake of liberalisation. Shyam Malhotra 
points out that reforms can change the industry only when 
there is stability, infrastructure and assured returns. R. 
Ramachandran suggests for a close look at the type of 
Government-industry interface prevalent in Japan. He also 
suggests that India should learn from Japanese experience 
which regulated its programme of liberalisation. 
J.R.D. Tata traces the evolution of the liberalisation 
process and is of the view that the new policies carry great 
challenges, both moral and economic, and also some 
sacrifices for Indian industry itself. Ramkrishna Bsjaj 
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contends that the most important gain of liberalisation 
process is that it has been accepted in principle that it is 
the consumer and not Government which will henceforth 
regulate our economic acivity. T.T. Ram Mohan says that 
the new economic policy may reduce red tape but it may not 
automatically guarantee faster growth. According to Rajiv 
4R Desai , the process of liberalisation is bound to fail 
unless the role of Government is curbed. D.H. Pai 
Panandiker compares the pace of liberalisation process 
with other countries which have liberalised and advocates a 
faster pace for the process of liberalisation. 
4-R According to Ashok Guha , despite some substantive changes, 
4q 
the old policy regime remains intact. To Murad Ali Baig , 
the key to success of liberalisation is the rural sector. 
SO Fredie A. Mehta is of the view that the success of 
liberalisation process will involve transitional costs which 
51 the nation must be prepared to pay. C.P. Shah cautions 
that care should be taken to regulate the foreign banks 
which are making their presence felt due to the process of 
liberalisation. 
52 Gurcharan Das is of the view that reforms in industrial 
sector should not stop at the policy level and efforts 
should be made to remove red tape from the procedures of 
customs, excise, sales tax, electricity boards, etc. Rajesh 
Kalra argues that the large dose of liberalisation is not 
palliative enough as it comes in the form of "technical and 
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54 legal pills". According to S.D. Naik' , liberalisation has 
thrown up new challenges before Indian exporters and the 
success of reforms will depend to a great extent on our 
ability to meet these challenges. On the other hand, the 
liberalisation of the economy cannot be smooth and trouble-
free if it is loaded against the workers, says Balraj 
Mehta.^^ 
According to V.L. Rao , out of the two approaches towards 
liberalisation, the sequence and timing of the pattern of 
liberalisation is important than speed and breadth of 
57 liberalisation. Kamal Nayan Kabra says that the problem of 
India is its weak and inconsistent Government interventions. 
He cautions that the simultaneous introduction of 
stabilisation and liberalisation measures with a cosmetic 
human face will not lead us to the envisaged objectives. 
C O 
Pradip N. Khandwalla comments on the liberalisation 
process by stating that unless policy management improves, 
the new policies will also get discredited -- not because 
the policies are bad but because their implementation is 
poor. In a similar vein, Prem Shankar Jha says that 
liberalisation will remain a chimera so long as bureaucrats 
continue to arbitrate. T. Thomas highlights the various 
issues Indian business will face in a liberalised 
environment and predicts that there will be a shakedown 
through mergers and acquisitions. Sanjivan Sahni suggests 
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that the Government roust reduce its direct and indirect 
holdings in the private sector and interfere less, and 
should delegate power to professional managers at all levels 
to restructure and remedy sick units. 
Ravi Yirmani^ is of the view that human resource 
development will face enormous challenges in a liberalised 
India and predicts that human resource will be the backbone 
of organisational success in near future. According to Raghu 
Krishnamoorthy , the human resource scenario in India 
during the 1990s is going to face paradigm shifts. To Deena 
Khatkhate , Government regulatoy bodies hold the key to 
success of liberalisation. Hurad Ali Baig contends that 
for economic reform to succeed, the management and 
motivation of the workforce in industry and in Government 
will have to undergo a sea-change. In a brief article, Kanoj 
RR Pant ° discusses the political economy of liberalisation. 
3.2 RESEARCH GAPS 
The review of relevant literature makes it quite clear that 
no study has yet been conducted with the objective of 
assessing the impact of liberalisation on business policies 
of private sector companies. In fact, the process of 
industrial liberalisation has not received the attention of 
researchers. As a result, practically no research work has 
been undertaken with regard to liberalisation except for the 
study conducted by NIPFP and one case study that deals with 
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the impact of technology import on a particular business 
house. Therefore, all other literature deals with 
liberalisation in a generalised manner or are simply 
journalistic in nature. It is worth mentioning that out of 
more than 250 articles reviewed by the researcher, a 
majority of them are repititive and do not go beyond the 
confines of rhetoric. 
While identifying research gaps, the researcher also 
surveyed the bibliography of doctoral dissertations 
published by the Association of Indian Universities (AIU), 
social science research abstracts, ICSSR (Indian Council for 
Social Science Research) survey of research in management, 
and 'University News'. These pubications do not mention of 
any doctoral work either in progress or already submitted on 
the subject of the present study. Moreover, Government 
policies have been an area of concern to chief executives 
and general managers but the various dimensions of business 
environment have not been a focus of research. The present 
study may bridge this research gap. 
3.3 HEED FOR STUDY 
Indian companies have operated in a regulatory environment 
since the commencement of the plan era in the country. It 
was, however, realised that the regulatory policies and 
state control over business served no real purpose due to 
the presence of rigid licensing procedures, and control on 
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expansion and modernisation of enterprises. It was the Rajiv 
Gandhi-led Congress Government that brought some changes in 
the regulatory mechanism in January 1985. Such policy 
changes were largely due to the recommendations of a number 
of committees set up earlier and the growing realisation 
that while "some controls had become an antithesis to 
Governmental intervention, many others became self-defeating 
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and archival"" . 
Later, major industrial policy changes — described as 
liberalisation measures -- were introduced by the Harasimha 
Rao Government, with the aim of accelerating the pace of 
growth of the industrial sector. It has been more than eight 
years that the process of liberalisation has been in 
operation. Still, little research has been done on the 
impact of Government's policies on organisations' policies 
and performance. It is, therefore, an opportune time to 
study the impact of liberalisation on business policies of 
companies. Besides, research on the relationship between 
national policy and corporate policies, and also between 
corporate policy and functional policies would provide 
insights into the policy-making process and identify 
RR 
variables which are relevant in the Indian context . 
Business Policy focusses on chief executives and general 
managers, and how they shape the objectives and policies of 
organisations and achieve their distinctiveness, efficiency 
and effectiveness through uncertain and changing 
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environments. However, research in this area is meagre . 
Despite the fact that regulatory and other environments 
faced by chief executives in the different sectors are 
changing, there is practically no study on how different 
general managers have responded to their environments and 
whether the Government policies have had the desired impact 
on the alternatives considered by the chief executives^. 
The present study is, therefore, an attempt towards 
fulfilling this need. 
3.4 FORHIJI.ATTON OF RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The identification of research gaps and the motivation to 
attempt at fulfilling an emerging need in the subject of 
study helped in formulating the research problem. The 
researcher's previous study during the pre-doctoral 
course (M. Phil.) also helped in this regard. 
Later, the proposed topic of research was checked for 
usability by taking adequate safeguards like necessary 
subject background, availability of some degree of 
information and feasibility of completing the study within 
the specified time. In the next stage, the aim was to limit 
the topic to a manageable level. As the researcher had 
already studied the 'Impact of Liberalisation Measures on 
Selected Industries' as a part of the M. Phil, degree, the 
topic of research was decided upon as: 
"Liberalisation and its Impact on Business Policies of 
Selected Private Sector Companies in India". 
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The selection of liberalisation measures is primarily guided 
by the findings of the researcher's preliminary study at the 
pre-doctoral level. During the course of preliminary study, 
it was found that the liberalisation measures chosen have 
had an impact, though with varying degree, on automobile 
fertilizer and petrochemicals industries. These findings 
also injected the inquisitiveness to study the impact of 
same measures on the business policies of private sector 
companies. As a result, the following major liberalisation 
measures have been chosen for the present study: 
(1) Delicensing 
(2) Minimum Economic Capacity 
(3) Capacity Re-endorsement 
(4) Broad Banding 
(5) Procedures for Industrial Approvals & Foreign 
Collaborations 
(6) Procedures for MRTP and FERA Companies. 
The above measures were also part of the liberalisation 
policies announced by the Government in January, 1985. 
Moreover, as the measures chosen are in the direction of 
liberalising the industrial sector, they form the basis of 
the present study. 
3.4.1 The Conceptual Framework 
The theory-building process is manifest in the general 
objectives of the study envisioned and relies on a few 
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general constructs that subsume a mountain of particulars . 
The researcher has therefore constructed a conceptual 
framework which graphically explains the main dimensions to 
be studied -- the key factors or variables -- and the 
presumed relationship among them. Doing such an exercise 
also forces the researcher to be selective -- to decide 
which dimensions are more important, which relationships are 
likely to be most meaningful and as a consequence, what 
information should be collected and analysed. 72 
Exhibit 3.1 : A Conceptual Framework 
LIBERALISATION MEASURES BUSINESS POLICY VARIABLES 
* Delicensing 
* Minimum Economic 
Capacity 
* Capacity Re-
endorsement 
* Broad Banding 
* Industrial App. & 
Foreign Coll. 
* MRTP & FERA Rules 
* Organisation 
Structure & 
Management 
* Size & Growth 
* Capital Acquisition 
& Finance 
* Marketing 
* Production & 
Operations 
* Human Resources 
As is evident from Exhibit 3.1, the framework seeks to 
specify that the study is attempting to know the impact of 
policy measures on business policy areas of selected 
companies and, therefore, is striving to collect data on 
specifically six factors of a company. The framework also 
assumes some relationship between policy factors and impact 
areas as indicated by arrows. These presumed relationships 
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are purely logical which may lead to more conceptual 
specificity as the study progresses. Any deviation from the 
above will only show the dynamism of theory-building 
process. It must also be mentioned that frameworks are only 
focussing and bounding devices that need not work as 
73 blinders or straitjackets . 
3.5 SCOPE OF THK STUDY 
The process of liberalisation initiated by the Government 
offers scope for formulation of new or alternative business 
strategies to chief executives of Indian companies. The 
polemics of liberalisation notwithstanding, the business 
environment today is different from that existing a decade 
ago. It is thus imperative to study the impact of 
liberalisation on business policies of companies and 
skillfully draw lessons for chief executives and general 
managers who are facing newer challenges in managing their 
business. 
Although the scope of research covers a wide horizon, the 
present study is limited by the following facts: 
(1) The scope of the present study is limited to only four 
private sector companies. The choice of companies is 
constrained by time and nature of the study. 
(2) The present study is confined to companies belonging to 
a single industry, that is automobile industry. 
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(3) The scope of the study is restricted only to the main 
profiles of the four companies. Other subsidiary, 
dependent or related business of the companies have 
been excluded from the purview of the study. For 
instance, manufacturing of machine tools or excavators 
by a company have not been dealt with. Similarly, 
financial subsidiary of a company has not been included 
in the study, though appropriate references have been 
made to such related activities. 
(4) While studying the impact of liberalisation on business 
policies of private sector companies, only major 
liberalisation measures related to the industrial 
sector have been chosen. Liberalisation measures 
related to foreign trade, capital market, monetary and 
fiscal policies have not ben included in the study in 
order to avoid any empirical distortion. 
(5) The period covered in the study dates from January, 
1985 till date. As a result, data relevant for 
analysing the impact of liberalisation have been 
collected for the said period. In the case of company 
profiles, data for earlier period have also been 
collected in order to make comparisons wherever 
necessary. 
(6) In analysing the impact of liberalisation measures, the 
study lays emphasis on the significantly relevant 
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factors and functional areas of companies which 
includes organisation structure and management, size 
and growth of the company, capital acquisition and 
finance, marketing policies, production and operations 
policies, and management of human resources. 
3.6 OPERATTOHAL nKFTHTTTOHR 
It is imperative that important terms of research topic are 
defined in a manner that they are not interpreted in a way 
other than what the researcher wishes to convey. Therefore, 
the words used in the topic of research are defined below as 
they will carry their own significance as the research 
progresses. 
(1) The term 'liberalisation' refers to opening up of any 
industry to competitive pressures . In its wider 
sense, it relates to the moves towards market-oriented 
economies in terms of greater integration into the 
world economy . Further, it is a process of change 
intended to make government policies, regulations and 
institutions responsive to the market forces and 
requirements. 
(2) The basic meaning of 'impact' is the initial force 
exerted by one policy on another variable. It, 
therefore, means influence or effect. Here a 
distinction must be made between immediate impact and 
their final incidence. 'Impact' primarily means the 
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first place where a policy or decision is imposed while 
incidence means the final resting place of a burden. 
(3) As a field in business administration, 'Business 
Policy' is the study of the functions and 
responsibilities of general management and the problems 
which affect the character and success of the total 
enterprise. In Business Policy, the problems considered 
and the point of view assumed in analysing and dealing 
with them are those of the chief executive or general 
manager, whose primary responsibility is the enterprise 
77 
as a whole . Moreover, the problems of policy in 
business have to do with the choice of purposes, the 
moulding of organisational character, the definition of 
what needs to be done, and the mobilisation of 
resources for the attainment of goals in the face of 
7R 
competition or adverse circumstance . 
(4) The "private sector' is defined as that part of a 
nation's economy that is not controlled either by 
Government or by nationalised or publicly owned 
•70 
undertakings . Private sector is therefore a private 
enterprise owned individually or by groups of 
individuals and corporations with numerous 
shareholders, 
(5) In common parlance, the word 'company' is applied to 
any form of business. For the purpose of this study^ 
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the term 'company' can also be defined as any group of 
people voluntarily united for performing jointly any 
activity, business or commercial enterprise . The word 
company is synonymous with firms. 
3.7 RESEARCH PRQPQSITTOHS 
On the basis of review of literature and the need for 
research, a set of general propositions has been framed for 
the purposes of the present study. 
(1) Liberalisation has had a varying impact on different 
policy variables, 
(2) Liberalisation has had a varying impact on different 
private sector companies. 
(3) Liberalisation has had an impact on business policies 
of private sector companies. 
3.8 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The nature of the present study is not so much directed 
towards the objective of interpreting or advancing a theory 
or a set of theories. Rather, the aim of this research study 
is to understand the practical significance of the idea of 
liberalisation. Therefore, stressing methodological aspects 
of research cannot take precedence over the evolving of a 
pragmatic approach to understand the phenomenon of 
liberalisation and its impact on business policies of 
private sector companies. 
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In view of the nature of research, exploratory research 
design has been selected for the present study. This 
selection is also guided by the reasoning that the research 
design appropriate for exploratory studies must be flexible 
enough to provide opportunity for considering different 
aspects of the problem under study. Moreover, while 
quantitatve research is useful, all research in management 
Q -I 
cannot rely on quantitative techniques . 
3.9 SAMPLE DESIGN 
The present study has chosen six major liberalisation 
measures for evaluating their impact on business policies of 
selected private sector companies. Further, only private 
sector companies in the automobile industry have been 
selected because : (1) automobile industry was among the 
first set of industries for which liberal incentives were 
announced in January, 1985, and (2) in the preliminary study 
undertaken by the researcher, it was found that the 
automobile industry had benefitted relatively more from the 
liberalisation process. 
In the selection of private sector automobile companies, 
choice have been made as research on a topical subject, like 
the present one, has to be undertaken in an arbitrary 
boundary. It must also be realised that one cannot study 
everything related to a problem due to constraints of time. 
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Therefore, fixing a workable limit is essential prior to the 
collection of data. The fixation of a limited number of 
companies was also done to prevent empirical anarchy. 
The selection of companies was primarily made on the basis 
of market share. In 1991, when the researcher started this 
study, the following companies were the leaders in their 
respective categories: TELCO (Heavy, Medium and Light 
Commercial Vehicles), Premier Automobiles Ltd (Cars and 
Jeeps), Bajaj Auto (Scooters and Three-wheelers), Escorts 
and Hero Honda Motors (Motorcycles), TVS Suzuki and Kinetic 
Engineering (Mopeds). 
The above companies were then checked for their ranking in 
"The Business India's Host Outstanding 100 Private Sector 
Companies" ^ and the The Economic Times' "Private Sector 
Giants" . It was found that among motorcycle manufacturers. 
Escorts had a much better ranking than Hero Honda in both 
the studies. Moreover, none of the two moped manufacturers 
figured in the lists. Thus by reasons of simple logic, only 
companies which were market leaders in their respective 
categories, and also figured in both Business India and The 
Economic Tijaas. rating, were selected. This selection 
criteria is shown in Exhibit 3.2. 
Besides these, the selection of companies can also be 
justified on grounds other than stated above. No company 
manufacturing mopeds was included in the study also because 
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of the fact that Bajaj Auto Ltd, too, manufactures mopeds 
though presently it is not the market leader. Therefore, the 
moped segment was not going unrepresented. Similarly, 
Escorts Ltd was given precedence over Hero Honda Motors also 
because it is a fairly diversified company and its policy 
response to Governmental changes may lead to newer insights 
from the viewpoint of chief executives and general managers. 
In the same way, the sole private sector jeep manufacturer 
Mahindra & Hahindra could have been included within the 
purview of the study. But, among the four-wheeled passenger 
vehicles, cars constitute 72 per cent of the segment which 
is fairly representative of the category. 
Exhibit 3.2 : Selection of Companies in 1991 
CATEGORY OF 
VEHICLES 
M & HCVs 
LCVs 
Cars/Jeeps 
Scooters 
Motorcycles 
Three-
Wheelers 
Mopeds 
LEADER IN 
MARKET 
SHARE {%) 
TELCO 
TELCO 
Premier 
Bajaj 
Auto 
Escorts 
Hero 
Honda 
Bajaj 
Auto 
TVS 
Suzuki 
Kinetic 
Engg. 
(72) 
(44) 
(50) 
(63) 
(29) 
(29) 
(89) 
(32) 
(32) 
BUSINESS 
RANKING 
2 
2 
63 
10 
18 
87 
10 
-
-
ECONOMIC 
TIMES 
RANKING 
4 
4 
37 
15 
25 
-
15 
-
-
WHETHER 
SELECTED 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Considering the above points, the selection can be justified 
on the grounds that the companies represent all the segments 
of automobile industry. Further, market leadership was given 
priority over other parameters like assets, turnover, 
profit, etc. because market share, as a basis, is 
comparative while financial parameters deal with just one 
company in isolation. This, however, does not imply that 
financial parameters have been ignored altogether. Both, 
Business India and The Economic Times. have ranked the 
companies on the basis of sales, net profit, market 
capitalisation, net fixed assets, etc. 
It must also be mentioned that due to the lack of a perfect 
indicator of performance to content with, the selection of 
sample is researcher-specific. 
3.10 DATA CnT.T.ECTinN METHODS AHD PROCEDURKS 
For the collection of qualitative information and 
quantitative data, the researcher has relied completely on 
the use of secondary data, that is, data that are already 
available -- though for other purposes. However, before 
using the secondary data, the reliability, suitability and 
adequacy of data were looked into as a matter of precaution. 
In view of the framework of research plan and taking into 
consideration the objectives of the study, qualitative 
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information relating to historical background of 
liberalisation process and present status have been 
collected from several Government documents and publications 
of the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). 
Data required for updating and restructuring, wherever 
necessary, the industry profile were collected from 
Government documents as also from publications of 
Association of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (AIAH) and 
Automobile Component Manufacturers Association of India 
<ACMA). Wherever gaps persisted, private publications were 
consulted as well. 
The researcher also consulted the libraries of American 
Center, Delhi School of Economics, Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), Institute of 
Economic Growth, PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(PHDCCI), and others, apart from the institutional and 
central libraries of Aligarh Muslim University. All 
libraries, except for the last one are located in Delhi and 
are rich in collection. The researcher also contacted the 
Ministry of Industry in order to procure latest information 
on automobile industry and industrial policy. 
Data needed for preparing company profiles were obtained 
from the following sources/agencies: 
(1) Department of Industrial Development, Ministry of 
Industry, Government of India. 
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(2) The Stock Exchange Official Directory 
(3) Kothari's Industrial Directory of India 
(4) The Handbook of Indian Companies 
(5) Publications of Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy 
(6) Publications of Association of Indian Automobile 
Manufacturers (AIAM) 
(7) Publications of Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India (ACMA) 
(8) Annual Reports of the companies 
(9) Reports, Articles and Papers appearing in various 
journals and periodicals. 
As Management is, inherently and historically, an inter-
disciplinary area of study, management problems are by and 
large multi-dimensional and require inputs from various 
disciplines. Therefore, contributions of scholars and 
practitioners from diversified disciplines and backgrounds 
such as economics, sociology, public administration, etc. 
have also been consulted. 
Data collected from different sources have been presented 
according to the requirements of the present study as 
secondary data is mostly not available in the form the 
researcher needs it to be. As a result, invariably available 
data has been rearranged, aggregated or teased out albeit 
without distorting the originality. At most times, suitable 
calculations have been done while on other occasions 
available data have been so quantified so as to maintain a 
symmetry for all company profiles. 
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3.10.1 Problems in Data Collection 
Use of only secondary data was not a part of the original 
plan of study. Taking into consideration the objectives of 
the study and its research design, the researcher had 
planned to administer mail questionaire to chief executives 
and general managers of selected companies. Consequently, a 
structured questionnaire was thrice mailed but the effort 
proved futile. Later, availing the opportunity of coming in 
close personal contact with senior industrialists and top 
executives of chambers of commerce, the researcher tried to 
cull out information from the selected companies but again 
to no avail. 
The researcher was surprised by the fact that even 
befriending executives of selected companies was of no help 
as all they could provide was the companies' annual reports. 
An executive of a large company even went to the extent of 
stating that the company has no organisation structure and 
therefore, the details cannot be furnished. This researcher 
has come to the conclusion that "until a researcher in India 
receives an opportunity for an open-ended exploratory 
research, research in management will continue to use 
84 
several methodologies' and rely on secondary data. In 
other words, there was neither a disincentive to engage into 
research nor a specfic incentive built into the 
institutional frame. 
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The adoption of use of secondary data, too, was not devoid 
of its pitfalls which at times gives rise to unanticipated 
difficulties in the process of research. The experience of 
the researcher proves that the information base in the 
country is weak and there exists an information barrier. At 
times, there is very little information to work on. Finally, 
the researcher had to rely on press clippings and 
rudimentary data. 
The researcher also faced problems in gaining access to 
certain in-house reference and research departments 
belonging to the Government as well as to the private 
corporate sector. The researcher also encountered the 
problem of utilising data supplied through Government 
publications, as in many cases they have considerable time 
lag. In using secondary data, problems also arise due to : 
* Absence of uniformity of data supplied by 
Government and by industry associations 
* Absence of details 
* Incomplete information 
* Poor and often changing categorisation of products 
of a particular industry. 
Within the limits of these constraints, the researcher made 
every possible effort in collecting a large amount of data 
relating to selected companies. Those who have worked on raw 
data would readily appreciate that some inexactness 
inevitably creeps in any aggregation or rearrangemnt of 
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data. Fortunately, such fuzsiness does not vitiate the basic 
authenticity of company profiles. 
Selection of themes and methodologies of research in 
management need to be governed by the basic consideration 
that management research should be relevant to management 
problems in India . Research in business policy must, 
therefore, strive to generate knowledge which will help 
Indian organisations develop their capability to cope with 
the rapid changes in the coming years. However, non-
cooperation of top management seems to be the major reason 
responsible for lack, of research in this area . 
3.11 ANALYSES AND TNTERPRETATTOH 
Guided by the need for research and the research 
propositions, the researcher has analysed the impact of 
liberalisation on business policies of selected companies in 
broadly two ways. At the first instance, the impact of 
liberalisation on business policy variables has been 
analysed and interpreted separately for each of the four 
selected private sector companies. The emerging business 
policy directions in each company has been shown in the form 
of an exhibit. Later, the results emerging out of the 
company-wise analyses have been consolidated and 
qualitatively described. The analytical framework of the 
study is shown in Exhibit 3.3 
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E x h i b i t 3 . 3 : The A n a l y t i c a l Framework 
i Autcaobile Industry 
I (Chapter 2! 
1 
iBajaj Auto Ltd 
1(Chapter 4) 
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The basis of analyses is the company profiles of the 
selected companies. In analysing the impact of 
liberalisation, the researcher has laid emphasis on six 
business policy variables which is guided by the conceptual 
framework of the study as well as its scope. It is worth 
mentioning here that although frameworks for analysing 
companies exist, yet the researcher has innovated the 
structure of company profiles to suit the requirements of 
the present study. Moreover, the company profile structure 
used in the study proved to be effective as, in retrospect, 
it proved to be quite appropriate. 
The company profiles have been analysed in such a manner 
that their respective business policy variables are easily 
identified. The analyses is primarily qualitative in nature 
as well as dynamic in approach. The emerging trends in 
business policies of companies have been appropriately dealt 
with. 
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The impact of liberalisation policies on business policies 
of the companies have been summarised in the form of an 
exhibit which shows pre-liberalisation status and post-
liberalisation changes. The extent of impact has been 
qualitatively assessed in a separate section. A note of 
caution here : no single liberalisation measure, on a set 
of measures, must be seen as the only factor(s) responsible 
for gauging the impact of liberalisation on business 
policies of companies as there are several other external 
and internal imponderables that affect change in, and 
performance of, enterprises. 
The summarised findings and conclusions, and the directions 
for future research have been briefly dealt with in a 
separate chapter. 
3.12 LIMITATIQWS Of THE STUDY 
The present study has the following major limitations. 
(1) Limited to six najor liberalisation measures : Due to 
constraints of time, only six major liberalisation 
measures related to the industrial sector have been 
chosen for the present study. 
(2) Liaiited to six Business Policy variables : The six 
variables which have been selected for analyses, in the 
opinion of researcher, capture the essence fo Business 
Policy. As the area of Business Policy is concerned 
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with integration of different functions at the level of 
chief executive and general manager, the policy 
variables includes different functional areas such as 
finance, marketing, production and personnel. 
(3) Linited to four companies : Because the duration of 
course is time-bound, the present research study has 
been restricted to a manageable limit. Therefore, only 
four private sector companies have been covered. The 
companies selected are, however, representative of the 
industry to which they belong. 
(4) Linited to one industry : Only private sector companies 
in the automobile industry have been chosen in order to 
confine the study to a workable limit. 
(5) Relies on secondary data : The study relies on 
secondary data due to the constraints of time and 
money, and the problems encountered in collecting 
primary data. 
(6) Time bound : The duration of the course has a time limit 
and the researcher is expected to complete the study 
within the prescribed time. This has led to putting an 
arbitrary limit on the scope of the study. 
(7) Cost limitations : Research has increasingly become 
cost-intensive which puts numerous constraints on the 
study. 
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Had these limitations not been there, further efforts could 
have been made for improving the research study. However, 
these constraints are common to any research study. 
135 
RKFEREHCES 
1. K.V. Iyer : Liberalisation of Industrial Policy. Indu 
Publications, New Delhi, 1982. 
2. Lhfi Liberalisation Process. Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy, Bombay, July, 1986. 
3. The Liberalisation Process. Centre of Monitoring Indian 
Economy, Bombay, February, 1990. 
4. Isher J. Ahluwalia : Industrial Growth in India: 
Stagnation ainiLS the mid-sixties. Oxford University 
Press, 1985. 
5. Pradip Bose, "Liberalisation Not Without Perils", The 
Times of India. June 2, 1985, P. 7. 
Prabhat Patnaik, "New Turn in Economic Policy : Context 
and prospects". Economic and Political Week.lv. June 7, 
1986, P. 1014. 
Yoginder K. Alagh, "Policy, Growth and Structural 
Change in Indian Industry", Economic and Political 
Weeklv. May, 1987, P. AN-57. 
8. H.K. Paranjape, "Mr. Gandhi's Economic Policy : 
Throwing the baby with bath-water", The Times of India. 
December 17, 1986, P. 7. 
Sharad M. Marathe : Regulation and Development: India's 
Policy Experience af Controls over Industry. Sage 
Publications, New Delhi, 1986. 
10. Amiya Kumar Bagchi : Public Intervention and Industrial 
Restructuring in China. India and Republic of Korea. 
ILO, New Delhi, 1987. 
11. S.S. Nadkarni, "Deregulation : Benefits start flowing". 
The Hindu Survey of Indian Indust-rv. 1987, P. 17. 
136 
12. Praful Bidwai, "Limits to Liberalisation : Why World 
Bank Prescriptions Won't Do (Part I & II>, The Times of 
India, February 15-16, 1988. 
13. Fredie A. Mehta, "Virtues of Liberalisation", The Times 
of India. February 23, 1988, P. 7. 
14. H.K. Paranjape, "Indian 'Liberalisation': Perestroika or 
Salaami Tactics?", Economic and Political Weekly. 
November, 1988, P. 2343. 
15. Padmini Swaminathan, "Liberalisation, Market Concen-
tration and Prospects for Growth: A study of the TVS 
Group of Companies", Economic and Political Weekly. May 
14, 1988, P. 1026. 
16. C.P. Chandrasekhar, "Aspects of Growth and Structural 
Change in Indian Industry", Economic and Political 
Weekly. November, 1988, P. 2359. 
17. S.S.M. Desai : Industrial Economy of India. Himalaya 
Publishing House, Bombay, 1988. 
18. P.D. Halgavkar : Industrial Policy and Prospects : 2001 
AH, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1988. 
19. Arvind N. Das, "Industry : The implications of 
Liberalisation", The Economic Times. February 13, 1989, 
P. 4. 
20. Dileep Padgaonkar, "In Quest of Growth : Role of State 
and Business", The Times of India. April 15, 1988, P. 7. 
21. K.S, Ramachandran, "The Economic Scene : Time to say 
'enough is enough'", Financial Express, January 28, 
1989, P. 9. 
22. C.T. Rurien, "Indian Economy in the 1980s and on to the 
1990s", Economic and Political Weekly. April 15, 1989, 
P. 787. 
23. Ashok Guha (ed.): Economic Liberalisation. Industrial 
Structure and Growth in India. Oxford University Press, 
Delhi, 1990. 
137 
24. B.S. Goldar and V.S. Ranganathan : Liberalisation of 
Jndnstrial and Trade Policies in India. HIPFP, New 
Delhi, 1990. 
25. M.S. Patwardhan, "Economic Beform : Heed for deregu-
lation", The Economic Times. October 26, 1990, P. 5. 
26. A.jit Mozoomdar, "A Critical View", Seminar. April 1991, 
P. 16. 
27. M.H. Panini, "Social Parameters", Seminar, April 1991, 
P. 44. 
28. Amit Mitra, "Why Liberalisation", Seminar, April 1991, 
P. 13. 
29. J. Rao, "The Liberalisation Argument", Seminar. April 
1991, P. 51. 
30. Isher J. Ahluwalia, "The Tasks Ahead", Seminar, April 
1991, P.54. 
31. Vinay Bharat-Ram, "An Agenda for Liberalisation", The 
Times of Tndia. April 25, 1991, P. 6. 
32. I.G. Patel, "Economic Policy" (Part I, II & III), The 
Economic Times. April 25-27, 1990. 
33. Manjul Bajaj, "Liberalisation : Going the global way". 
The Economic Times. October 1, 1990, P. 9. 
34. Vijay L. Kelkar, "India in the 90s : Structural 
remedy". The Economic Times. March 4, 1991, P. 9. 
35. A. Vaidyanathan, "Emerging Issues in Policy Planning" 
(Part I & II), The Economic Times. March 11-12, 1991. 
36. Deena Khatkhate, "To Liberalise, First Curtail 
Planning", The Times of India. June 19, 1991, P. 8. 
37. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, "How to Liberalise : 
Neither token change nor Laissez Faire", The Times of 
Irdia, June 26, 1991, P.O. 
138 
38. Pulin B. Nayak, "Liberalisation Alone Hot the Answer", 
The Times of India. June 29, 1991, P. 8. 
39. T.C.A. Srinivasa-Raghavan, "Economic Reforms : Walking 
the tightrope". The Economic Time.c;. July 15, 1991, P. 9. 
40. R. Srinivasan, "Can SSIs live with liberalisation?". 
The Times of India. July 17, 1991, P. 11. 
41. Shyam Malhotra, "Liberalisation : Choosing priorities", 
The Economic Times. July 17, 1991, P. 7. 
42. R. Ramachandran, "Liberalisation, Japanese style". The 
Rcnnnmic Times. July 18, 1991, P. 8. 
43. J.R.D. Tata, "New Industrial Policy : A mix of economic 
challenges and sacrifice". The Times of India, August 
1, 1991, P. 1. 
44. Ramkrishna Bajaj, "The price of market reforms". The 
Time5^ of India. August 9, 1991, P. 9. 
45. T.T. Ram Mohan, "Liberalisation : Building on misplaced 
hopes". The Economic Times. August 19, 1991, P. 7. 
48. Rajiv Desai, "Liberalisation : With blinkers on". The 
Ecnnnmic Times. October 28, 1991, P. 7, 
47. D.H. Pai Panadiker, "How liberal is our policy?". The 
Hindustan Times, October 28, 1991, P. 15. 
48. Ashok Guha, "Illusory Move Towards An Open Economy", 
The Business & Political Observer. November 1, 1991, 
P. 3. 
49. Murad Ali Baig, "Liberalisation : Rural sector key to 
success". The Economic Times. November 16, 1991, P. 8. 
50. Fredie A. Mehta, "Will the reforms package succeed?". 
The Economic Times. November 23, 1991, P. 6. 
139 
51. C.P. Shah, "Liberalisation : Cautious progress". The 
EconQmio Times. December 5, 1991, P. 11. 
62. Gurcharan Das, "Press Ahead with Economic Reforms", The 
Times of India. December 27, 1991, P. 8. 
53. Rajesh Kalra, "Liberalisation has not changed system". 
The Times of India. January 15, 1992, P. 13. 
54. S.D. Naik, "Post liberalisation changes". The Economic 
Tiiaas., January 23, 1992, P. 15. 
55. Balrao Mehta, "Structural adjustment will strain 
industrial relations". The Pioneer. April 6, 1992, 
P. 12. 
56. V.L. Rao, "Beyond the rhetoric of liberalisation". The 
Pioneer. April 12, 1992, P. 10. 
57. Kamal Nayan Kabra, "The mirage of economic 
restructuring'. The Pioneer. April 18, 1992, P. 12. 
58. Pradip N. Khandwalla, "Management imperative for 
liberalisation", The Economic Times. April 23, 1992, 
P. 12. 
59. Prem Shankar Jha, "Nipped in the bud". The Observer of 
Business & Politics. May 5, 1992, P. 9. 
60. T. Thomas, "Liberalisation : What it means for 
business". The Economic Times. May 9, 1992, P. 6. 
61. Sanjivan Sahni, "Structural reform and politics of 
control", (Part I & II), The Economic Times, May 13-14, 
1992. 
62. Ravi Virmani, "People, the backbone of organizational 
success". The Times of India. July 4, 1992, P. 9. 
63. Raghu Krishnamoorthy, "The HRD challenge in liberalised 
India", The Times of India. July 4, 1992, P. 11. 
140 
64. Deena Khatkhate, "Regulatory Bodies Key To Liberali-
sation", The Times of India. June 8, 1992, P. 8. 
65. Hurad Ali Baig, "Successful Reform : Need to change 
attitudes". The Economio Times. July 29, 1992, P. 7. 
66. Manoj Pant, "The Political Economy of Liberalisation", 
Financial Express. September 9, 1992, P. 6. 
67. Jamshed A. Siddiqui : Impact of Liberalisation Measures 
on Selected Industries ^unpublished H.Phil. disser-
tation). Department of Business Administration, Aligarh 
Muslim University, Aligarh, 1991, P. 56. 
68. B.L. Maheshwari (ed.): Survey of Research in Management 
1970-82. Indian Council for Social Science Research, 
New Delhi, 1986, pp. 6-7. 
69. K.R.S. Murthy, "Business Policy" in B.L. Maheshwari 
(ed.): ibid.. P. 36. 
70. ibid., P. 38 
71. Mathew B. Miles and A. Michael Huberman : Qualitative 
Data Analysis ; A Sourcebook of Hew Methods. Sage 
Publications, California, 1986, P. 28. 
72. ibid. 
73. iiiid. 
74. ADB : Privatisation Policies. Methods and Procedures. 
Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1985, P. 60. 
75. ibid.. P. 63. 
76. Arthur Seldon and E.G. Pennance: Everyman's Dictionary 
of Economics. J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., London, 1976, 
P.332. 
141 
77. C.R. Christensen et al : Rn.qiness PoTicv : Text. and 
Cases. Richard D. Irwin, Illinois, 1969, P. 3. 
78. ibid 
79. P.K. Ghosh et al : Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Hanage-
irient ("Vol. 1^. Anmol Publications, New Delhi, 1988, 
P. 59. 
60. -ihid. . (Vol. 2'>, P. 134. 
81. B.L. Maheshwari : OP. cit.. P. 17 
82. Rafiq Dossani and Alka Mukundan, "The best and the 
brightest". Business India. Sept. 30 - Oct. 13, 1991, 
P. 54. 
83. "Private Sector Giants", The Economic Times. February 
21, 1991, P. 11. 
84. B.L. Maheshwari : op. cit.. P. 18. 
85. B.L. Maheshwari : QP. cit.. P. 25 
86. K.R.S. Murthy, OP. cit. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
BAJAJ AUTO LIMITED 
4.1 Evolution of the Company 
4.2 Corporate Objectives 
4.3 Organisation Structure and Management 
4.4 Strategic Shifts 
4.5 Capital Acquisition and Finance 
4.6 Marketing Policies 
4.7 Production and Operations Policies 
4.8 Management of Human Resources 
4.9 Strategic Plans and Future Outlook 
BAJAJ AUTO LIMITED 
4-1 FVni-"TTOH OF THK rOMPANY 
The company was incorporated on November 29, 1945 in the 
name of 'Bachraj Trading Corporation Ltd', as a private 
company . Later, the name was changed to Bajaj Auto Pvt. Ltd 
on June 21, 1960*^, and to the present one -- Bajaj Auto Ltd 
(BAL) -- on August 24, 1960 when it was converted into a 
public limited company. The company, under an agreement with 
Western Maharashtra Development Corporation Ltd, set up a 
joint sector company by the name of Maharashtra Scooters Ltd 
(HSL) on June 11, 1975^ to produce scooters. In 1980-81, the 
company invested US $ 15,000 in the equity capital of Bajaj 
America Inc. to establish a joint venture abroad. The field 
of collaboration relate to marketing of Bajaj vehicles . 
Bajaj Auto Holdings Ltd (BAHL) and Bajaj Auto Finance Ltd 
(BAFL) are subsidiaries of the company. 
4.1.1 Business QperationH 
BAL manufactures and markets scooters, motorcycles, three-
wheelers, mopeds and relevant spare parts under the brand 
name 'Bajaj'. Earlier, the brand name of vehicles 
manufactured by the company was 'Vespa' as it had technical 
collaboration agreement with Piaggio & Co., Italy. After the 
expiry of collaboration agreement on March 31, 1971, the 
brand name 'Bajaj' was adopted on April 1, 1971 . BAL also 
provides CKD (completely knocked down) packs for its 
scooters to MSL. 
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4-2 CORPORATE OBJECTIVES 
From the very beginning, the objective of BAL is to be a 
technology and design engineering based company which would 
manufacture a product of the highest standard, and serve not 
only the needs of the domestic market but also make BAL a 
leading automotive company selling two-wheelers in the world 
market. At BAL, the philosophy is to grow and expand into 
new markets. 
The company has also initiated the practice of laying down 
yearly objectives for each of its departments in terms of 
production, quality, finance, marketing, human resources and 
social welfare . 
4.3 ORQAMISATIOH STRUCTURE AHD HAHAGEMEHT 
The Board of Directors of the company consists of nine 
members -- including one ICICI nominee -- and is headed by 
its Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) Mr Rahul Bajaj. 
The company has many divisions and sub-divisions. A number 
of divisions under senior officers report to the Executive 
Director who in turn reports to the CMD. The organisation 
structure of top management is shown in Exhibit 4.1. 
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E x h i b i t 4 . 1 : Top Management O r g a n i s a t i o n S t r u c t u r e of 
Ba j a j Auto Ltd 
CHD 
Secretary Executive Director 
h-
Co-ord Aurangabad 
Division 
t 
i l l I I I I 
GH 8« GH SH GH GH C h i e f 
Works Hotor - Finance Deve- Ha te r - Harke- Execut ive 
cycle lopient ials ting (Tech) 
~i Div. , ' 1 
D6H D6« 
(Exports! (8.A.1 
I I 
DSH DG« 
(R t D) (Tool 
Engg.) 
Source : Adapted from B.S.K.S. Chopra: Cases in Corporate 
Planning. The Times Research Foundation, Pune, 
1989, P. 30. 
Few years back, the company restructured some of the 
divisions. With the growth of BAL into a colossus, its 
managerial hierarchies multiplied. As a result, the number 
of layers in the organisation was also slashed from eleven 
g 
to six, truncating the decision hierarchy across the board . 
Moreover, each of the company's four divisions -- scooters, 
motorcycles, three-wheelers and engines -- operate in a 
virtually autonomous fashion . Says Rahul Bajaj, "We are 
also undergoing an organisational 'perestroika' at Bajaj 
145 
Auto. If a decision has to be implemented on the shopfloor, 
it has to be processed through three or four levels of 
management. We are now trying to reduce the channel to one 
or two managers' . 
4.4 STRATEGIC SHIFTS 
After the announcement of liberalisation measures in early 
1985, BAL realised it cannot remain passive and exist. To 
meet the competitive challenge of the changing business 
environment, it decided to be faster, better, cheaper and 
12 
newer in several ways . Consequently, in the last eight 
years, it has radically overhauled manufacturing, increased 
investment in R & D, entered into all available two-wheeler 
segments, restructured its organisation set-up and built an 
incredibly complex computer network. No functional area and 
possibly no one in its [more than] 18,000 strong workforce 
has remained untouched by the upheavels . 
4.4.1 Siae of the Cocpanv 
The company doubled its licensed capacity of two-wheelers 
from 80,000 to 1,60,000 vehicles per year in 1979-80-'-'^ . 
Later, in 1981-82, the licensed capacity of three-wheelers 
was raised from 15,000 to 20,000 vehicles per year and 
scooter CKD packs for MSL from 30,000 to 32,000 per annum^^. 
When the Government allowed new players to enter the market, 
it also allowed BAL to expand its production capacity. As a 
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result, in 1985, the company set up a new plant at Waluj 
near Aurangabad (a centrally notified backward area) with 
1 R the licensed capacity of 3,00,000 vehicles per annum . 
During 1986-87, the company sought permission from 
Government for expansion of the licensed capacity at Waluj 
from 3,00,000 to 10,00,000 numbers of two and three-wheelers 
per annum. Exhibit 4.2 shows the total capacity of the 
company as on March 31, 1990. 
Exhibit 4.2 : Capacity Statistics of BAL (in nos.) 
Capacity Per Annum 
Class of Goods 
Licensed Installed 
*• CKD packs for motorised two 
wheelers upto 350cc for MSL 
(at Akurdi, Pune) 2,00,000 2,00,000 
* Motorised 2 and 3 wheelers 
upto 350 cc (at Akurdi) 3,03,000 3,03,000 
* Motorised 2 and 3 wheelers 
upto 350 cc (at Waluj) 10,00,000 3,55,750 
TOTAL 15,03,000 8,58,750 
Source: Adapted from The Stock Exchange Official 
Direotorv. July 9, 1990, Vol. 13/30 (ii). 
BAL also set up a plant at Waluj with an installed capacity 
of 2,00,000 vehicles per annum to manufacture a new model of 
motorcycle in collaboration with Kawasaki Heavy Industries 
Ltd, Japan and a new 50 cc scooter (Bajaj Sunny), developed 
by its own R & D . On obtaining broad banding endorsement for 
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"motorised two and three-wheelers upto 350 cc engine 
capacity", steps were taken to set up a separate three-
wheeler division at WaluJ to produce upto 50,000 three-
wheelers per annum within the overall licensed capacity. 
This division commenced manufacturing of three-wheelers in 
1 7 1987 . As of present, BAL's capacity utilisation is about 
95 per cent-*"^ . 
4.4.2 Growth of the Company 
The growth of the company can be divided into two broad 
phases. Between 1968 and 1980 — in the first phase 
growth was rather slow. It was in this phase that there was 
maximum pressure on MRTP companies. Consequently, the 
company was not allowed to expand in any significant way. It 
was only in the second phase -- between 1980 and 1990 
that the company grew enormously, especially after 1985, 
when major new competitors first made their appearance. At 
present, BAL is the third largest two-wheeler manufacturer 
of the world^^. 
According to a study conducted by Business World.a leading 
business magazine of the country, BAL tops the list of 
companies which recorded phenomenal rates of growth in the 
eighties. The company recorded a sales growth rate of 1,852 
on 
per cent between 1980 and 1990"^  . The production of two-
wheelers, which was a mere 1.15 lakh in 1980-81 doubled in 
the next five years to 2.85 lakh in 1985-86 and further 
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increased to 5.43 lakh in 1989-90. Earlier, in 1960, BAL 
produced just 2,535 scooters which increased to 32,091 in 
1970, and to 60,745 in 1975^ -'-. Similarly, the company 
produced 337 three-wheelers in 1961; 3,496 in 1970; and 
9,925 in 1975^^. Exhibit 4.3 shows the growth of the company 
since 1980-81. 
Exhibit 4.3 : Growth in Production (in nos.) 
Year Two-wheelers Three-wheelers Total 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
153233 
154783 
169586 
205519 
217913 
325949 
440634 
410071 
525907 
632063 
677457 
643121 
21,881 
18,706 
24,512 
28,019 
31,592 
34,785 
43,921 
47,963 
66,480 
74,210 
79,428 
69,556 
175114 
173489 
194098 
233538 
249505 
360734 
484555 
458034 
592387 
706273 
756885 
712677 
Source : Automotive Industry of India. Facts & Figures. 
1991-92. Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, pp. 8-11. 
Although the company has grown in the past decade -- since 
1984-85, its share of the two-wheeler market has grown from 
30 per cent to 43 per cent -- but the present recession in 
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the automobile industry has hit the two-wheeler segment 
badly including BAL . As a result, the company was forced 
to cut production by 30 per cent from December 1991 . With 
recession, probably the worst in the history of the Rs 2,000 
crore two wheeler industry, BAL's sales plunged by almost 50 
25 per cent . The company, as a result, was left with 
unprecedented levels of unsold scooters . Says Rahul Bajaj, 
"The reasons for the slump are macro-economic in nature and 
have little to do with the auto industry itself"'^ . 
Nevertheless, uncertainty in the market place has forced the 
company's chairman Rahul Bajaj to make a break from the past 
practice of setting targets for Bajaj Auto at the company's 
-annual general meetinsg . 
4.4.3 Distinctive Competencies 
BAL, despite severe competition in the scooter market, has 
maintained its dominant position in the market place. The 
company's products have an edge over others because of their 
ruggedness, fuel-efficiency and long life. This has, 
probably, impressed upon the company to keep one line in all 
their advertisements: "Value for money for years". And this 
is the reason that the company does not do feature-based 
29 
advertising . 
Ever since Rahul Bajaj took over the responsibility of 
managing the operations of BAL, he realised that the future 
success of the company basically rested on economies of 
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scale. Only such economies would permit BAL to offer 
products at the most competitive price to the Indian and the 
world market as well as enable it to incur research and 
development expenditure and engineerng design expenses of 
the required level, which were necessary to make the product 
on 
truly of high quality and low cost . 
4.4.4 Key Strategic Actions and Events 
BAL started manufacture of scooters and three-wheelers in 
the year 1960-61 in collaboration with Piaggio of Italy. 
The company entered into a technical assistance agreement 
with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Japan for the manufacture of 
100 cc engine capacity motorcycles in 1983 . However, 
Kawasaki does not have any equity stake in the company. In 
1984, BAL signed another agreement with Vigel SpA, Italy for 
technical know-how for the manufacture of special purpose 
machine tools for captive consumption . 
Later, BAL signed two technical assistance agreements in 
1987 -- one with Moto Piatt S.A., Spain for electronic 
components like magnetos and electronic ignition system, and 
another for restyling of rear engine three-wheeler body with 
oo 
I de A, Italy . For development of fuel injection system 
for 150 cc scooters to reduce fuel consumption and 
emissions, the company entered into a technical 
collaboration agreement with Orbital Engine Co., Australia 
in 1989^^. 
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For the supply of technical know-how for the manufacture of 
scooters and three-wheelers in Indonesia, BAL entered into a 
technical collaboration agreement with P.T. Tunas Bekasi 
Motor Co., Jakarta in 1975 followed by another such 
agreement with Paijifa Industrial Co., Taiwan for 
manufacturing scooters. For setting up an assembly plant for 
scooters and three-wheelers in Bangladesh, the company 
entered into a technical know-how agreement with Henoka 
35 Motors Ltd, Chittagong in 1979 . Besides, BAL gave complete 
technical assistance in setting up MSL's factory at Satara 
in 1975 . The company also set up a subsidiary, Bajaj Auto 
Finance Ltd (BAFL) in 1987 for financing the purchase of its 
37 two- wheelers . 
4.5 CAPITAL ACQUISITION AND FIHANCE 
The company has a paid-up capital of Rs 18.81 crore. Fifty 
per cent of the equity is held by the Bajaj family while 
financial institutions have a 7.7 per cent st.ake . Other 
major shareholders in the company are from public (47.8 per 
cent). 
In 1984-85, International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
Washington sanctioned a foreign currency loan of US $ 22 
million (then equivalent to Rs 24.2 crore) for the company's 
new project at Aurangabad. In 1986-87, this loan was paid 
out of the proceeds of a fresh loan from Standard Chartered 
Bank and Bank of Baroda . 
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During August-September 1984, the company offered 15 per 
cent non-convertible debentures for Rs 23.4 crore as rights 
to augment the long-term resources for working capital 
requirements. The issue was over-subscribed and the company 
was allowed to retain an additional amount of Rs 11.7 crore 
out of the over-subscribed portion for financing non-project 
capital expenditure for replacement, modernisation, etc. 
In 1990-91, the company had invested Rs 81.22 crore in units 
of the Unit Trust of India (UTI) which yielded over Rs 10 
42 crore per annum . 
From a turnover of Rs 109.61 crore in 1980-81, BAL reached a 
turnover of Rs 1064.63 crore in 1989-90 and to Rs 1219 crore 
in 1990-91"^ "^ . The growth in total assets was 1,603 per cent 
-- from Rs 59.67 crore in 1980 to Rs 694.35 crore in March 
1990 . However, during 1990-91, there was a decline in the 
efficiency of capital employed, return on net worth, 
operating margins and asset efficiency. The company has 
affected cuts in production to avoid the costs of carrying 
inventory. 
From BAL, 1990 was a banner year as sales exceeded Rs 1000 
crore and profits increased to 70 per cent on an annualised 
basis. During the same year, the company paid a record 
45 divided of 110 per cent 
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Exhibit 4.4 : Balance Sheet of Bajaj Auto Ltd 
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The current slump apart, being a market leader in two-
wheelers for more than a decade has improved the company's 
health considerably. Says G.B. Laddha, Dy General Manager 
(Finance), "Our debt-equity ratio is extremely low, less 
than 0.5 per cent. Our borrowings too are much lower than 
normal. Advances from customers help meet our cash 
requirements to a great extent. Financial planning has been 
our major strength". Exhibit 4,4 and 4.5 show the 
consolidated balance sheet, and profit and loss account of 
the company respectively for the period 1981-90. 
4.6 M&RKETIHG POLICIES 
BAL is the second largest scooter producer in the world, 
next only to Piaggio of Italy. The company, whose product 
used to command a high premium till the middle of last 
decade by virtue of high demand, has now matched the 
requirements resulting in easy availability of its product 
at present . About a decade ago, the influx of new entrants 
into the two-wheeler industry has changed the game-plan 
altogether. 
4.6.1 Product 
The company has been producing indigenous scooters and 
three-wheelers since 1971 and markets its product under the 
brand name 'Bajaj'. BAL started producing and marketing 
Bajaj Chetak and Bajaj Super brands of 150 cc scooters in 
1975 and 1977 respectively. A 100 cc scooter, Bajaj Cub, was 
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launched in the market in 1986 along with another in-house 
developed 80 cc motorcycle, the Bajaj M 80 °. Thus, scooters 
are made in four basic models from 100 cc to 150cc capa-
cities, with doens of variations to meet specific needs. 
After collabortion with Kawasaki of Japan, BAL introduced 
the two-stroke Kawasaki Bajaj KB 100 motorcycle in 1986 with 
an engine capacity of 100 cc. This product was subsequently 
improved and marketed as a different model -- the KB 100 RTZ 
in 1988. A four-stroke model was launched in February 
1991 which is 85 per cent indigenous from beginning. The 
company has recently entered the moped market with Bajaj 
Sunny with production of 34,583 vehicles in 1991-92 as 
compared to only 2,051 vehicles in 1990-91 . Says Arun 
Pande, GM (Marketing) of the company, "We have the widest 
range [of products] and will continue to do s o " . 
The Bajaj three-wheelers' range is unique to any 
manufacturer in the world. These novel and indispensible 
little commercial vehicles include front engine and rare 
engine autorikshaws, pick-up and delivery vans, trailers, 
and bare chassis for tasks that require custom-built bodies. 
These vehicles provide a livelihood to an estimated 2 
51 
million people in India and other developing countries . 
BAL will soon introduce heavily restyled scooters -- the 
Stride and the Legend. "These will essentially be 
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replacement models [for the present range] which should 
gradually get phased out, says Rahul Bajaj. He adds further: 
"The idea is to grow with the market, in order to cater to 
Indian needs, and should help retain volume and market 
52 
share' . Thus, BAL hopes to have a vehicle in each segment 
of the two-wheeler market. Emphasises Arun Pande, "Our goal 
is to achieve market leadership in every segment and to 
C O 
consolidate our leadership in the indusry as a whole" . 
4.6.2 Pricing 
BAL's guiding spirit is the aim of serving the country by 
providing world-quality two-wheelers at a reasonable price. 
This definition of BAL's mission required that the product 
not only matched the quality of foreign competitors but also 
a product manufactured at a scale of operation which would 
enable the company to price its product on the basis of 
manufacturing efficiency . 
Says BAL's Executive Director P.C. Nahar, "We have been very 
clear about aiming our products primarily for the middle 
class" . This is why BAL's products have always been priced 
lower than other vehicles in the same category. According to 
H.K. Firodia, Chairman of Kinetic Engineering which manu-
factures 100 cc Kinetic Honda scooters, "The biggest 
strength of Bajaj Auto is that they have been able to keep 
their costs low. Their high turnover of vehicles naturally 
reduces their cost of production. Besides, they have also 
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been able to absorb production cost increases that other 
manufacturers had to pass on to customers' . 
Retail pricing of BAL's vehicles is also a part of the long-
term strategy. Even eight years ago, when Bajaj scooters 
commanded a hefty premium because of the long waiting 
periods, its prices were kept low. Further, its motorcycle 
is priced much lower than its competitive products in the 
same category. Competitors point out at Bajaj Kawasaki's 
lower price; the accusation is of cross-subsidisation of its 
motorcycle activity from its mammoth scooter profits to gain 
market share . However, for BAL, costs have always been a 
priority area. Says Arun Pande, GM (Marketing), "We believe 
that no cost is too small to cut. Though we are very big, we 
try to run this company like it's a very small 
organisation"^ . Emphasises Rahul Bajaj, "I need to slash 
costs. I don t care where the savings come from" . 
4.6.3 Propotion 
Until a few years ago, industry leaders like BAL did not 
have to advertise. Its advertising budget in 1980-81 was 
merely Rs 7 lakh. But as of present, BAL is the heaviest 
RD 
advertiser in the two-wheeler business . In 1988-87, the 
company spent Rs 3,25 crore on advertising which went up to 
Rs 10.10 crore in 1990-91^ -'-. During 1990-91, with the supply 
of Chetak and Super models of scooter matching demand and 
pressure from competitors, the "Hamara BajaJ" campaign was 
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unveiled. It was for the first time that the two "star 
products" were advertised on television. Moreover, there has 
been a not-so-subtle change in Bajaj Auto's advertising 
its TV campaign turned to highlighting the fact that a Bajaj 
scooter was now available "off-the-shelf"°^. 
Says Arun Pande, "Our advertising strategy is aimed both at 
the urban and the rural customers and we use all the media 
applicable for that. 45 per cent of our advertising is on 
television" . The company's "You just can't beat a Bajaj" 
campaign transcends BAL's product to define the philosophy 
and value system of the organisation . 
Total expenditure on sales promotion in 1989-90 was Rs 646 
lakh and in 1990-91, it increased to Rs 1315 lakh^^. 
Commissions and discounts amounted to Rs 105 lakh in 1989-90 
and Rs 305 lakh in 1990-91. Expenditure on advertising was 
Rs 541 lakh in 1989-90^^. Thus, BAL recorded an increase of 
more than 100 per cent in the commission and discount 
expenses and more than 85 per cent in advertising 
expenditure in 1990-91®"^. 
Among the two-wheeler companies, BAL was the first to 
introduce a hire-purchase scheme. Bajaj Auto Finance Ltd 
(BAFL), a subsidiary company, was established in March 1987 
with a capital of Rs 55 crore . Since then, BAFL has 
distributed over Rs 100 crore to about 89,000 customers 
under its hire-purchase financing scheme '^ . 
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4.6.4 Distribution 
The number of Bajaj dealers across the country were 150 in 
1985. Since then, it increased to 270 in iggo"^ *^  and further 
71 to 300 in 1992 . With the advent of a buyer's market, the 
company appointed a second dealer when the earlier dealer 
did not reorient himself. 
Zweirad Roth GmbH of Germany are sole distributors of BAL in 
Europe. Further, more than 100 dealers across the country 
interface with the VAX 8800 mainframe computer at the 
company's Pune headquarters through dial-up telephone links. 
3,000 vehicles that are produced per day is despatched using 
a 1,400 truck fleet with inventory levels not over three 
days against 1 1/2 days of dealer funds lying with the 
72 
company on an average day . 
The company attaches significance to after-sales service and 
stocking of spare parts. Thus, BAL has over 550 service 
centres and spare parts dealers covering every state in the 
country . The company offers training to dealer's technical 
staff in after-sales service and periodically also deputes 
service engineers to dealerships. Says Arun Pande, GM 
(Marketing), "Even our dealership profile is changing. Gone 
are the days when no sooner did a BajaJ vehicle landed at a 
dealer's showroom, it was picked up. Now we are looking for 
more dynamic dealers who will actively complete in the 
market" . 
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4.6.5 The State of Competition 
Primarily, there are four active scooter manufacturers in 
the country (excludng Andhra Scooters which produced Just 
270 scooters in 1990-91 and none in 1991-92*^^, and Gujarat 
Harmada Auto Ltd which produced 3,596 scooters in 1991-92 ). 
With the liberalisation of the automobile policy in 1985, 
several new-comers have joined the two-wheeler bandwagon. 
Although BAL still holds a major share of the scooters 
segments, its market share has come down from a high of 95 
per cent in 1984'^ '^  to about 64 per cent in 1992"^^. In the 
three-wheelers segment, the company had a market share of 
about 70 per cent in 1985-86 which increased to 91 per cent 
in 1991-92"^^. Automobile Products of India Ltd (API) is 
BAL's only competitor in the three-wheeler segment. 
In the motorcyle segment, BAL has 27 per cent market share. 
The rest is shared by four other manufacturers. At present, 
the company has 9 per cent market share in the mopeds 
segment . Exhibit 4.6 shows the major players and their 
market shares. 
With the advent of Kinetic Honda and LHL Vespa, market share 
of BAL has come down considerably. "No doubt, competition 
has affected us", admits Rahul BaJaJ" . Even then, the 
company commands 40 per cent of the total two-wheeler 
market. Says Rahul BaJaJ, "Recession may come and go. What 
82 I'm worried about is competition" 
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Exhibit 4.6 : Major Players & their Market Shares (1991-92) 
Manufacturer 
Scooters 
Bajaj Auto 
LML 
Maharashtra 
Scooters 
Kinetic Honda 
TOTAL 
Mopeds 
TVS-Suzuki 
Kinetic Engineerin 
Market 
Share 
(5i) 
64 
11 
13 
12 
100 
33 
g 31 
Manufacturer 
Motorcvcles 
Baoaj Auto 
Escorts 
Hero Honda 
TVS-Suzuki 
Enfield India 
TOTAL 
Three-wheelers 
Bajaj Auto 
API 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
27 
27 
31 
9 
6 
100 
91 
9 
Majestic Auto 18 
Bajaj Auto 9 
Others 8 
TOTAL 100 TOTAL 100 
Source : Automotive Industry of India. Facts ^ Figures. 
1991-92. Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India, Kew Delhi, 1993, P. 4. 
The wealth of advanced technology available at BAL also 
plays an important role in the small scale industry sector. 
The company buys about 60 per cent of the components from 
vendors. Appropriate know-how is made available to vendors 
by the company's engineers to help them improve their own 
technology and the quality of their components, and also 
diversify their product range. 
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BAL's buyers are advised by its service engineers for 
maintenance of vehicles. The company pays considerable 
attention to the development of technical and service skills 
in small private workshops. The Service Division of BAL 
holds several training camps for garage owners and service 
mechanics to train them in the care and repair of 
Bajaj vehicles. 
Among the earliest two-wheeler manufacturers that attempted 
to export included BAL, The export efforts of the company 
started in 1973 by developing contacts in the Asian 
countries. To start with, sample vehicles were exported in 
the year 1973-74. The real export breakthrough came in 1975 
when technical collaboration agreements were signed with 
licencees in Indonesia and Taiwan for assembly-cum-
progressive manufacture of Bajaj scooters and three-
wheelers . Its two and three-wheelers were well-received 
in the Sout East Asian markets. However, the company is 
facing stiff competition from Japanese manufacturers who 
have re-entered these markets of late with trendier 
models^^. 
In 1980-81, BAL exported 12 per cent of India's total two-
wheeler production worth Rs 13.3 crore. Although exports 
dipped in 1984-85 (Rs 2.2 crore) , the company's exports in 
1990-91 were worth Rs 20.8 crore^"^. In 1991-92, BAL exported 
op 
vehicles worth Rs 14.9 crore . The company still earns 
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about 2 per cent of its turnover overseas . BAL aims to 
export 7.5 per cent of total production by 1995, In other 
words, the company plans to take its exports to Rs 100 crore 
90 in three years' time . "Currently, the bulk of our exports 
is to the Middle East and Southeast Asia", says V.G. Nulkar, 
Manager (Exports), "but we are also concentrating on 
91 
establishing our brands in Europe" . Says Rahul Bajaj, "The 
new brands [of scooters] will be launched with the Indian 
market in mind, but my export department's requirements will 
also be kept in mind m designing them" . 
The company is taking several steps to consolidate its 
position in the overseas market. BAL is modifying some of 
its products to meet European requirements. Says Rahul 
Bajaj, "We are also enlarging our global reach so that we 
have a presence in most major markets. Our entry into South 
93 America in 1992 has been rewarding" . BAL's export efforts 
include homologation of products exportable to major 
developed countries, further upgradation in manufacturing 
technology and productivity for achieving quality and price 
competitiveness, closer contact with overseas market and the 
induction of innovative product technology in the areas of 
fuel efficiency, exhaust emission control, auto electricals, 
94. 
etc. Says Rahul Bajaj, "To compete effectively in the 
world markets on a sustained basis, we have to reinvent 
.95 
ourselves as companies . 
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4.7 PRODUCTION AND QPERATTONS POT.TCTKS 
BAL has the most sophisticated mass production technology 
which makes it the country's most efficient and quality-
96 
conscious company . The manufacturing process is kept at a 
high level of efficiency through the extensive use of 
sophisticated flow production systems, optimised plant lay-
out, computerised inventory control and materials flow, 
production scheduling and advanced management information 
systems. The company undertakes value engineering exercises 
too. 
As the automotive industry requires a vast range of custom-
built special purpose machines and toolings, BAL set up a 
tooling division which started production in the 1960s. At 
present, the division produces about 90 per cent of the 
97 tooling required by the various plants . Manned by over 400 
personnel, the division is also responsible for maintenance 
of all current tools and development of toolings for new 
products . Such a facility not only ensures toolings which 
meet precise standards but also reduces the lead time for 
introducing new models. Thus, the company's efforts to 
achieve capability for rapid readjustment of manufacturing 
capacity to meet changing market demands have continued. 
However, during the current phase of recession, BAL slashed 
99 
production levels by 30 per cent from peak levels . As for 
operational plans, the day to day follow up and meeting of 
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operational short term targets are coordinated through 
monthly and quarterly production meetings. The monthly 
production meetings are presided by the CMD and are attended 
by all officers of the rank of managers and above. In case 
of quarterly meetings, the entire managerial staff including 
assistant managers also attend .the meeting . 
BAL has a well-defined quality assurance system. Therefore, 
despite the fact that one vehicle is produced every 35 
seconds, each of them undergoes 4,000 quality control 
checks . The quality assurance system starts with checking 
the quality and specifications of every bought out 
components and raw material. To maintain the viability of 
this system, BAL has more than one hundred 'Quality Circles' 
with a total membership of over 1000 persons. They meet 
regularly to evaluate current practices and discuss the 
development of more advanced techniques. 
With the adoption of the Japanese model [of manufacturing], 
each manufacturing process on the shopfloor of the company 
now acts as the client of the previous process which becomes 
the vendor and each process team has the right to reject 
parts of poor quality . After the recession hit BAL, the 
structure of its Quality Department has undergone a change. 
For one, the quality assurance staff no longer report to a 
quality assurance chief, who in turn, reported to the 
executive director. Instead, they now report to the 
production department and work in tandem with the newly-
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created product support group . The company believes that 
it is better to produce good quality rather than setting 
minimum quality standards. At present, each division bears 
the responsibility for the quality of its products itself 
instead of the Quality Assurance Department as in the recent 
past 104. 
The company has also laid emphasis on increasing 
productivity. Two years ago [1990], a single shift used to 
produce 128 scooters per assembly line which went up to 154 
scooters in 1991. And in 1992, the same assembly line with 
the same number of workers produce 210 scooters per shift 
-- a 64 per cent increase in people productivity . 
Otherwise also, people productivity (per employee value of 
production) has increased from Rs 31172 in 1986-87 to Rs 
519738 in 1990-91^°^. Earlier, BAL used to take 3 minutes 
and 10 seconds to make a scooter which has now been reduced 
107 to 1 minute and 58 seconds . The company has also 
introduced Suggestion Scheme to reduce cost and increase 
productivity. Many workers' suggestions have led to increase 
in productivity — in some cases upto the extent of 20 per 
cent 
BAL has acquired VAX 8800 mainframe computer that monitors 
the efficiency of each worker in the plant on a day-to-day 
basis. From a 65 per cent level in 1981, efficiency today is 
1 no 
up to 120 per cent . In the paint shop, which works round 
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the clock, the supervisor can solve problems cropping up 
late at night (when senior managers are not present) by 
using an expert system software that studies the symptoms 
and prescribes solutions. 
In the face of increasing competition, combined with 
recession in the two wheeler segment, the company is laying 
emphasis on cost reduction as well. As a result, five teams 
were created on a crash basis to deal with the key areas --
cost reduction, human resource development, vendor supplies, 
business planning, and product development and upgradation. 
To allow quick decision making and to demonstrate their 
criticality, each of the groups was headed by one of the 
general managers. Says Executive Director P.C. Nahar, "What 
is amazing is the way our priorities have percolated down. 
Everyone has started thinking in terms of cutting costs and 
increasig productivity' . Cost reduction meetings are held 
every Monday and Wednesday where managers and workers thrash 
out the suggestions coming from shopfloor workers. At the 
remotest possibility of a saving, a cost-reduction team gets 
to work. The company is also trying to bring down total raw 
materials costs by at least 10 per cent by 1995 which would 
lead to a saving of Rs 60 crore . At present, raw 
IIP 
materials constitute 54.9 per cent of production cost . 
BAL is less dependent on imports than others. Says G.V. 
Santurkar, General Manager (Works), "Import substitution has 
been easier for us. And with the rupee depreciating against 
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the yen, we have suffered relatively less' . Moreover, 
with an older plant, BAL's production cost has remained low 
despite the 120 per cent hike in wages since 1984-85. 
"Optimising on our input costs without comprising on quality 
has been our priority all through," says P.C. Mahar. He adds 
further: "Now that our volume is growing, efficiency and 
productivity will have to increase further. "We are trying to 
eliminate non-value added systems of operations altogether. 
Automation and flexible machines are going to be the order 
of the day" . The company also hired in 1986 Coopers & 
Lybrand, a UK management consultancy firm, at a fee of 
240.000 Pounds to suggest measures to improve capacity 
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utilisation and some other shopfloor exercises . 
4.7.1 Research and Development (R S D> 
R & D (or Product Engineering, as it is called within the 
company) is one department in BAL that does not have a 
1 1 R budget allocation . One reason for this is the company's 
obsession with self-reliance and quality. BAL's R & D 
division plans its work towards two objectives: identifying 
and meeting the needs of the market place, as much as those 
of the country. While one objective is to develop superior 
raw materials, reducing dependence on imported components 
and developing techniques to increase fuel-efficiency, the 
other objective is to ensure that the vehicles meet the most 
stringent exhaust emission level standards so as to reduce 
117 
environmental pollution . 
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Three new vehicles -- Legend, Stride (150 cc) and Sunny (50 
cc) -- and the popular rear-engined three-wheeler have been 
developed completely in-house by BAL's R & D department on a 
newly acquired mainframe computer. It is also to the credit 
of R & D wing that it modified the KB 100 motorcycle three 
times in less than three years of its launch. "We are also 
constantly developing newer cost-effective parts. In the 
coming years, we intend to replace a large portion of our 
steel requirements with polymer-based products," says G.P. 
Agarwal, General Manager (R & D)-'-^ °. 
During 1989-90, the project of metal replacement by 
polymeric materials was undertaken in association with the 
Department of Science & Technology and National Chemical 
Laboratory . The aim is to achieve the twin objectives of 
weight and cost reduction. Besides, the company has signed 
collaboration agreement with a Spanish company to make 
electronic components for two-wheelers, some of which will 
be microprocessor based. It is also seeking Italian help in 
body designing of its vehicles. "The main thrust of all 
these improvements is to upgrade the product. I admit that 
we are as yet not truly internationally competitive," says 
Rahul Bajaj^2°. 
BAL's expenditure on R & D in 1988-89 was Rs 1.68 crore 
which went up to Rs 5.62 crore in iggO-gi^ -^'- — that is, 
IP? 0.46 per cent of the turnover . The company plans to boost 
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R & D spending to Rs 23 crore a year on product development 
by 1995-96-^^^. BAL has adopted a two-pronged strategy for R 
& D -- one priority will be to improve upon BAL's present 
products by making them more fuel-efficient and 
ergonomically designed. And the other priority will be to 
develop new products . The present strategy is to bring R 
& D out of the lab onto the shopfloor and focus as much on 
1 ?5 
small innovations as on big breakthroughs . 
4,8 MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
The logistics of producing over 6,00,000 scooters, 
motorcycles, mopeds and three-wheelers a year demand 
unusually high levels of professionalism in the management 
of systems and men who manage them. Over the decades, BAL 
has developed a broad-based infra-structure of professionals 
in every function -- from highly skilled shopfloor workers 
to plant managers, procurement specialists, financial 
experts, system analysts, product designers, quality control 
engineers and marketing executives. As of present, BAL has a 
18,448 strong workforce^^^. 
The supervisory staff in BAL is divided into four grades. 
Above them come two officer "grades. Managers have three 
grades. The ranks of general manager and above are graded 
categories. The Executive Director is the kingpin in the day 
to day functioning of the company. Though designated 
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Executive Director, he however is not a member of the Board 
1 27 
of Directors-^"^' . 
With the advent of competition in the automobile industry, 
the recruitment policy at BAL has also changed. "We have 
stopped hiring management graduates except for finance and 
marketing. On the technical side, we are recruiting only 
engineering graduates and are training them in-house", says 
Ranjit Gupta, General Manager (Coordination) . After the 
recession hit automobile industry BAL has slashed staff 
strength in its Quality Department- from 400 to 300-^^^. 
When two-wheeler sales declined due to the Gulf War in 1990, 
about 1,800 temporary workers were retrenched. "But ", says 
Gangadhar Ambedkar, President of the Employees' Union, "the 
workers did not suffer any cut in salary as the fall in 
production was not their fault" . The employees of BAL are 
protected by an agreement signed in February 1990 under 
which they assured the management a 20 per cent increase in 
productivity in the manual part of the operations. Where 
increase was not achieved, there was no salary cut but the 
union was asked to make up production in the following year. 
The company's Chairman and Managing Director Rahul Bajaj has 
assured the workers that there will no retrenchment as this 
was the first time in 25 years that the company is facing a 
1 31 
recession . 
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Industrial relations within the company have generally been 
cordial except for late 1970s and early 1980s when the 
management went through rough weather with unions, as 
workers resisted the company's demand for optimum 
productivity levels, or demanded wage hikes. Overall, the 
management maintains a firm and fair dealing with workers. 
To boost productivity and increase quality continuously, 
there is involvement of all managers and workers -- the 
emphasis is on team work cutting across functional 
specialisations. The company has also implemented Suggestion 
Scheme through which BAL workers provided about 600 ways for 
132 
reducing expenditure . Many of these suggestions were 
implemented by the company. 
The system of rewards in BAL is based on the basis of 
impartial appraisal of the person's performance. Explains 
Rahul Bajaj, "Sincerity and hard work should be rewarded and 
by reward I don't mean only money, there should also be 
appreciation of his hard work. But mere appreciation will 
not motivate a person, so a proper balance of appreciation 
and monetary benefits is needed to get the best out of a 
person" ^ '^ '^. 
4.9 STRATEGIC PLAHS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 
BAL plans to achieve 50 per cent share of the two-wheeler 
market. And to achieve this goal, it has planned to leave no 
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segment untapped. Besides two 150 cc scooter models, the 
company plans to introduce a scooter with advance features 
like automatic transmission and self-starter. Says Arun 
Pande, GM (Marketing), "Our current products will be around 
for a very long time. Yet new needs are emerging everyday 
and we plan to satisfy all of them. The permeating spirit in 
our company has always been, and will be, constant growth on 
a large basis'"-^  . 
As regards Rahul Bajaj, Chairman and Managing Director of 
the company, his aim is to maintain leadership in India and 
establish the brand in the international markets. To quote 
him : "We want to be as good as anyone else in the world 
in technology, in reaction time, in customer 
satisfaction" . 
The ambitious plans of the company are backed by a strategy 
"that has always stood us in good stead", says Executive 
Director P.C. Hahar. We started with scooters and we are 
going to stick to scooters, the recent fancy for the new 100 
cc Japanese bikes notwithstanding. At Bajaj Auto, scooters 
will definitely be growing at a faster pace than 
motorcycles" 
BAL also plans to give a thrust to exports. Says Rahul 
Bajaj, "My immediate objective is to get into exports of 
two-wheelers in a big way and concentrate on developing a 
three-wheel personal transport vehicle. Adding a fourth 
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wheel would be a logical extension but unless there are 
large volumes, there is no point of getting into manufacture 
of cars"^^"^. 
The company is also pushing harder than ever on the R & D 
front because it has plans to launch at least one new 
product every year. As Rahul Bajaj says -- "Smother the 
competition! With volume, with range". BAL has three key 
priorities -- improve the fuel-efficiency of existing 
products, develop new products for niche markets, and come 
up with fundamentally new three-wheeler design . 
The long-term objective of the company is to become as big 
as possible in its own area, eschewing diversifications in 
field unrelated to its main line of activity as "without a 
certain size you cannot be an international player", says 
Rahul Bajaj . Thus, Bajaj Auto's aim is to improve 
processes, materials, models, cut costs and improve quality. 
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ESCORTS LIMTTED 
5-1 KVnUITTQH OF THE COMPANY 
The company was incorporated on October 17, 1944 at Lahore 
as a private company . After partition of the country in 
1947, the registered office of the company was shifted from 
Lahore to New Delhi. At that time, the company functioned as 
a small agency house and was known as Escorts (Agents) Pvt. 
Ltd . The company took its name from the fact that it used 
to escort goods from the manufacturer to consumer . 
The name of the company was changed from Escorts (Agents) 
Pvt. Ltd to Escorts Ltd upon its conversion into a public 
limited company on December 21, 1959 . In 1960, the company 
secured a licence for manufacture of 6,000 motorcycles per 
annum under the technical and foreign collaboration of 
CEKOP, Poland, and started production of motorcycle at 
Faridabad (Haryana). In 1978, the company entered into a 
technical collaboration with Yamaha Motor Co. of Japan for 
the manufacture of two-stroke, two-cylinder motorcycle 
engine of 350 cc capacity . The company later started 
manufacturing 350 cc motorcycles in 1983 and introduced 100 
n 
cc capacity motorcycles in 1985 . 
5.1.1 RiiRinftss Operations 
Escorts Ltd manufactures and markets motorcycles under the 
brand name 'Rajdoot'. The company also manufactures 
tractors, railway shock absorbers, agricultural implements. 
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heating elements, etc. In short, it a multi-product 
engineering company . Since its inception, the company has 
been functioning as a representative of well-known foreign 
manufacturers like M.A.N. Co. of the US, Massey Ferguson of 
UK, and several others. Besides, the company also carries on 
the business of general contractors and agency business of 
all kinds^. 
5.2 CORPORATE OBJKCTTVES 
Escorts is committed to producing products which are geared 
to meet the core needs of the people. The company believes 
in incorporating the world's finest existing technology to 
meet the demands of Indian consumers by collaborating with 
internationally renowned companies. Says Rajan Nanda, 
President of Escorts Ltd, "Our mission is to be leaders in 
whatever we make' . 
The company also believes that it is the people, rather than 
machines, that make an organisation successful. The 
philosophy and objectives of Escorts are reflected 
graphically in its symbol. The hidden philosophy behind the 
alphabet E in the word 'Escorts' is ENTERPRISE. The hexagon 
is a symbol of precision; when interpreted as a nut, it 
symbolises craftmanship and unending productivity. 
Firmly believing that success is a result of being close to 
the customer. Escorts has all along endeavoured to address 
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itself to the end user. As a result, all of Escorts products 
are considered leaders in keenly competitive markets . Says 
Anil Nanda, Managing Director, Escorts Ltd, "We need healthy 
and self-sustaining growth in competitive markets rather 
than competition per as.- We need to believe in strategies 
and run organisation in terms of competition and total 
quality"^^. 
The Escorts group, as a whole, has earned a name for itself 
in farm mechanisation equipment and is currently 
spearheading the technological drive to penetrate rural 
areas — a corporate mission of Escorts according to its 
13 Chairman, Mr H.P. Nanda . The immediate gameplan of the 
company is to revitalise the health of its mainstay 
operations in motorcycles, upgrade technology and add more 
products to strengthen its market position . 
5.3 ORGANISATTQH STRUCTURE AHO MANAGEMENT 
The Board of Directors of the company consists of fifteen 
members and is headed by its Chairman Mr H.P. Nanda. Mr. 
Rajan Nanda is the Company's Vice-Chairman and President 
while Mr Anil Nanda is its Managing Director. Mr Anil 
Nanda's main brief is to run the large scale motorcycle 
operation while Rajan Nanda is the overall incharge. Their 
father Mr H.P. Nanda does not play any active role in the 
1 'i 
running of the companies anymore . Escorts' Group structure 
is shown in Exhibit 5.1. 
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Exhibit 5,1 : Escorts Group Structure 
Escorts Board of Directors 
* Chairman 
* Vice-chairman & President 
* Managing Director 
Company Secretary office 
3. Group Corporate Functions 
* Finance Control : 
* Human Resources 
* Projects 
Treasury Operations 
Management / Development / 
Planning / Industrial 
Relations 
New Project / 
Expansion / Business Strategy 
Group Administrative Services 
* Legal Affairs Department 
* Exports 
* Advertising, Public and Government Relations 
Group Service Companies & Departments 
* Escorts Employees Welfare Ltd 
Escorts Medical Centre 
Escorts Employees Welfare Trust 
Escorts Leasing and Finance Ltd 
Cardiac Care Centre 
Snhsidiarv Companies fIndependent Board of Directors^ 
* Escorts Tractors Ltd : Tractors 
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* Goetse (India) Ltd : Piston Rings 
* Escorts JCB Ltd : Excavators & Loaders 
* Escorts Financial Services 
Ltd : Leasing / Hire 
Purchase 
* Escorts Herion Ltd : Hydraulic Valves 
* Escorts Employees 
Ancillaries Ltd : Magnetos & Clutches 
* Escorts Electronic Ltd : Trading 
* Escorts Ltd : Motorcycles / Tractors 
Source : Adapted from N. Chandra Mohan & B. Murali, 
"Escorts : Thinking big once again", Business 
India, Aug. 31 - Sept. 13, 1992, P. 55, and 
various issues of Annual Reports of the company 
The Escorts Group today comprises basically of five major 
companies, with interests in motorcycles, tractors, auto 
components, construction and farm equipment, and finance. 
However, substantial part of the group's turnover comes from 
16 the automotive and tractor divisions . 
Escorts Ltd has a divisionalised management structure. The 
company has eight divisions. Escorts has adopted the profit-
centre concept. Each centre is highly decentralised and has 
17 
a fairly powerful finance person . The various divisions of 
the company, their activities and status of divisional heads 
are shown in Exhibit 5.2. 
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Exhibit 5.2 Management Structure and Activities of Escorts 
Group 
DIVISION HEAD OF DIVISION ACTIVITIES 
* Tractor 
Division 
Associate Vice-
President 
* Engineering 
Division 
* Motorcyle & 
Scooter 
Division 
* Projects & Power 
Power 
Marketing 
Division 
Vice-President 
Vice President 
(Operations) & 
Vice President 
(Marketing) 
Executive Vice 
President 
Manufactures range of 
tractors at Faridabad 
plant. Manufacturing 
and marketing of indus-
trial and construction 
equipment. 
Manufacturing and mark-
eting of automotive 
shock absorbers, heavy 
duty shock absorbers, 
railway brakes, couplers, 
industrial x-ray machines 
and heating elements. 
Manufacture and marketing 
of a range of motorcycles. 
Also magnetos. 
Sales, service and ins-
tallation of power, gene-
rating sets, sub-stations, 
transmission lines mining, 
drilling and communication 
equipment and turn-key 
projects in India and 
abroad. 
* Automotive 
Division 
Associate Vice 
President 
Manufacturing of pistons 
and pins at Patiala and 
Bangalore plants 
* Telecommunication Associate Vice Manufacture and marketing 
Division President of EPABX systems and key 
telephones 
* Farm equipment 
Division 
Vice President Marketing of Escorts 
Tractors and its spare 
parts. Marketing of Ford 
tractors and its spare 
parts. 
* Agency Sales 
Division 
Vice President Sales, service and ins-
tallation of diesel 
engines, alternators, 
control panels, gear boxes, 
shafting and propellors. 
Source : Adapted from various iFssues of Annual Reports. 
Escorts Ltd 
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With Escorts losing its market share, it has now decided to 
redefine operations. The company's plan is to make Escorts a 
lean organisation, with even greater emphasis on their 
fortes -- motorcycles and tractors. A four-pronged strategy 
has been drawn up which includes: hiving off the loss-making 
telecommunications division; transferring the piston making 
and assembly units to Goetze (India) Ltd - a group company; 
slashing overheads in Escorts; and modifying the Rajdoot 
1 ft 
motorcycle to meet today's market needs. Says Lfoesh 
Bannerji, finance controller, "A decision has been taken to 
phase out [unviable] lines and operations' . Adds 
President of the company, Rajan Nanda, "The emphasis today 
in on rationalisaton so that at the end we will have three 
major business groups -- motorcycles, tractors and others 
like auto components, each contributing to a third of 
4. "20 turnover . 
The company's corporate gameplan is to evolve the flagship 
Escorts Ltd as a predominantly vehicle manufacturing 
company, while components and other ancillaries would be 
farmed out to other group enterprises and subsidiaries which 
will gradually be leveraged into public limited companies 
21 
within the 'Escorts Group . Already 80 per cent of Escorts 
turnover accrues from vehicles and the strategy is to 
increase that proportion. Another strategy which is being 
implemented is to leverage each of the company's 
22 
subsidiaries and formulate growth plans for each of them 
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The Escorts strategy marks the beginning of group planning 
for Escorts and its clutch of subsidiaries. According to 
Rajan Handa, the move to restructure Escorts is part of the 
company's long-term group planning for the flagship company 
together with its subsidiaries and associate companies. "We 
have done through introspection and taken a close look at 
23 
our product profile", comments Rajan Nanda. 
Escorts has sold off deadwood diversification units in order 
to be leaner and fitter for the years ahead . Says Rajan 
Nanda, "We are rescheduling our expenses in alignment with 
our revenues" . 
5.4 STRATEGIC SHIFTS 
Escorts Ltd is the flagship company of the Escorts Group, 
With over 20,000 employees and a turnover exceeding Rs 1,000 
crore. Escorts Ltd is one of India's premier engineering 
companies. Escorts has grown virtually from scratch to 
emerge as one of the top company in the country . 
Escorts is considered a good company with marketing and 
engineerng strengths. The company has constantly focussed on 
the engineering sector, technology upgradation and quality 
control. With the opening up of the economy in the 1980s, 
the company has embarked on a path of diversification and 
has been restructuring its present operations. 
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5.4.1 ^iT-.e of the Coppanv 
Escorts was initially given licence to manufacture 6,000 
27 
motorcycles in 1960 which gradually kept increasing. With 
the launch of 350 cc Yamaha motorcycle in 1983 and of 100 cc 
motorcycle in 1985, the licensed capacity of the company 
went upto 5,21,250 numbers per annum in 1986-87 . Yamaha RX 
100 was started with a capacity of 1,50,000 units per 
29 
annum . 
Consequent to the Government's liberalisation policy. 
Escorts increased its licensed capacity to 6,64,083 units 
30 per annum . Exhibit 5.3 shows the total capacity of the 
company as on March 31, 1991. 
Exhibit 5.3 : Capacity Statistics of Escorts (in nos.) 
Class of Goods 
Capaciy Per Annum 
Licensed Installed 
* Motorcycle upto 400 cc 3,32,000 1,31,250 
and scooters 
* Motorised 2-wheelers 3,32,063 1,32,500 
upto 350 engine 
capacity 
TOTAL 6,64,063 2,63,750 
Source : Adapted from The Official Stock Exchange 
Directory. March 26, 1990, Vol. 13/30 (iv) & 
Automan. AIAM, 1991, pp. 151-152. 
Escorts expanded its capacity primarily between 1982 and 
1985. In order to manufacture the RXlOO model of 
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motorcycles, the company established a manufacturing 
facility at Surajpur, Uttar Pradesh. At present. Escorts 
31 
capacity utilisation is about 60 per cent . 
5.4.2 Growth of the Company 
Escorts Ltd started manufacturing motorcycles in 1961. The 
decade betwen 1965 and 1975, proved to be the growth years 
of the company. Despite a dismal national industrial average 
growth of four per cent a year. Escorts grew at a twenty per 
cent annual growth rate for a decade . The company 
exploited every business opportunity that came in its way 
and created others where none existed. Escorts expanded into 
virtually everything that moved on wheels : motorcycles, 
33 tractors, excavators, cranes, etc . 
However, the company faced deceleration in the mid-1980s. 
The causes of slow growth in the recent past have been many. 
Most important of these was the non-resident Indian Swraj 
Paul's bid for a hostile takeover of the Company. From 1983 
to 1987, the management of Escorts did little else but to 
cope with the after-effects of the takeover bid . But at 
the same time, the Company planned to embark on a massive 
horizontal and vertical integration in the existing fields. 
A detailed plan was drawn up to venture into each segment 
35 
of the two-wheeler industry . 
During the period 1970-86, the growth of the Company was 
16.2 per cent. However, the expansion of capacity between 
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1981 and 1985, and the opening of related diversification 
possibilities as a result of broad banding of capacity in 
1985, resulted in exceptional growth in the Company's 
production. During the period 1980-85, the company recorded 
an overall production and sales growth of 52 per cent. 
According to a study conducted by Business World. Escorts 
recorded a rate of growth of 378 per cent during the 
eighties . The production of motorcycles, which was merely 
48,579 in 1980-81"^ "^ , went up to 83,418 in 1985-86^^ and 
further increased to 158,539'^^ in 1989-90. Earlier, in 1982, 
Escorts produced just 38 vehicles which increased to 17,267 
in 1970 (including 767 scooters) and to 24,513 in 1975 
(including 538 scooters) . Between 1961-65, the company 
produced 14,204 vehicles . Exhibit 5.4 shows the growth in 
production of the company since 1980-81. 
Exhibit 5.4 : Growth in Production (in nos.) 
Year Motorcycles Year Motorcycles 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
48,579 
54,631 
60,857 
72,775 
87,213 
85,239 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
100,890 
125,810 
148,003 
156,539 
154,311 
116,514 
Source : Automotive Industry of India. Facts and Figures. 
1991-92j Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association, New Delhi, 1993, P. 8. 
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Although the company has grown in the post-liberalisation 
period, the current phase of recession has hit Escorts the 
hardest among the motorcycle manufacturers. Says H.M. Mehta, 
Vice President of the Company's motorcycle and scooter 
division, "Demand has gone into hibernation". As a result. 
Escorts is saddled with huge inventories. The company's 
production went down to 154.3 thousand vehicles in 1990-91 
from 156.5 thousand vehicles in 1989-90'^'^. In 1991-92, the 
company produced 116.5 thousand vehicles , the lowest since 
1987-88. 
5.4.3 Distinctive Conpetencies 
Increased horizontal and vertical integration, constant 
technological upgradation and improved product quality are 
some of the major factors that have lent Escorts a 
competitive advantage over its rivals in the motorcycle 
segment of the automobile industry. The company also has a 
formidable presence in the engineering industry due to its 
AC. 
presence in the major sectors of the economy . Escorts' 
apparent advantage over its cmpetitors is its better access 
to ancillaries. Another advantage for the company is that 
its vehicles are ninety-five per cent indigenous and it 
does not have to bow to the pressure of Japanese yen for 
imports. 
Escorts has always concentrated on product excellence. The 
company has created a market niche in rural and semi-urban 
areas for its Rajdoot motorcycle -- a market which, till 
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recently, none of Escorts competitors could enter. The 175 
Rajdoot motorcycle is rugged, goes to remote rural areas and 
is fully indigenous. Its prices are much lower than the 
motorcycles manufactured with Japanese collaborations . 
5.4.4 Key Strategic Actiona and Events 
To manufacture piston rings, Escorts tied-up with Goetze AG 
of Germany and established Goetze (India) Ltd at Patiala in 
48 1954. In 1959, the company acquired licence and technology 
of Hahle of Germany for manufacture of pistons and tied-up 
with Suko AG of Germany in 1962 for manufacture of piston 
pins. It later entered into a technical agreement with Knorr 
49 Bremse for manufacture of vacuum and air-brakes in 1969 . 
Escorts has been the brand leader in the manufacture of 30 
mm to 300 mm range piston assemblies and has been supplying 
these products to major engine and vehicle manufacturers 
including Tata, Ashok. Ley land, Baj aj , etc ". 
In 1960, the company entered into technical and foreign 
collaboration agreement with CEKOP of Poland for the 
manufacture of motorcycles. Escorts took over Bahri 
Automobiles in Bombay in 1965 and later converted it into 
Escorts Transmission Ltd at Faridabad. The company 
manufactures hydraulic and automotive components / sub-
assemblies. 
In 1978, the company entered into a technical collaboration 
with Yamaha Motor Company of Japan for the manufacture of a 
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two-stroke, two-cylinder motorcycle engine of 350 cc 
capacity, developing an output of 18 to 24 bhp^-^. Yamaha was 
the first Japanese company to enter India with this 
collaboration. As no foreign collaborations were permitted 
in the automotive sector, Escorts had availed of the Yamaha 
technology through the Technology Development Fund (TDF)^^. 
This technology was later integrated into the expansion and 
diversification activities of the company's motorcycle 
operations. 
Escorts entered into a technical collaboration with MAN 
(Maschinenfabrik Augsburg Nurnberg) AG of Germany in 1981 
for the manufacture of IC engines, diesel engines and engine 
blocks^^. 
With the opening up of the economy in the eighties. Escorts 
entered into a formal technical collaboration with Yamaha 
Motor Co. in 1983 for the manufacture of the fuel-efficient 
100 cc motorcycles -- the RX 100. The company constructed 
a separate plant at Surajpur <U.P.) in 1984 and commercial 
55 production commenced in November 1985 . 
The financial services subsidiary of Escorts — Escorts 
Financial Service Ltd -- started operations in September 
1990^ . The technical collaboration agreement with Yamaha 
was renewed in April 1992 for another five years with a 
long-term programme perspective for expanding product 
57 
range"^'. 
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Escorts' joint venture with German automobile giant BMW, for 
the manufacture of four-stroke 125 cc to 150 cc engines for 
motorcycles received Government clearance in September 
1991 . The company has recently tied up with Italian firm 
Hineralli to enter the 50 cc moped segment. The 
collaboration aims to make use of the capacity at Escorts' 
Faridabad plant which is underutilised due to the fall in 
sales of the company's 175 Rajdoot motorcycle model . 
5.5 CAPITAL ACQUISITIQH AMD FIHAMCE 
The company has a paid-up capital of Rs 3390 lakhs Major 
shareholders of Escorts Ltd are financial institutions (44.5 
81 per cent), public (37 per cent) and NRIs (2.5 per cent) . 
The debt-equity ratio of the company is 0.4:1. Sometimes 
this year, the company plans to raise Rs 236 crore through a 
partially convertible debenture (PCD) issue. This would 
6? further lower the debt-equity ratio to 0.3:1 . 
From a turnover of Rs 197.21 crore in 1980-81^*^, Escorts 
64 
reached a turnover of Rs 943 crore in 1990-91 and to Rs 
1093 crore in 1991-92®^. Although turnover of the company 
increased by over 12.7 per cent in 1992 over the previous 
year, profits after tax declined by more than 60 per cent 
for the year ended March 31, 1992. 
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Exhibit 5.5 : Balance Sheet of Escorts Ltd 
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Exhibit 5.6 : Profit and Loss Statement of Escorts Ltd 
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Escorts profit after tax in 1990-91 was Rs 53.40 crore while 
in 1991-92, it was Rs 21.15 crore . A constant stream of 
new projects with long lead times besides recession, 
inflation and dearer money depressed the profits. Says Rajan 
Handa, "Escorts is today not operating at its optimal 
levels. We have lost a turnover of about Rs 400 crore and 
R7 profits of about Rs 40 crore to Rs 50 crore". Adds Anil 
Handa, "Rising cost of imports and . inflation have put 
severe pressure on profit margins. In the short run, 
therefore, the future looks bleak. However, given the 
resilience of Indian industry, we should in the long run 
RR 
certainly bounce back" . However, in a hostile corporate 
environment. Escorts feels rather vulnerable to take-overs 
which essentially stems from being a vastly under-
capitalised company . Exhibit 5.5 and 5.6 show the 
consolidated balance sheet, and profit-and loss account of 
the company respectively for the period 1980 to 1990. 
5.6 MARKETIHG POLICIES 
Ever since Escorts started manufacturing motorcycles, it was 
the largest manufacturer of motorcycles in the country. 
However, the liberalisation of Indian economy in mid-1980s 
led to entry of other motorcycle manufacturers which pushed 
Escorts to the second position. In order to meet the 
challenge of the market place, the company introduced new 
models of motorcycles. The company also gave more emphasis 
on marketing strategies in the post-liberalisation period. 
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5.6.1 Product 
The company has been producing motorcycles since 1962 and 
markets its products under the brand name 'Rajdoot'. It 
started producing and marketing sports model motorcycles 
'Rajdoot GTS' in 1972 which was popularly known as 'Bobby 
Rajdoot'. Escorts' Rajdoot 175 cc motorcycle was the market 
leader. During its peak years, Rajdoot 175 found 50,000 
70 
customers in the non-metro markets . 
In 1991, the sales of Rajdoot 175 crashed to 56,277 from an 
all time high of 97,176 motorcycles in 1990. And since 1985, 
when the company's competitors first unleashed their more 
fuel-efficient 100 cc motorcycles, the once supreme 175 cc 
Rajdoot has been losing its market share -- from 60 per 
71 
cent, its share is down to 18 per cent . Says Rajan Nanda, 
"Business in the pre and post liberalisation period are not 
72 the same" . 
The company introduced the 350 cc Rajdoot motorcycle in 1982 
as a result of the collaboration agreement with Yamaha Motor 
Co., Japan. Rajdoot Yamaha 350 was not a big success and the 
company made the logical move of discontinuing production. 
The main reason was that the volume of sales did not cover 
the cost of production. Also, the high cost of maintenance 
combined with a lower fuel-efficiency had stalled sales. 
This forced the company to close the dvision and cut back 
its losses . 
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As a result of Escorts' technical collaboration with Yamaha 
Motor Co., the company introduced 100 cc motorcycles 
Rajdoot RX 100 in 1986^. Besides, the company devised a 
strategy to combat the competition from the 100 cc Japanese 
motorcycles. It launched Rajdoot AC 130 in 1987 to cater to 
the semi-urban areas . 
Escorts' joint venture company with BMW of Germany is to be 
incorporated in 1992-93 for the manufacture of 125 cc new 
7R generation motorcycles for the domestic market . Besides, 
the company is also planning to widen its product base 
further by introducing a 50 cc moped by using the Italian 
Mineralli technology. It is planned to be launched this year 
(1993) with an initial capacity of 60,000 units per annum . 
Says P.S. Batra, Vice President (Marketing) of Escorts Ltd, 
"We want to offer the complete range- from 50 cc moped to a 
7R 350 cc motorcycle' . 
5.6.2 Pricing 
The objective of the company is to provide the customer with 
a quality product at a reasonable price. Why Rajdoot 175 
still sells could be attributed to extraneous factors such 
as the yen appreciation or duty differentials. The price 
differential of about Rs 7,000 as compared to the 100 cc 
Japanese motorcycles exhibits the company's concern towards 
79 pricing . Returns on Rajdoot 175, on the other hand, are 
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only 5 per cent. Even these returns are getting squeezed 
because of increasing input costs, and the company is 
finding it difficult to raise the price in a competitive 
market. 
Otherwise also, it has been Escorts' constant endeavour to 
manufacture products at a viable scale of operations so as 
to price the product on its production efficiency basis. 
Although cost of major inputs like steel and power increased 
by about 200 per cent between 1980 and 1985, the prices of 
on 
Escorts motorcycles increased only by about 34 per cent . 
The price of Yamaha RX 100 increased by 14.6 per cent in 
1991 to Rs 28,897 from Rs 25,225 in 1990^^. Incidentally, 
this was despite two-wheelers being exempted frou the hike 
in special excise duty. Being dependent on imported inputs, 
their costs went up after the devaluation of Rupee. Besides, 
ancillary units of the company also raised their prices 
after their raw material costs increased. 
Withdrawal of concessional duty of two-wheelers, enjoyed by 
them on import of components, in the 1992 Union Budget led 
to a further increase in the price of Escorts RX 100 model. 
Even during the recessionary phase in 1991-92, Escorts had 
to increase the prices of its vehicles due to 
underutilisation of production capacities and a simultaneous 
increase in the prices of inputs. 
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5.6.3 Promotion 
Escorts' Rajdoot 175 cc model of motorcycle was India's 
largest selling motorcycle in pre-liberalisation period. 
Consequently, the emphasis on product promotion was not 
much. However, with the entry of new players in the 
motorcycle segment during mid-1980s, the company gave more 
thrust to promotion of its products. Consequently^ Escorts 
adopted an aggressive marketing strategy for Yamaha RX 100. 
For its 175 cc model alone, the company spends Rs 1 crore 
every year on advertising . 
Total expenditure on sales promotion in 1989-90 was Rs 1097 
lakh which went up to Rs 1204 lakh in 1990-91.^"^ Expenditure 
on commissions and discounts amounted to Rs 415 lakh in 
1989-90 and Rs 457 lakh in 1990-91. In 1989-90, expenditure 
on advertising and publicity was Rs 882 lakh which 
increased to Rs 747 lakh in 1990-91^^. 
The company took a decision to position the 175 cc model as 
a rugged rural model, leaving the RX 100 to cater to the 
performance-oriented urban market. Says P.S. Batra, Vice 
President (Marketing), "The needs of these two markets are 
very different. City driving requires quick accelertion and 
good road handling capabilities while in the rural market, 
ruggedness and ease of maintenance are important criteria in 
the purchase decision' . To this effect, the advertising 
communication was also changed -- the strategy was to 
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establish that the technology vias appropriate for Indian 
conditions. On the other hand. Escorts exploited the 
performance image of the Yamaha RX 100 by projecting it as a 
flR performance machine . 
Escorts Financial Services Ltd -- a 100 per cent subsidiary 
of Escorts was established in 1990. It has been engaged in 
hire-purchase services of the company's products as well as 
those manufactured by other organisations. The company has 
disbursed financial assistance of Rs 40 crore in 1991-92. It 
has now enlarged its scope of operations to include merchant 
banking and other financial services. Its capital has 
already been increased from Rs 1 crore to Rs 2.5 crore in 
the current financial year and will be expanded further to 
enhance its revenue earnings . 
5.6.4 Distribution 
Escorts has managed to stay ahead of its competitors in the 
area of distribution. Its dealer network, which has evolved 
over the years to cover virtually every centre of demand for 
motorcycles, is acknowledged by industry observers to be one 
of the best. Says P.S. Batra, "We have an excellent 
distribution network". 
Escorts has a network of more than 700 dealers all over the 
country selling its motorcycles. To ensure prompt service to 
its customers, it has 100 service vans and 1,000 service 
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motorcycles. The company's sales and service staff manages a 
trained workforce of 5000 dealers personnel. There are more 
than 3000 retailers of auto-components / spare parts 
manufactured by Escorts. Therefore, easy availability of 
spare parts and quick serviceability has helped Escorts in 
popularising its vehicles. The marketing section of 
Motorcycle and Scooter Division of the company undertakes 
89 programme for dealer development . 
5-6.5 The State of Competition 
Primarily, there are six motorcycle manufacturers in the 
country (including Ideal Jawa which produced 5800 
motorcycles in 1990-91 and none in 1991-92^°). With the 
opening of the economy, several new players have joined the 
motorcycle segment. As a result. Escorts share in the 
motorcycle segment has come down from a high of 47 per cent 
in 1984^ ''- to 29 per cent in 1991^^. Its market share further 
went down to 27.06 per cent in 1991-92. Exhibit 5.7 shows 
the major players and their market shares. 
Exhibit 5.7 : Major Players and their Market Shares 
(1991-92) 
Manufacturer Market Manufacturer Market 
Share (%) Share (X) 
Escorts 27 TVS-Suzuki 9 
Bajaj Auto 27 Enfield 6 
Hero Honda 31 
Source : Automotive Industry of India. Facts & Figures. 
1991-92. Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, P. 4. 
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With the entry of Hero Honda and Bajaj Auto Ltd in the 
motorcycle segment, market share of Escorts has suffered 
adversely. Exhibit 5.8 shows the major players in 100 cc 
category and their market shares. 
Exhibit 5.8 : Market Share in 100 cc Category (1992) 
Manufacturer Market Manufacturer Market 
Share (%) Share (%) 
Hero Honda 52.1 Bajaj Auto 15.2 
Escorts 20.6 TVS-Suzuki 12.1 
Source : Sushila Ravindranath, "TVS-Suzuki : Revving up", 
Rnsine.'=;s India. March 15-28, 1993, P. 87. 
The company relies heavily on ancillary units for production 
of motorcycles. Says Anil Handa, "For motorcycles, we rely 
upon outside suppliers rather than thinking of setting up 
93 
our own manufacturing unit with an enormous expense" . 
Automobile pistons, shock absorbers and piston rings, 
manufactured through Escorts associate company Goetze 
(India) Ltd, are products with 10 per cent in-house 
consumption . 
In fact, ancillarisation was a part of growth strategy of 
the company since its inception. The company spawned 900 
ancillary component manufacturers in the Faridabad area. 
Thus, ancillarisation turned out to be of immense help in 
growth of the company and in earning profits. The company 
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buys 75 per cent of its motorcycle components from ancillary 
• 4. 95 units . 
The company has also been exporting its vehicles mainly to 
South Asian and African markets. In 1988-87, Escorts 
exported vehicles worth Rs 3.01 crore which increased to Rs 
4.35 crore in 1988-89^°. Its exports grew to Rs 34.25 crore 
in 1991 and further to Rs 40.55 crore in 1992^'^. Despite its 
willingness to capture overseas markets, the company has not 
been able to make much headway as Japanese do not let their 
collaborators undertake any significant exports. Says H.P. 
Nanda, "We cannot export Rajdoot and the Japanese will not 
98 let me export RX 1 0 0 " . Net forex earning of Escorts was Rs 
31 crore^^ in 1991-92. 
5.7 PRODUCTION AHD OPERATIOHS POLTCTES 
The liberalisation of the economy in 1984 set the stage for 
newer entrants into the marketplace and the resultant 
competition probably made Escorts rethink their priorities. 
For years, Escorts made a conscious decision that it did not 
need the newest technology -- instead, it was highly labour 
-- intensive. Today, chastened by competition. Escorts has a 
plan that will hopefully put it back in the driver's seat. 
Says H.P. Nanda, "We have had to change our way of thinking 
and our plans. We are computerising extensively, getting the 
latest technology and cutting down on labour" . As a 
result, automatic and CNC (computerised numerically 
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controlled) machines are replacing the older ones in the 
factories to improve quality and productivity, and output 
per man . Adds H.P. Handa, "With liberalisation and 
convertibility of rupee, Indian industry was now exposed to 
global competition. Escorts has accordingly taken strategic 
steps and realigned its resources with emphasis on 
technology, quality and cost effectiveness' . 
The company has also undertaken product and technology 
improvements in the existing fields of production. It has 
upgraded its manufacturing facilities. Says P.S. Batra, Vice 
President (Marketing), "We have facilities for many 
Operations like a paint shop, machining shop, e t c " . 
Elaborates H.P. Nanda, "Vertical integration in existing 
fields will also be achieved by setting up casting and 
forging facilities in the coming years. One's own units in 
these areas will lead to considerable savings in costs" . 
Escorts Ltd has embarked on a major cost-cutting exercise. 
The Value Engineerng Department of the company suggests ways 
to reduce the cost of the product without affecting its 
quality. The Capital Budgeting Section of the company plans 
and procures machines in the process of formulation and 
implementation of manufacturing activity. The required 
machines are mostly purchased from outside sources such as 
HMT, or are imported if no suitable indigenous source 
exists. Besides, some of the machines are also developed in 
the company's SPM Section depending on cost, sophistication 
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and urgency. Moreover, this department prepares a five year 
investment plan taking into consideration capacity 
enhancement, replacement policy for all machines and 
105 technology upgradation 
The Product Engineering Design Department of the company 
design the assemblies, sub-assemblies and parts of a 
product. The proposed design undergoes a feasibility study, 
conducted by the Product Engineering Testing Section. Before 
being released, the product design is completely tested by 
this section for endurance and other functional aspects of 
the prototype. After successful testing of the prototype, 
the final design documents are released for information and 
necessary action to various departments such as Industrial 
Engineering, Manufacturing Engineering, Materials, 
Production Planning and Control, Quality Control and 
Inspections, and Marketing Department. It is due to the 
presence of such infrastructure within the company that 
Escorts has been able to sell the relevant technology in the 
market. A classic success story in relevant technology is 
the Escorts 175 cc Rajdoot motorcycle, a product which has 
1 nR 
steadily evoluted over a quarter century . As a result, 
the company has been responding to the needs of the changing 
market through product development and innovation. 
The company has constantly upgraded its Industrial 
Engineering Section which plays a vital role in the complete 
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manufacturing activities such as plant layout, installation 
and commissioning of machines, component cost estimation, 
etc. Plant modernisation has been undertaken by the company 
in order to reduce manufacturing cost. The company's 
production and operations policies are geared towards 
broadening the product range, product development and 
quality improvement. Keeping in mind the problems of vastly 
greater loads. Escorts has embarked on a plan for developing 
a range of rugged products with an eye on the future. 
Over the years. Escorts has invested . in some of the 
country's most modern manufacturing facilities -- at present 
numbering sixteen. The company envisages that in the 
challenging decade ahead, these plants will serve as the 
Escorts resource, one that will continue to give products 
that incorporate the most contemporary innovations and 
technology-^^ . 
5.7.1 Research and Developgent <R & D> 
Escorts believes that in the 1990s, the difference between 
survival and supremacy will be dictated by one factor — the 
willingness to invest in research and development (R & 
10ft D) °. Says P.S. Batra, "We are constantly researching and 
upgrading our product, so that, while the technology 
remained appropriate to Indian roads and conditions, the 
fuel-efficiency and other aspects improved in step with 
developments in the market" •^^. Rapid indigenisat ion of the 
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RX 100 motorcycle is an example of the company's R & D 
capabilities. In five years' time the RX 100 model has been 
indigenised upto 95 per cent . It is, however, not doubted 
that the process of product development and innovation was 
aided by the infusion of Japanese technology via the Yamaha 
models of motorcycles . 
Collaboration with international organisations of 
technological excellence, constant research to adopt the 
emerging technology to the specific requirements of the 
market, and belief in the philosophy of industrial inter-
dependence have made Escorts a leadng company in the 
automobile industry. The Escorts Research Centre (ERC) at 
Faridabad is making sustained efforts in meeting the ever-
widening market horizons of technological competence in tune 
with the country's unique and changing needs. Escorts has 
invested considerably in R & D and has trained its personnel 
abroad . Apart from development of existing products, the 
company has laid considerable emphasis on improving 
acceleration, fuel-efficiency and lowering of exhaust 
emission of its vehicles. Says Anil Nanda, "We will do 
whatever is necessary to improve our models and may be 
113 
restyle if . According to N. Venkataraman, Managing 
Director of the Madras-based, India Pistons Ltd, "Escorts 
is a good competitor and deserves respect for its good 
technology and diversified range of products' . 
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5-8 MAHAflKHKHT OF HUMAH RESOURCES 
The company believes that it is the people, rather than 
machines, that make an organization successful. Escorts 
acknowledgement to its people is reflected in the fact that 
it takes care to nurture the skills of its employees and 
their talents by offering them growing and prosperous 
careers, not mere jobs. The company attributes its success 
to a constellation of the right people — numbering more 
than 24,000 — striving for one goal — progress, one 
commitment --perfection, one attitude — professionalism and 
one philosophy --enterprise of work. The company also lays 
emphasis on team-work. In its more than four decades of 
existence, the company has developed the right kind of 
professionalism that is needed to run a large 
^„^„„^„^.. „115 corporation 
In the post-liberalisation period. Escorts is restructuring 
its set-up to have a complete synergy. Enumerating the 
measures that are being taken up, H.P, Nanda says, "First, 
we are trying to cut down the unnecessary manpower in our 
new plants by introducing automation and computerisation. 
This was started after the Yamaha tie-up. A golden handshake 
1 1 R 
scheme is being offered for affected workers' . Admits 
Rajan Nanda that the company is overstaffed at present but 
with progressive modernisation, hopes it will require fewer 
117 people . 
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To cut down on manpower costs, intake of freshers has been 
frozen for the last few years and an attempt has been made 
to make the workers more versatile. This, however, seems 
inadequate. Escorts' staff costs have increased from Rs 44 
crore in 1987 to Rs 84 crore in 1990-91 — an increase of 90 
per cent 
Escorts Ltd went for some drastic cost-cutting measures when 
there was a downturn in the two-wheeler and automobile 
industry. In a span of ten days, the company relieved 10 
executives from the motorcycle division, all of them being 
senior level personnel. Those who were sacked were Vice 
119 Presidents and senior divisional managers . The move was a 
part of the company's reorganisation exercise as well. Says 
Rajan Handa, "In an organisation that employs 24,000 people 
out of whom 700-800 are managers, dropping 10 persons is no 
reason for panic. There is no design to dismantle 
operations.... We are cutting expenses right across and 
120 
rationalising our operations'. 
Notwithstanding the above actions, the company is known as a 
fair and generous employer which cares for its employees. It 
121 gives incentives to workers for raising productivity . It 
gives considerable importance to manpower training and 
development. The Personnel Department of the company is 
responsible for employment, manpower planning, training and 
development, personnel administration, industrial 
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relations, welfare, general administration and security 
services. 
Escorts' commitment to its people goes beyond an individual 
and extends to their families and to the community as a 
whole. As part of the company's corporate philosophy. 
Escorts undertakes numerous activities in order to meet its 
social obligations. H.P. Nanda, Chariman of Escorts, is as 
much known for his concern for community development as for 
his contribution to the shaping of industrial policies, 
government-industry relations and business ethos . Says 
H.P. Nanda, "With the Government failing to promote the 
social system is India, the entire onus of social 
123 development is on the industry". He adds further: "The 
industry has to look beyond its nose. Its role is not just 
to manufacture. What is needed today is that we go back to 
the villages and start development from there. These are the 
areas which will create demand for what the industry 
produces. The industry should help farmers become wealth 
creators and create a purchasing power in these areas" . 
Escorts has held an almost unblemished industrial relations 
record. It faced a lock-out for a brief period in 1973. 
After a gap of almost 17 years, there was a tools-down 
strike in March 1990^^^. 
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5.9 ?^ TRATEffTr PLAHS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK . 
Escorts Ltd has embarked on a two-pronged strategy to regain 
its erstwhile position among the top ten companies in India, 
The company is going in for technology tie-ups to upgrade 
its existing products. At the same time it is also 
diversifying into unrelated / newer areas such as 
telecommunications, foods and finance in a fairly big 
1 PR 
way . Large capital-intensive projects -- in power 
generation, aluminium and steel -- is the emerging trend 
among the large Indian corporate conglomerates which feel 
threatened by international competition. Escorts is planning 
127 to follow suit in the next few years . Says Rajan Nanda, 
President of the company, "Having looked as to what kind of 
equity and net worth could be built up and possible 
leveraging, we will take up a project of anything between 
three-and-a-half to five thousand crore' . 
Anil Nanda, the company's managing director is planning a 
series of diversifications in totally unrelated areas . 
Says Rajan Nanda, "We are looking at various projects 
unrelated to the automotive and engineering fields. We would 
like to get into food processing, petro-chemicals and of 
course, cars. We believe we can make cars as well as anybody 
else" . However, he sounds a note of caution: "We do not 
want to rush into unfamiliar fields. The effort is to first 
stabilise the existing operations, earn good returns and 
• 131 only then think of diversification ^ ^. 
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The most significant change, however, has been planned for 
the motorcycle division. The rugged Rajdoot -- the company's 
mainstay -- will cease to exist in a couple of years from 
now. It will be a completely new motorcycle fitted with a 
180 CO BMW engine and chassis, both of which are now being 
developed by the German company for Escorts . 
Escorts is also planning to launch a 125 cc motorcycle in 
collaboration with BMW in order to provide greater choice to 
•130 
the buyer . The company also plans to produce a four-
stroke 180 cc motorcycle tailormade for the Indian roads 
with BMW collaboration. The emphasis of production 
priorities would be on reduction of exhaust emission, 
greater fuel-efficiency and payload capacity. The company 
hopes to cater extensively to the rural market through these 
models. 
Escorts is also planning to increase exports of its 
vehicles. It is planning to export about 30,000 vehicles 
every year after the BMW collaboration comes into force 
later this year . Even its diversification plans have 
exports as its main strategy. Says H.P. Nanda, "The company 
is diversifying into new products to gain specific market 
1 35 
niches, with a sharp focus on exports""^ . 
To reinforce the company's position in the motorcycle 
market, a 10 year programme has been finalised with Yamaha 
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Motor Co. of Japan for additional models to be progressively 
introduced for specific user segments . 
As regards the future plans of the company, P.S. Batra, Vice 
President (Marketing) is clear that Escorts will continue to 
concentrate on the two-wheeler business. The 175 cc model 
definitely has "a few years left in it" , though Escorts is 
already planning to come out with a newer range of 
motorcycles in the 200 cc to 500 cc range, with technical 
collaboration from BMW of Germany . Thus, the corporate 
gameplan of the company is to increase its product range in 
order to satisfy the varying needs of the consumers as well 
as to meet the challenge of the market place in the near 
future. 
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PREMIER &VTQMOBILES LIMITED 
6.1 KVnT.HTIOH QF THE CQMPAWY 
Premier Automobiles Ltd (PAL) was incorporated in 1944 . The 
company commenced production in 1947 with the assembly of 
Desoto, Dodge and Plymouth cars, and Dodge and Fargo trucks 
2 
in agreement with Chrysler Corporation of USA . The assembly 
of cars was suspended in 1956 after the Government 
announced that firms which merely imported vehicles in 
completely knocked down (CKD) conditions and assembled them 
in India will not be given permission to do so. In 1959, the 
company entered into a technical collaboration agreement 
with Fiat SpA of Italy for the manufacture of 500 cc cars . 
This small car was later replaced by Fiat 1100 model in 
1960. The production of Fiat 1100 continued after the 
collaboration agreement expired on June 30, 1970 . Later, on 
December 31, 1972, the company's collaboration agreement 
with Chrysler Corporation for the manufacture of commercial 
vehicles came to an end . The manufacture of commercial 
vehicles gradually declined and finally stopped in 1985-86 . 
Premier Auto Electric Co. Ltd and PAL Hire Purchase Ltd are 
wholly owned subsidiaries of the company. 
6.1.1 Business Operations 
PAL manufactures and markets passenger cars under the brand 
name 'Premier'. The company also manufactures industrial and 
marine engines, automotive diesel engines, sophisticated 
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machine tools and air conditioners, and automotive spare 
parts . Earlier, the brand name of vehicles manufactured by 
the company was 'Fiat' as it had collaboration agreement 
with the Italian car manufacturer Fiat. After the expiry of 
the collaboration agreement, the brand name 'Premier' was 
adopted on July 1, 1970. 
6.2 CORPORATE OBJECTIVES 
Ever since the company started manufacture of passenger 
cars, the objective of PAL is to produce a reasonably 
priced, comfortable car in the family segment of the 
g 
market . However, with the change in business environment, 
the company's objective has changed and it now plans to 
enter the other segments of the Indian car market also. 
PAL's recent objectives also include making its existing 
brand of cars -- especially the vintage brand. Premier 
Padmini -- more cheaper. 
The intensified competition in the passenger car segment 
has led to the reorientation of objectives at PAL. The 
company now aims at producing fuel-efficient cars and 
upgrade its manufacturing facilities . 
6.3 QRQAHISATTQH STRUCTURE AMD MAMAGEMEHT 
The Board of Directors of the company consists of fifteen 
members and is headed by its Chairman and Managing Director 
(CMD) Mr Vinod L. Doshi. Mr J.M. Vakil is the Company's 
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President & Managing Director. Mr Lalchand Hirachand is the 
Chairman Emeritus of PAL. 
The company has a divisionalised management structure. The 
head of the various divisions primarily report to the 
President and Managing Director of the company, who in turn 
reports to the CMD. Management style at PAL has primarily 
been traditional and bureaucratic . However, there has been 
a paradigm shift in the style of management in the past two 
years. 
After a nine-day long brainstorming session in August 1991, 
the top executives of PAL decided to bring a change in the 
management culture of the company as part of its future 
1 9 
strategy . Says Maitreya Doshi, Vice President (Corporate 
Planning) and heir apparent of the company, "It is almost as 
if we have loosened the shackles on the true potential of 
the poeple. We have moved towards a totally decentralised 
system of operation, where decisions are taken faster and 
13 people are given more responsibilities' . Adds J.M. Vakil, 
President of the company, "Premier [Automobiles Ltd] is a 
different kind of company now, with a different kind of 
management and with very little bureaucracy" . 
Faced with an ominous mix of high duty structure, tight 
money position, severe competition and declining market, PAL 
has reoriented its management style. Says Vinod Doshi, 
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Chairman of the company, "We have moved from a pyramidal 
management structure to a more flattened one. People are 
taking more responsibilities now"-'-^ . He further adds, "The 
present crisis provided us the opportunity to change. I 
think we are entering a new phase. In the next two years [by 
mid-1994]. Premier will be a completely different company 
than what people have seen or remembered" . 
At present, PAL is taking various steps at restructuring the 
company and is striving to become a lean organisation. 
6.4 STRATEGIC SHIFTS 
For nearly four decades, the passenger car segment of the 
automobile industry remained in isolation devoid of any 
competition. The protection offered to the two major car 
manufacturers -- Premier Automobiles Ltd and Hindustan 
Motors Ltd -- led to uneconomic size, slow growth, and out-
dated design and manufacturing capabilities. However, the 
entry of the public sector Maruti Udyog limited transformed 
the passenger car industry. As a result, existing players 
like PAL were forced to take various steps to remain in the 
business. PAL has, therefore, undertaken crisis- combating 
strategies to meet the challenges of the marketplace and 
ensure its survival. 
6.4-1 Size of the Company 
The company increased its licensed capacity of passenger 
cars from 18,000 to 28,600 per annum in 1983-84^'^. Later, 
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in 1985-86, the company received an endorsement on its 
licence from the Government increasing its licensed capacity 
1R ' 
to 35,000 vehicles per annum . The licensed capacity was 
further increased to 50,000 vehicles per annum in 1988-89. 
Exhibit 6.1 shows the total capacity of the company as on 
June 30, 1990. 
Exhibit 6.1 : Capacity Statistics of PAL (in nos.) 
Capacity Per Annum 
Class of Goods 
Licensed Installed 
* On road automobiles 
with 4 or more wheels 50,000 54,5000 
Source : The Stock Exchange Official Directory. Jan. 14, 
1991. Vol, 13/30 (iii). 
The company has a composite licence for any four wheelers as 
per the scheme of broad banding permitted by the 
1 '^ Government . PAL, however, has licence for 82,500 cars per 
year including 25 per cent automatic enhancement of 
on 
capacity . As of present, PAL's capacity utilisation is 
about 60 per cent. During 1990-91, the capacity utilisation 
of the company stood at 78.9 per cenf^ . 
6.4.2 growth of the Cnwa>an^r 
The growth of the company can be distinctively divided into 
two broad phases. During te decade of 1970-80, that is, 
after the expiry of PAL's collaboration agreement with Fiat, 
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growth of the company was rather slow. PAL produced merely 
22 9,301 cars in 1980-81 . However, growth picked up in the 
second phase — between 1980 and 1990 — especially after 
1986-87. 
According to a study conducted by the leading business 
magazine of the country. Business World. PAL secured third 
position in the list of companies which recorded phenomenal 
rates of growth in the eighties. The company recorded a 
sales growth of 836 per cent between 1980 and 1990^*^. The 
production of passenger cars, which was 19,764 in 1981-82, 
doubled in 1988-89 to reach the figure of 38,743 and further 
to 42,313 in 1990-91^'^. Earlier, in 1960, PAL produced just 
6,516 cars which increased to 12,054 in 1970, and to 13,630 
in 1975 . Exhibit 6,2 shows the growth of the company since 
1980-81. 
Exhibit 6.2 : Growth in Production (in nos.) 
Year Cars Year Cars 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
9,301 
19,764 
20,778 
21,456 
28,014 
29,256 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
1990-91 
1991-92 
27,457 
33,556 
38,743 
42,313 
42,925 
32,564 
Source : Automotiv? Industry of India. Facts & Figures. 
1991-92. Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association, New Delhi, 1993, P. 5. 
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Although PAL has improved its production of passenger cars, 
especially after 1986-87, its share in the passenger car 
segment has ben constantly declining since 1985-86, except 
for a brief recovery between 1988-90. However, between 1981 
and 1991, PAL recorded an increase in production by 100 per 
cent. 
The present recession in the automobile industry has hit the 
company adversely. PAL was forced to cut production by 50 
per cent in December 1991. As car sales decelerated, the 
company's finished goods inventory went up to 8,000 
vehicles, or almost 20 per cent of the production. 
Production of Premier Padmini cars at the company's Kurla 
plant was stopped in the first week of December 1991 
following huge pile of stocks. Since then only the Kalyan 
plant of PAL was operational which manufactures 118 NE 
28 cars . 
Otherwise also, the growth of the company has been hampered 
in the past too. Says Vinod Doshi, "From the mid-1960s to 
the mid-1970s. Premier made constant losses due to controls 
27 
on prices, distribution and capacity". In the early 1980s, 
PAL piled up a huge inventory for manufacturing 15,000 light 
commercial vehicles that never took off. Says Maitreya 
Doshi, Vice President (Corporate Planning), "It caused us an 
average loss of Rs 2 crore per year" . To regain its 
position in the market, the company is implementing several 
strategies. Says Vinod Doshi, the company's chairman, "We 
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are aware that the situation calls for new responses, and we 
are doing all that is possible within the existing policy 
frameworrk. Our strategy in this respect includes several 
29 approaches 
8 . 4 . 3 D i s t i n c t i v e ConDfitRncie.'^ 
Despite several drawbacks, PAL's passenger cars made their 
presence felt in the market due to the relatively low price 
of the vehicles and long life. Of late, the company's 
products have gained respectaibilty for their fuel-efficient 
engines. A major competitive edge that PAL's products have 
over others is their looks and comfort as a family car. 
However, the competitive market of passenger cars and changed 
consumer preferences have diluted the distinctive 
competencies of the company's products. 
6.4.4 Key Strategic Actions and SYenta 
PAL started assembly of cars in 1947 in agreement with 
Chrysler Corporation of USA. Later, it entered into a 
technical collaboration agreement with Chrysler in 1968 to 
manufacture commercial vehicles. The agreement expired in 
1972 . The company also entered into technical 
collaboration agreement with Fiat SpA of Italy for the 
manufacture of 500 cc Hilecento cars which was later 
replaced by a four-dor 1100 cc car. This agrement cane to an 
31 
end in 1970 . For the production of diesel engines, the 
company had entered into collaboration agreement with Henry 
Meadows of UK in 1967^2_ 
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For the supply of technical know-how for the manufacture of 
axles, assemblies and related components of commercial 
vehicles, PAL entered into a technical collaboration 
agreement with North American Rockwell Corporation (USA) in 
1963 . The company again entered into a technical 
collaboration agreement with Fiat SpA in 1981 for adoption 
of Fiat 124 car body. In 1984, the company signed a 
collaboration agreement with Nissan Motor Co. of Japan for 
technical know-how for adoption of Nissan A-12 Engine 
transmission in its existing models of cars . 
In 1987, PAL entered into a technical collaboration 
agreement with the UK-based Techno-Licence Ltd for the 
manufacture of Fratelli Negri Machine (FNM) automotive 
diesel engines for its existing cars . The company also 
signed a technical agreement with AVL GmbH of Austria for 
improvement in engine performance by way of fuel-efficiency, 
improved rated output of horsepower and torque, improved 
emission control, etc. During the same year the company tied 
up with Powers Design Intra (PDI) of USA for improving the 
aerodynamics, reducing weight, restyling and enhancement of 
36 
aesthetics of PAL's existing cars . 
Earlier, in August 1987, PAL acquired the machine tool 
division of Walchand Industries Ltd at Chinchwad, Pune*^ . 
The unit is well equipped to manufacture a range of CNC 
(computerised numerically controlled) machines and special 
purpose machines. 
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PAL started manufacturing diesel engines for its cars in 
1989. The company achieved a strategic success by 
dieselising its Premier Padmini engine. Says Maitreya Doshi, 
"With petrol prices shooting up every year, there will 
always be a good market for diesel cars' . 
As a part of its strategy, the company closed its loss-
making foundry unit at Wadala in 1991 and sold real estate 
39 to save around Rs 28 crore . PAL also introduced a 
Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) to reduce its workforce. 
In March 1993, PAL signed a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) with Peugeot of France for setting up a joint venture 
in India to manufacture and distribute Peugeot vehicles 
suited for Indian and designated foreign markets . 
6.5 CAPITAL ACQUTSITIQH AHD FIHAHCK 
PAL has a paid-up capital of Rs 22.52 crore . Financial 
institutions have a 22.2 per cent stake in the company while 
public hold 53.2 per cent of the shares . 
In 1978-79, financial institutions viz. ICICI, IDBI and IFCI 
sanctioned soft loans aggregating Rs 6,5 crore for the 
company's extensive programme of modernisation and 
renovation of its plants. In 1981-82, a consortium of 
financial institutions sanctioned further soft loans 
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aggregating Rs 13.5 crore for the programme of upgrading of 
Premier Padmini car and second phase of modernisation . 
During 1983-84, the project outlay of Rs 28.5 crore for the 
new model car project increased to Rs 36.6 crore. Financial 
institutions and banks sanctioned an additional soft loan of 
Rs 6.25 crore which, however, are not availed as the 
company's cash flow position improved. 
In the same period, 3 lakh non-convertible debentures of Rs 
100 each were privately placed with the Army Group Insurance 
Directorate. A further 7 lakh non-convertible debentures of 
Rs 100 each were offered as rights to equity shareholders. 
The funds raised were used to finance working capital 
expenditure and normal capital expenditure. During 
August/September 1988, the company offered 20 lakh 
redeemable non-convertible debentures of Rs 100 each on 
. • . . 4 4 
rights basis . 
From a turnover of Rs 58.2 crore in 1980-81, PAL reached a 
turnover of Rs 230.78 crore in 1985-86 and to Rs 551.01 
crore in 1989-90. The turnover of the company increased to 
Rs 639.81 in 1990-91. The growth in total assets was 779 per 
cent — from Rs 43.38 crore in 1980 to Rs 381.34 crore in 
1990. However, despite the sizeable turnover, profits have 
stagnated due to cut throat competition from Maruti Udyog 
Ltd. 
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Exhibit 6.3 : Balance Sheet of Premier Automobiles Ltd 
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Exhibit 6.4 : Profit and Loss Statement of Premier Automobiles Ltd 
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The changed market scenario, combined with recession in the 
industry, has adversely affected the financial health of the 
company. PAL's turnover in 1991-92 stood at Rs 397.09 crore 
as against Rs 639.81 crore in the previous year. Similarly, 
operating profit came down to Rs 13.38 crore compared to Rs 
37.47 crore in the previous year. The company made a loss of 
Rs 16.96 crore in 1991-92. ° However, despite poor financial 
results, the company maintained its record of uninterrupted 
dividend payment. It was also last year that the company 
changed its accounting year from June to March. Exhibit 6.3 
and 6.4 show the consolidated balance sheet, and profit and 
loss account of the company respectively for the period 
1981-90. 
6.6 MARKETTNG POLICIES 
PAL is the second largest car manufacturer in the counry. 
The entry of a major player in the car segment and 
Government's changing excise and customs duties structure 
has led to some reflexive response from the company. In the 
past two years, it has introduced new models and 
restructured prices of vehicles in order to face the 
challenges of market place. PAL's declining market share and 
changing consumer preferences in the post-liberalisation 
period has brought a perceptible change in the company's 
marketing policies. 
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6.6.1 Product 
The company has been producing indigenous passenger cars 
since early 1970s and markets its products under the brand 
name 'Premier'. Until few years back, PAL had just one 
product -- the Premier Padmini car -- which accounted for 
over 92 per cent of aggregate sales in 1985-86 . However, 
in the wake of introduction of new model of car by Maruti 
Udyog Ltd in May 1986, and the announcement of a higher 
excise duty of 35 per cent on passenger cars of 1000 cc, 
demand for PAL's cars went down. Consequently, the company 
introduced a variant of Premier Padmini as economy model in 
August 1986. This introduction proved successful and demand 
for the modified car was much higher than expected. 
PAL introduced a new model of car in late 1986 -- Premier 
118 NE — incorporating a new Fiat body and Hissan engine 
transmission . The company later introduced another version 
of 118 NE with diesel engine in 1989 and Premier Padmini 
diesel cars in 1990. A 1400 cc diesel engine- fitted Premier 
Padmini car was launched in 1992. 
The company applied to the Government for manufacturing 
'Sunny' model cars of Nissan Motor Co. (Japan) but the 
49 Government rejected its application in 1988-89 despite the 
announcement of scheme of broad banding in 1985 for the 
automobile industry. 
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Despite introducing various versions and a new model of car, 
PAL has not been able to maintain its position in the highly 
competitive market. The company has been producing outdated 
and less fuel-efficient cars since it always operated in a 
duopolistic car market. The changing business environment in 
the later half of 1980s changed consumer preferences with 
which the company probably could not keep pace. Admits 
Maitreya Doshi, "We have an image of having never changed 
over the years, of making only the Premier Padmini year 
after year. That will have to change if we are to grow" . 
PAL will soon inroduce a restyled car with better 
aesthetics. It has recently signed a HoU with Peugeot of 
France to manufacture latest vehicles for the Indian car 
market in order to restructure its product-mix. 
6.6.2 Pricing 
Although the objective of PAL is to meet customer 
requirements by producing reasonably priced cars, it seems 
that the prices itself have been a major cause for the 
company's retarded growth and stagnant profitability in 
recent years. The heavy incidence of customs duty, excise 
duty. Central sales tax and other levies on passenger cars 
51 is a major factor restricting demand for vehicles . The 
high ad valorem duties levied on ex-factory prices led to an 
increase of 55.3 per cent in three years on the end price of 
PAL's Premier cars. Until the recent Union Budget (1993-94), 
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in which excise duty on passenger cars was reduced from 55 
per cent to 40 per cent, the total impact of all levies in 
respect of Premier Padmini was 76 per cent compared to 47 
per cent in 1989. The incidence of excise duty alone had 
risen to 55 per cent from 35 per cent . Fierce competition 
within the passenger car segment has virtually forced the 
company in not increasing the price of the finished products 
on its own. 
In order to boost demand for its vehicles, the company 
introduced a cheaper variant of the Premier Padmini car. 
Says S. Hashmatullah, DGM (Marketing), "The decision to 
introduce the economy model of Premier Padmini cars was 
based on the hunch that the market for cars has become very 
price-conscious. The response to our economy model has 
proved that the right direction to move is to lower prices 
as much as possible. However, apart from cutting out the 
frills, there is no further scope to cut costs and 
C O 
prices' . Says Vinod Doshi, "The demand for cars is price 
sensitive, especially at the lower end of the market. This 
is apparent from our experience of the economy model" , 
In the recent past, PAL has followed the strategy of 
reducing manufacturing costs in order to lower the prices of 
its vehicles. As rising labour costs have been the company's 
bane for a long time, the strategy adopted was to reduce 
workforce. Other steps taken by the company include 
reduction of inventory and increase production to achieve 
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economies of scale so as to price the vehicle on the basis 
of production efficiency. Earlier, in 1981, the company had 
to file a petition in Supreme Court -- on behalf of 
passenger car manufacturers -- to allow producers to raise 
the price of cars ^. 
6.6.3 Pronotion 
Long accustomed to operating in a seller's market in which 
demand for PAL's cars by far exceeded supply, the company 
did not put any effort in marketing its product. Its 
advertising budget in 1980-81 was merely Rs 18 lakh. 
However, increase in competition in the car segment, and 
PAL's declining market share, prompted the company to 
increase product promotion expenditure. Product advertising, 
for instance, for the Premier Padmini cars was stepped up 
for the first time in 1986. Consequently, the aggregate 
advertising budget of the company went up to Rs 1 crore in 
1986-87 . PAL also launched an aggressive marketing 
campaign for its hire-purchase scheme for Premier Padmini 
in November 1986. 
Another strategy that PAL adopted was to introduce a sales 
campaign, to encourage the purchase of Premier Padmini, in 
states where the incidence of sales tax was substantially 
lower. Besides, the company also introduced innovative 
schemes for consumers. 
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When the company accumulated unsold stocks of cars last 
years due to recession in the automobile industry, it 
relaunched its economy model at the Gwalior car 'mela' 
(fair). These cars costed Rs 28,000 less than the standard 
price at which it is sold. During the period of 'auto fair', 
the state Government reduces sales tax by 10 per cent to 
57 
ease purchase of vehicles . 
Earlier, the company did not give attention to product 
positioning as there hardly existed any need to do so. 
However, the introduction of different cars with varying 
engine capacities and sizes suggest that the car market is 
now divided into distinct segments. A perceptible decline in 
PAL's market share alongwith increase in market share of 
Maruti Udyog Ltd (HUL) convinced the executives of PAL that 
the company's market overlaps with that of the Haruti. 
Consequently, the company positioned its 118 NE car at the 
bottom of the top end. PAL, later positioned its diesel cars 
for tourist cars and taxis . By planning to introduce much 
cheaper cars, PAL is now targetting the low price high 
volume end of the market. 
The company increased its advertising expenditure from Rs 1 
crore in 1988-87 to Rs 1.2 crore in 1989-90. This was 
subsequently increased to Rs 2 crore in 1990-91 . PAL also 
introduced a hire-purchase scheme for its products by 
establishing a wholly owned subsidiary, PAL Hire Purchase 
Ltd in 1985. 
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6 . 6 . 4 niFr t .T- ihnt . ion 
The presence of PAL in the passenger car business for more 
than four decades has strengthened its disribution network. 
The company has an estimated 200 dealers across the 
country. With increasing competition in the market, the 
company is placing more emphasis on reorienting dealership 
practices. 
The company attaches importance to after sales service of 
its vehicles and easy availability of spare parts. The spare 
parts of its cars are virtually available in every part of 
the country at a reasonable price. The number of spare parts 
dealers of PAL has increased in the post-liberalisation 
period. 
PAL also offers training to technical staff of its dealers 
and periodically deputes its service engineers to 
dealerships. Concessions and discounts provided to dealers 
have increased in the recent past. 
6.6.5 The State of Competition 
Although five companies have ben granted licence to 
manufacture passenger cars, primarily there are three active 
car manufacturers in the country (excluding TELCO which 
produced just three vehicles in 1990-91 and 1,080 vehicles 
in 1991-92 ). Earlier, PAL used to be in a duopolistic 
nfiarket, aloT\gv(ith Hindustan Hotors Ltd <HHL>, after the exit 
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of standard Motors by late 1960s. The entry of the public 
sector Maruti Udyog Ltd, which has a technical and financial 
collaboration with Suzuki Motor Co. of Japan, in 1983 
intensified competition in the passenger car segment. 
PAL used to command a major share of the Indian car market 
upto 1984. However, since then, its market share has 
constantly been declining. In 1982, the company had a market 
share of 48 per cent which came down to 45 per cent in 1983. 
Its market share further went down to 42 per cent in 1984 . 
For PAL, the banner year was 1975 when it had a market share 
of 58 per cent. Exhibit 6.5 shows the major players and 
their market shares since 1985-86, 
Exhibit 6.5 : Major Players & their Market Shares (%) 
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With the advent of Haruti Uciyog Ltd, market share of PAL has 
come down considerably. Quite recently, TELCO has also 
entered the passenger car market and has introduced two 
models of indigenously developed cars. Says Vinod Doshi, 
"With their sound R & D , deep pocket and long experience, 
TELCO is the juggernaut of the Indian auto industry. I think 
they will eventually have a full range of cars and nobody 
R2 
will be able to stop them" . 
PAL depends on the vendors for the supply of components. The 
company purchases about 60 per cent of its component 
63 
requirements from outside suppliers . This has helped many 
small units in adopting modern technology and supplying 
components at competitive prices. However, vendors exert 
considerable pressure on the company's operations. For 
instance, production of 118 WE cars could not be stepped up 
in the initial years due to irregular supply of essential 
components by Indian suppliers. Says Vinod Doshi, "Regarding 
118 NE, production and not demand is the constraint. Our 
main problem to increase production volume relates 
predominantly to erratic supplies of components from 
ancillary units" . 
Exports of vehicles by the company are almost negligible. 
Probably because of the outdated design and technology of 
its cars, PAL could not tap the overseas market in a 
significant way. On an average, the company exported about 
30 cars every year between 1986-87 and 1989-90^^. 
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6.7 PRnniicTinH AHD OPERATTOWS POLICIES 
PAL is one of the two earliest companies which was 
established with Indian capital and with programmes of 
indigenisation approved under the Industrial Regulation Act. 
Although for many years, the company manufactured cars and 
commercial vehicles, it gave up production of commercial 
vehicles in 1980s and since then has concentrated on 
production of cars. 
The manufacturing of cars was undertaken with technical 
collaboration agreement with Fiat Motors of Italy. For 
years> technical agreement was limited to occasional 
purchases of technology and components. Although model 
changes were taking place frequently in the overseas 
company, the changes in Indian models were less frequent and 
superficial, and PAL came in for adverse criticism for not 
keeping pace with developments abroad. Even quality 
standards were considered low. A secure market with a 
duopoly situation, in which customers had to wait for 
several years to purchase a car after advance payments, 
appeared to have made the company complacent in its attitude 
towards aarket requirements. 
With demand for cars increasing in later years and the felt 
need to meet market requirements, PAL gradually equipped its 
manufacturing plant and established new facilities for 
production. At present, the company has various 
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manufacturing facilities such as a forge shop, tool room, 
assembly line, paint shop and facilities for manufacturing 
RR 
engines, axles, camshafts, crankshafts, etc 
The company also has indigenous SPHs (Special Purpose 
Machines), dedicated and CHC machines such as OUC gear 
hobbing and cam grinding machines. PAL has a number of non-
CNC imported machines too for the manufacture of gear 
besides a crankshaft processing line. 
Over the years, the company has acquired the capacity to 
improve technology in specific areas but do not have the 
capability to design a fully integrated modern car. However, 
PAL developed and introduced improved versions of its 
existing products after 1986-87. Frequent collaborations 
with overseas automobile companies have helped the company 
in technology absorption, adaptation and upgradation. During 
implementation of the technology transfer projects, a number 
of problems were encountered by PAL which, at times, 
necessitated provision for special tooling, training of 
personnel, upgradation of plant facilities and technology 
transfer to ancillary suppliers . Nevertheless, all 
projects were implemented by PAL's own engineering 
personnel. 
The intensification of competition in the car market and 
Government's erratic policies towards passenger car segment 
of the automobile industry led to a change in production 
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strategy of the company. PAL drew a comprehensive plan to 
modernise plant and equipment, cut costs and overheads, 
maximise usage of underutilised manpower and plant to 
manufacture ancillary components, and improve fuel-
go 
efficiency of Premier Padmini cars . Raising worker and 
capital productivity was the strategic concern of the plan 
which reflected the obsolescence of the company's plant and 
equipment -- despite modernisation -- and its relatively low 
worker productivity. 
The company's top management was aware of the need to 
modernise its manufacturing base. Says C.P. Shah, Vice 
President (Finance), "We have drawn up a plan to invest Rs 
100 crores in the next few years on modernising plant and 
equipment, and on expanding the capacity to manufacture the 
118 NE cars. This investment is needed because a substantial 
part of the existing stock of machines in obsolete, which in 
turn does not permit the flexibility and quality that is 
eg 
required in a rapidly changing market' . Consequently, the 
company's plants were modernised and capacity expanded in 
1988-89. 
In order to remain competitive in the market, the company 
adopted various strategies to reduce the cost of production 
which had risen due to high costs of inputs. As a result, 
PAL installed an online multi-user multi-terminal computer 
system to reduce the average volume of component 
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inventories. The company also reduced the wastage of 
consumables such as the engine oil, grease, paint, solder 
and connecting wires, etc. Says Vinod Doshi, "Our approach 
in the overall strategy has been to reduce the price of 
Premier Padmini [cars] through a reduction in manufacturing 
costs' . Besides, the company also planned to instal a high 
performance fuel-efficient diesel engine in Premier Padmini 
cars, and restyle and improve its aesthetics. Consequently, 
PAL introduced a dieselised version of the car, improved its 
fuel-efficiency and introduced an economy model of the car. 
In 1991, a severe recession hit the automobile industry, and 
pasenger car segment was hit the hardest. Slowdown in demand 
for cars was aggravated as a result of a combination of 
extraneous factors. The foreign exchange crisis led to 
problems in component imports and to an increase in costs. 
Besides, the overall slowdown in the economy led to sagging 
demand and high interest rates pushed the 'instalment car' 
purchase out of the budget of the middle class. Moreover, 
with depreciation method changing, institutional year and 
71 
sales also fell . As a result, PAL was adversely affected 
and it had to cut down its production by 50 per cent. 
In face of the difficult situation that the company was in, 
the top executives of PAL decided to restructure the 
product-mix and emphasised on shutting down loss-making 
T? 
units . As a corollary to this strategy, the company 
embarked on an extensive cost-reduction programme. PAL shut 
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down its large foundry at Wadala which resulted in a saving 
of Rs 5 crore. According to President of the company, J.H. 
Vakil, "The company has reduced its inventory of imported 
steel stocks from a year to six months which has meant a 
73 
saving of Rs 10 crore in interest costs' . 
As part of the long-term cost reduction programme, the 
company plans to drastically reduce the number of in-house 
made car parts. Through this and other cost reduction 
programmes, the company will save as much as Rs 103 crore by 
March 1994 . PAL is also implementing its strategy of 
closing down the inefficient plants and using the subsidiary 
company. Premier Auto Electric, for supply of some 
components. Says Vinod Doshi, "The machine tools division at 
Pune [acquired in 1987] will supply a number of critical 
75 parts for the auto division in near future" . 
Moreover, PAL intends to cut costs by indigenisation, lower 
inventory, labour force reduction, single point 
manufacturing, value engineering, farming out components, 
single shift operations and by lowering maintenance costs of 
machines. 
6.7.1 Rftsearch and Develnoiient ( R & D ) 
PAL has a separate R & D set up for automobiles at its Kurla 
plant. The R & D division was first given recognition by 
DSIR (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research) in 
1977, and the recognition is renewed from time to time. 
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There are a total of 252 employees in the Division which 
includes 15 scientists, 74 engineers, 27 technicians and 136 
7fi 
supporting staff . 
For the initial thirty years, there was negligible R & D by 
the company. However, over the past few years, PAL's R & D 
capability has matured to a level where it can absorb 
imported technology and make improvements in vehicles. Says 
Vinod Doshi, "The R & D division is the company's strength. 
It can develop new products to meet specific market 
demand" . 
PAL has achieved some major R & D breakthroughs in the past 
seven years. The fuel consumption of Premier Padmini cars 
has been considerably lowered and merits comparison with the 
fuel-efficient cars of MUL. The R & D division also 
developed a diesel engine version of the car and introduced 
the same in market. Besides, the company also introduced a 
new model. Premier 118 HE, with a new Fiat body and a Nissan 
engine. Although the technology was purchased from abroad 
for this purpose, the new model was developed by PAL's R & D 
engineers to suit the Indian conditions. The design of the 
car was later stabilised. The R & D division of the company 
made improvements in 118 NE in the areas of fuel system, 
suspension and cooling system. PAL also developed nickel 
free steel for use in manufacturing of the car, and flexible 
manufacturing system for transmission and engine 
no 
components 
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Although the company has made development in the areas of 
exhaust gas emission control, skin panels, metal 
replacement, use of engineering plastics and dieselisation 
of cars, considerable technological gaps exists in critical 
areas such as exhaust emission control system, noise 
control, automatic transmission and body styling . Few 
years back, the company has sought technical help from AVL 
of Austria, a world famous engine design specialist firm, to 
review the design of 1100 cc engine and suggest 
improvements. Some success has been achieved and redesigned 
engines are now under tests. 
PAL, in collaboration with PDI of USA, is also working on 
improving the body of existing products. Says C.V. Gopal 
Rao, Senior Vice President (Operations) and chief of the R & 
D division, "We are also trying to modify the body of the 
Premier Padmini cars to make it slightly more roomy and 
aerodymanic, and lighter as well"^^. The company is 
« 
confident that these developments will enable it to make 
inroads into both the lower and upper ends of the passenger 
car market and thereby guarantee its survival against the 
Maruti at lower end, and competition from HML and other 
manufacturers at the upper end. 
PAL's expenditure on R & D in 1986-87 was Rs 2.15 crore 
which went up to Rs 3.24 crore in 1988-89.^-^ The R & D 
expenditure as a percentage of turnover in 1988-69 was 0.71 
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per cent . In establishing R & D facilities such as a 
design section, and metallurgical and other laboratories, 
the company has made an investment of Rs 3.06 crore. 
Although the expenditure on R & D in 1989-90 was only Rs 
2.27 crore, the company plans to increase expenditure on R & 
D in near future. Even otherwise, PAL's R & D expenditure to 
turnover ratio is the highest among the three car 
manuf acturers"*^. 
6.8 MAHAgEMEHT OF HUMAH RESOURCES 
The growth of PAL, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, 
increased its base of professionals and employee strength. 
Most of its top executives have been trained in-house in 
their specialised areas. In the post-liberalisation period, 
occasionally the company has been conducting training 
programmes for its executives in order to broaden their 
horizons and prepare then to function in the emerging 
competitive business environment. 
In recent years, professionalism within the company has been 
encouraged and the company no longer functions as a 
traditional family-run business. Says Maitreya Doshi, Vice 
President (Corporate Planning) and heir apparent of the 
company, "I opted to give an international flavour [sic] to 
my education which is essential to become a business leader 
84-in the future" . The company is also laying emphasis on a 
well-defined succession planning. 
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With the advent of competition in the passenger car segment, 
PAL has stopped recruiting fresh graduates. Instead, it is 
relying on its existing group of professionals. The company 
considers its workforce as one of its major strengths. Says 
Vinod Doshi, "One strength is that we have a strong manpower 
base which is innovative and dedicated" . 
Workers and labour costs, however, have been the bane of PAL 
from the very beginning. The company has suffered setbacks 
in growth due to low worker productivity. In 1985-86, about 
10,000 of PAL employees produced a mere 29,000 four-
wheelers. Industrial relations, too, have not always been 
cordial within the company. 
Production declined to 9,301 vehicles in 1980-81 from 15,469 
vehicles in 1979-80 due to prolonged labour unrest and 
strike in 1979-80. Although the strike came to an end in 
September 1980, and the company resumed production, normalcy 
in operations could not be restored as certain issues 
arising out of the wage settlement remained to be resolved. 
Later, in 1984, the company signed another wage settlement 
8R 
agreement with employees to improve its production . It is 
worth-mentioning here that the first "bandh" organised in . -^  
87 the country was in support of workers of PAL in 1954 . 
The recession in the automobile industry and the changing 
market environment has adversely affected PAL. As part of 
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its future strategy, the company decided to urgently cut 
down the bloated employee strength through a good Voluntary 
Retirement Scheme (VRS) as the company's average wage per 
employee is higher than MUL and Bajaj Auto Ltd. In 1991, 
wage costs constituted nearly 18 per cent of PAL's net 
sales. Says Maitreya Doshi, "There was no way we could have 
continued like that' . Earlier, the company had reduced the 
wages of over 1,000 workers as a result of production cuts 
in 1986-87^^. 
Implementing its formulated strategy, PAL introduced a VRS 
in late 1991 for its workers to bring down the total staff 
strength from the existing 9,000 to 5,400. The VRS gave the 
workers the option of a 'golden handshake' or a monthly 
pension of over 50 per cent of the average salary drawn 
between January and October 1991. As many as 2,200 workers 
opted for the VRS in the initial phase. Says C.K. Birla, 
Vice Chairman of Hindustan Motors Ltd, "I think it is a good 
success they have achieved; especially considering that the 
[trade] unions in Bombay are very strong". Admits Maitreya 
Doshi, "More than the generous amount that we offered, the 
Scheme succeeded because of our marketing efforts [for the 
same]"^^. 
The company also conducted seminars for the workers to help 
them plan their retirement and investment. In addition, 
every worker was provided with a group medical insurance, a 
promise of Rs 5,000 as marriage expenses for one child; and 
that their children would continue to be eligible for the 
company's education scholarship programme. Says R.P. 
Medhekar, General Manager (Industrial Relations) of the 
company, "PAL's workers have learnt to accept the idea that 
their welfare is linked to the company's well-being". The 
VRS will save almost Rs 10 crore on an annual wage bill of 
about Rs 80 crore^"^. 
As part of its cost cutting exercise, the company also 
stopped over-time payments and productivity-linked 
incentives for workers. PAL plans to extend its VRS further 
in order to drastically restructure its manpower and 
establish a lean organisation in the near future. 
6.9 STRATEGIC PLANS AND FUTHRK OHTLOnK 
PAL is currently going through one of its worst crisis and, 
by its own admission, there is a question mark over its 
survival. In 1987, the eventual shape of the Government's 
liberalisation policy was the single most important 
94 determinant of the survival prospects of the company . PAL 
adopted certain strategies to counter the threat of the 
marketplace but subsequent external as well as internal 
developments did not lent any advantage to the company. As a 
result, PAL now plans to diversify. Says Vinod Doshi, "We 
are exploring various avenues of diversification" . 
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For PAL, the short-time plans includes cutting down 
inventory and labour costs and thus save on interest, 
increasing production of 118 NE cars to almost 100 vehicles 
per day and bring its price down by almost Rs 25,000. In the 
long-term, the company plans to phase out Premier Padmini 
cars, centralise all operations at the Kalyan factory near 
Bombay to achieve higher output, sell land and assets of its 
foundry division, diversify into real estate and financial 
services, and export key automobile components ". PAL also 
plans to collaborate with a well-known foreign company to 
manufacture cars with a 1.3 litre engine and diesel option. 
The company, adhering to its defined plans, has recently 
signed a MoU with Peugeot of France to manufacture cars. PAL 
proposes to float a new joint venture for the purpose at an 
estimated cost of Rs 450 to 500 crore. It also proposes to 
transfer the plant, dies, tool, lands and building in 
Kalyan, the engine and gear box facilites at Pune and a new 
paint shop to the new joint venture. The company has plans 
to transfer the firm's existing upper-end product -- the 118 
HE — and the licence for 62,500 cars per year (including 25 
per cent automatic enhancement of capacity) to the proposed 
joint venture. 
Another strategy that the company has formulated for future 
is that the old reliable car of the company -- Premier 
Padmini -- will remain with PAL proper, as the second 
company in a three-tier new structure. PAL intends to 
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establish a third company by launching the existing machine 
tools division as a joint venture with a foreign company. 
Negotiations are already on with Num of France for this 
97 purpose . The central focus of PAL's future strategy is the 
emphasis on complementarity. Says Maitreya Doshi, "There is 
ample scope for marketing synergy between PAL and the 
[proposed] new firm. This is possible as both the firms will 
be in non-conflicting segments and would use the same dealer 
98 network" . 
PAL's new gameplan tries to address the other segments of 
Indian car market too. The basic idea is to launch a two-
pronged attack on the domestic car market -- where HUL 
currently leads -- with the old Premier Padmini tackling the 
bottom end and the new joint venture the middle and upper 
segments. Therefore, the focus is on producing 1300 cc car 
since Premier Padmini already has 1100 cc engine and 118 NE 
is a 1200 cc car. 
The company also plans to make the Premier Padmini car 
cheaper in near future. Says Maitreya Doshi, "Premier 
Padmini is a cheap car and the plan is to make it the 
cheapest. The advantage is that, in the coming years, 
Premier Padmini will be much cheaper than Maruti mainly 
99 because of the restructuring plans" . 
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The top management of the company is acutely aware that cost 
cutting is equally vital for the survival of PAL. As a 
result, a full-fledged cost-cutting scheme is being 
implemented. Plans are also on to improve the production 
efficiency of the company and quality of its products. 
Moreover, after its joint venture with Peugeot comes into 
operation, the company plans to sell its cars in the 
overseas market. 
The immediate objective of the restructuring plan is to make 
the joint venture operational in the shortest possible time 
after all the clearances are obtained from the Government as 
the company's collaborator will subscribe equally to the 
equity capital of the new company. Government's approval to 
the new project, and its subsequent policies towards 
passenger cars will, therefore, determine the future of PAL. 
Says Maitreya Doshi, "If the Government allows free imports 
of foreign cars in a few years' time, we may have to shut 
shop. And if nothing works out, may be I will dump the car 
business and go into something else"-*-^ .^ 
All these changes, both those underway and in the pipeline, 
point towards a radically different future from Premier 
Automobiles' past. 
^^ o^ \^ ^^ %^ 
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TATA EHGIHEERING AHD LOCOMOTIVE COMPANY 
7.1 T-VQLIJTIQH OF THE COMPANY 
Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company (TELCO) was 
incorporated on September 1, 1945 at Bombay to manufacture 
locomotives for the Railways, pulp and paper-making 
machinery. Later, in 1954 TELCO began production of 
commercial vehicles in collaboration with Daimler Benz AG, 
West Germany . The commercial vehicles, which were known as 
'Tata Mercedes Benz' (TMB), are now known as TATA vehicles 
after the expiry of the collabortion agreement with Diamler 
Benz in 1970 . The manufacture of locomotive, a major 
• 
activity of the company in the past, progressively tapered 
off since 1961 and finally stopped in June 1970 . The 
company established a joint venture in September 1977 in 
Kuala Lumpur -- Tata Industries Sdn. Bhd. -- for 
manufacturing and assembly of commercial vehicles . 
7.1.1 Business Operations 
TELCO manufactures and markets heavy, medium and light 
diesel vehicles for commerical use and their relevant parts 
under the brand name 'TATA'. The company also manufactures 
excavators, industrial shunters, dumpers, high quality steel 
and alloy iron castings, a variety of heavy forgings and 
machine tools . The company also has facilities for the 
manufacture of truck and bus bodies. Recently, TELCO has 
made its appearance in the passenger car segment by 
introducing two models of totally indigenous cars. 
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7.2 CORPORATE OBJECTIVES 
TELCO is committed to a programme of technological autonomy, 
quality - consciousness and positive foreign exchange 
earnings. It is the endeavour of the company to develop its 
capability to be a world class manufacturer of vehicles'. 
Values are the unwritten principles of Tata culture . 
"My goal is to attain market leadership", says Ratan Tata, 
q 
Chairman of TELCO . Such objectivity is not new to TELCO. 
Earlier also, the company's former Chairman, late Sumant 
Moolgaokar had said, "My objective has been to prove, 
through results, that when we in India work together with 
commitment and eye on the future, the organisations and 
products we build are second to none in quality and 
performance" . 
The corporate goals of the House of Tatas to which TELCO 
belongs, are to : (1) Achieve technology-driven leadership 
(2) Focus on selected products and markets (3) Tap synergies 
within the Tata group of companies . 
7.3 ORGAHISATIOH STRUCTURE AND MANAGKHEHT 
The Board of Directors of the TELCO consists of sixteen 
members — including four Executive Directors — and is 
headed by its Chairman Mr Ratan Tata. Mr J.E. Talaulicar is 
the company's Vice-chairman & Managing Director. The company 
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has many divisions and sub-divisions. Many divisional heads 
report to the Executive Directors who in turn report to the 
Vice-chairman & Managing Director. 
Tata Sons Ltd is the apex holding company of the Tata Group. 
It has 2 per cent stake in TELCO. Legally, the writ of Tata 
Sons Ltd does not run across all the Tata companies. They 
have their own boards which lays down the policies. However, 
the individual companies rarely depart radically from the 
guideline(s) evolved at the holding company . 
"The Tata Group has a unique structure", says Raju Bhinge, 
1 ? 
who heads the Tata Strategic Management Group . The 
structure comprises several clusters of companies which have 
independent boards but are overseen by key personalities. 
What the Group lacks is the unifying vision and control of a 
central figure overriding the formal structure . 
Ratan Tata drew up an integrated business plan for the whole 
Group in 1983 which was largely ignored by the major Tata 
companies . This experience made him alter his strategy for 
the nineties. The biggest change is that he has stopped 
planning for the Group, at least formally. Instead, Ratan 
Tata has set up a strategic planning services cell which 
1 R 
offers independent consultancy to Group companies . 
In view of the above, the Tata Group is a management oddity 
in the Indian setting. Unlike the Birlas, Ambanis, Modis or 
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Mafatlals, the Group is not tightly controlled by a family. 
And yet, certain clusters of Tata companies are headed by 
professionals whose hold on them is an complete as those in 
family-run fiefs. Ratan Tata may publicly be seen as the 
Group head, but even he has little say in the management of 
individual companies like TELCO. Top Tata managers control 
capital like individual entrepreneurs, often duplicating one 
another's efforts . 
The new business environment has thrown big growth 
opportunities for the Group, both in new business and old 
ones. But there will probably be new threats too. To meet 
the threat, the Group may have to close ranks. "We have to 
1 ft 
consolidate and regroup quickly", says Ratan Tata-'^. He 
further adds: "We have surveyed the areas of overlapping 
businesses. We are just getting them (the individual 
companies) to talk". Says N.A. Soonawala, a member of Tata 
Sons board and one of the most respected professionals in 
the group, "If the constituents themselves feel it makes 
sense to get together, there could be mergers" . Probably, 
in the long run, Tata companies may have to squarely face 
the issue of ownership and management control. 
7.4 STRATEGIC SHIFTS 
One of the flagship companies from the country's largest 
business house of Tatas, TELCO has come of age over the 
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recent past and has emerged as the largest private sector 
company in India. 
TELCO is one of the most respected companies in the country 
and is known for its good management, unquestioned product 
quality and self-developed technology"^ . However, to meet 
the challenges of the new business environment, it is 
pursuing its corporate objectives with greater vision. Since 
mid-1980s, it has increased its capacity, production, 
strengthened R & D facilities, increased investment and has 
entered into newer market segments. 
7.4.1 Size of the Company 
The company increased its licensed capacity of commercial 
vehicles from 36,000 to 56,000 vehicles per year in 1979-
SO"^ -^  after its Pune plant was completed. Later, in 1984-
85, the licensed capacity for manufacturing vehicles at Pune 
was increased from 20,000 to 35,520 numbers per annum. 
Consequent to the Government's liberalisation policy, TELCO 
received a letter of intent in 1985 for establishing a 
manufacturing facility at Lucknow with a capacity for making 
23 9,000 vehicles annually . Commercial vehicles assembly at 
Lucknow is likely to commence shortly. Exhibit 7.1 shows the 
total capacity of the company as on March 31, 1991. 
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Exhibit 7.1 : Capacity Statistics of TELCO (in nos.) 
Class of Goods 
Capacity Per Annum 
Licensed Installed 
* On road automobiles with 
4 or more wheels 
(at Jamshedpur) 33,480 33,480 
* On road automobiles with 
4 or more wheels 
(at Pune) 35,520 35,520 
* Lucknow plant 9,000 
TOTAL 78,000 69,000 
Source : Adapted from The Stock Exchange Official 
n-irectorv. Jan. 14, 1991, Vol. 13(30) (iii) & 
Annual Report 1990-91. AIAH. 1991,P. 19. 
TELCO expanded its capacity primarily between 1980 and 1985. 
Besides, TELCO has a licensed capacity of 2,160 numbers per 
annum to manufacture truck and bus bodies which is fully 
installed at its Pune plant . At the Lucknow plant the 
company's vehicles will be initially assembled with the use 
25 
of components from both the Pune and Jamshedpur units . As 
of present, TELCO's capacity utilisation is about 89 per 
centos. 
7.4.2 growth of thft Coppany 
Shortly after World War II, when the German indsutry lay in 
tatters, Daimler Benz approached TELCO with a proposal to 
manufacture diesel road transport vehicles. The 
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collaboration became functional in 1954 on the condition 
that within four years, TELCO would indigenise considerably 
a commitinent that was met. Thereafter, the company 
embarked on a growth path. After the technical tie-up with 
Daimler Benz ended in 1970, TELCO build a base of its 
own^^. Says Nani Palkhivala, member of TELCO's Board of 
Directors, "After all, TELCO is not merely the first 
engineering unit in the country, it is a national 
institution" . In short, the country's largest automotive 
and engineering unit— TELCO-- consistently followed a 
strategy of aggressive volume expansion from its very 
29 inception . 
During the period 1970-86, the growth of the company was 
average. However, the expansion of capacity by TELCO between 
1980 and 1985, and the opening of diversification 
possibilities as a result of broad banding of capacity 
policy introduced in 1985, resulted in exceptional growth in 
the company's prodcution. TELCO recorded a rate of growth of 
312 per cent in the eighties . The production of commercial 
vehicles (heavy and medium) which was merely 36,312 in 1980-
Sl*^^ went up to 46,671 in 1985-86*^2 and further increased to 
65,321 in 1991-92^^. Taken together with LCVs, production of 
vehicles increased from 46,984 in 1985-86 to 81,931 in 1990-
91 and further to 90,638 in 1991-92"^^. Earlier, in 1960, 
TELCO produced just 9,655 vehicles which increased to 24,463 
in 1970, and to 25,269 in 1975*^^. Exhibit 7.2 shows the 
growth in production of the company since 1980-81. 
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Exhibit 7.2 : Growth in Production (in nos.) 
Year M & HCVs LCVs Total 
1980-81 36,312 - 36,312 
1981-82 46,280 - 46,260 
1982-83 44,252 - 44,252 
1983-84 46,590 - 46,590 
1984-85 47,353 - 47,353 
1985-88 46,591 313 46,904 
1986-87 44,190 5,052 49,242 
1987-88 47,357 9,305 56,662 
1988-89 50,520 10,738 61,258 
1989-90 52,927 12,036 64,963 
1990-91 62,123 19,808 81,931 
1991-92 65,309 24,249 89,558 
Source : 
1993, pp. 6-7 
Although the company has grown in the past seven years, the 
current recession in the automobile industry has also hit 
TELCO'^^. As a result, till June 1992, almost 10,000 trucks 
and buses were lying unsold at TELCO' s Pune plant aga:inst 
average monthly inventory of 3,000 . The cumulative growth 
rate of the company during 1980-81 and 1985-86 was 22.5 per 
cent while it was 48.25 per cent during 1985-86 and 1991-92. 
7.4.3 Distinctive Cowipetencie.'s 
Vertical integration, constant technical innovation, 
research and development, and self-reliance are TELCO's 
engineering tenets that have helped the company in 
maintaining a dominant position not only in the automobile 
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or engineering industry but in the whole of the Indian 
private sector. TELCO's apparent advantage over its 
competitors, especially in the LCV segment, is that is does 
not have to depend on costly imports whose value is directly 
39 
related to the depreciating Indian rupee . 
Single-minded concentration on product excellence and the 
commercial vehicles market have been a source of great 
strength for the company . TELCO's products are well-known 
for their reduced fuel emissions, improved fuel-efficiency, 
high level of safety and greater driver comfort besides good 
after-sales service. 
7.4.4 Key Strategic Actions and Events 
To start the machine tools division, TELCO took over 
Investa's plant at Chinchwad in 1959 . As mentioned 
earlier, TELCO had a technical tie-up with Daimler Benz for 
the manufacture of buses, trucks and diesei engines which 
ended in 1970. Remembers K.G.K. Rao, former Director 
(Research & Development), "Once the writing on the wall was 
clear that the Daimler Benz collaboration was ending, we 
started planning ahead . 
TELCO entered into a technical tie-up with Daimler Benz for 
manufacture of direct injection engines in 1969. The 
agreement came to an end in 1974 , Later, the company 
entered into a collaboration agreement with Kuhnle Kopp & 
28i 
Kausch AG of Germany for manufacture of turbo chargers for 
IC engines for the period 1877-85'^ '*. 
For the manufacture of ductile / SG castings, TELCO entered 
into a technical collaboration with George Fischer Ltd 
(Switzerland) for the period 1978-88'^^. In 1985, the company 
imported techology from Nachi of Japan for the manufacture 
of NC (Numerically Controlled) and CNC (Computerised 
Wumericaiiy Controlled) special purpose machine tools . The 
company also obtained know-how in 1989 for the manufacture 
of thin-walled automotive aluminium castings from Kloth 
Senking Metalligiesserei GmbH, a subsidiary of Salzgitter 
Stahl GmbH, Germany. These castings provide a key input for 
the lighter range of vehicles . The agreement will 
terminate in 1994. 
TELCO signed a technical collaboration agreement with 
Hitachi of Japan in 1989 for the manufacture of 'EX' series 
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of hydraulic excavators^ . The company also signed a 
technical collaboration agreement with Ricardo Consulting 
Engineers, UK in 1990 for improvement in the performance of 
diesel engines for medium and heavy commercial vehicles . 
Last year (1992), the company entered into a technical know-
how tie-up with AVL GmbH of Austria for improvement in 
performance of diesel engines for lighter range of vehicles 
and conversion to a petrol version . Recently, TELCO has 
taken over the Pune-based sick company Noduran Foundries 
Maharashtra Ltd (NFML) and has converted it into the 
company's casting division. TELCO had been buying over 80 
per cent of NFML's products. Prior to take-over by TELCO, 
HFHL had the capacity to manufacture 9,000 tonnes per annum 
of spherical graphite iron castings and semis . 
7.5 CAPITAL ACQUISTTTON AND FIHAHCE 
TELCO had a paid-up capital of Rs 103.67 crore^^ which 
increased by approximately 25 per cent on conversion of the 
rights debenture^*^. TELCO has a promoter's share of 19.26 
per cent in the company while financial institutions have a 
54 40.73 per cent stake . Other major shareholders in the 
company are Daimler Benz (12 per cent) and public (28.1 per 
cent)^^. 
In 1980-81, the company obtained foreign currency loans 
equivalent to about Rs 6.86 crore from ICICI and a foreign 
currency loan equivalent to Rs 1.10 crore from International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) for the import of machinery and 
CO 
equipment required for its expansion programme . A foreign 
currency loan of DM 20 million (about Rs 8.5 crore) was 
obtained from M/S Thyesan Rheinstahl Technik GmbH of West 
Germany for the import of special machine tools required for 
the company's expansion programme from 36,000 to 56,000 
vehicles per annum . During 1982-83, the company obtained a 
foreign currency loan of DM 27 million (about Rs 10 crore) 
from a consortium of banks led by Dresdner (South East Asia) 
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Ltd, Singapore for financing the import of machinery for the 
company's modernisation and replacement programme. 
TELCO raised funds through the issue of 12.5 per cent 
convertible debentures in 1987 for use in its capital 
C O 
expenditure programme and working capital requirements . 
Later, in February 1991, the company issued 12.5 per cent 
partly convertible debentures aggregating Rs 311.02 crore on 
59 
a rights basis to shareholders . The funds are being used 
for capital expenditure of the company. 
From a turnover of Rs 609.65 crore in 1980-81^'^, TELCO 
reached a turnover of Rs 1905.86 crore in igsg-go^ -'- and to 
Rs 3024.36 crore in 1991-92^^. Although turnover of the 
company increased by over 20 per cent in 1992 over the 
previous year, profit after tax declined by about 3.8 per 
cent for the year ended March 31, 1992. TELCO's profit after 
tax in 1990-91 was Rs 142.05 crore while in 1991-92, it was 
Rs 136.60 crore^"^. This was largely due to the fact that 
during the year interest charges on borrowings had risen by 
about 70 per cent . 
One strength of TELCO lies in its finance structure. The 
company's debt to equity ratio has moved from 0.83 to 1.43 
but is yet comfortable . However, "TELCO has not been too 
innovative with its tax planning", says Ratan Tata . 
Exhibit 7.3 and 7.4 show the consolidated balance sheet, and 
profit and loss account of the company for the period 1981-
90. 
288 
Exhibit 7.3 : Balance Sheet of TELCO 
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Exhibit 7.4 : Profit and Loss Statement of TELCO 
31.C3.8i; 31.03.82; 
KKt fe ;' m ?.s i 
•t.' I ; 
31.03.33; 31.03.84 
000 RE ; OOO RB 
• / . ; 
il2(fl,47; 
52140.27; 
85; 
31707,73; 
52; 
i 
645i,2&; 
11; 
i(-'i; 
6i474,17; 
34; 
^ 1 
38%7.72'; 
4^ ?; 
1 
3134,so; 
lo ; 
35i5^43; S3i?3,i3 
KKi; I'OO 
71i21,3«; 73^673,34 
34; 38 
43434.64; 43520,03 
c« I en 
9&2,57; 11032,92 
12; 13 
13?76,23; 19371.65; 
24; 
13324.51; 19145,90 
0, , 
2310.24; 
4; 
6753.97; 
ii; 
3791,a ; 
Cf 
^*( 
^i _ 
9260,5'3'; 
12; 
5192.f«; 4634.3 
6; 
345.57; 5365,46 
10; 
3097,77; 3343.79; 45'0O,67; 4208,; 
5; 
3661.20; 
6; 
5411,79; 4344,91; 1157,1 
7; 5; 
1616,35; 1992,65; 2187,02; 2923,1 
•t I 
2'M4.35; 
243-6 
-
2436 
10; 
1; 
1 
95; 
4; 
( 
1 
95; 
4; 
3419,14; 
4; 
2157.39; 1766,0: 
1; 
. . , l _ 
4137.77; 
343.41; 3923,5S 
1; 5 
3021.30; 2162.5 
4; ; 
J n--c 235.0-3 
4137,77; 3021,30; 1927,5! 
4; ; 
100 luO lO-O ; hKl 
605, l i ; 336,95; 
20; 
837,75; 922,78 
23; 43: 
i9.3i; 18,11 
534.6O; 613.44; 313,44; 904,67 
27; 47 
1331,34; 3343,32; 
-•CI AAI 
2183.55; 1C.:'4,7 
7 T •= 
31,03.8: 
Wi ft£ 
91404 ,>>3 
1 « 
76543,0-0 
34 
46315.>>0: 
51 
11930.00 
13^  
17303.00' 
19 
77:^,00 
3 
7120.00 
3 
4636.00 
2434,01 
3 
3595.99 
4 
1460,99 
-1 
4164,00' 
5 
2703,00 
390,00 
313.00 
3 
100 
1241,-Xi 
54 
20,'DO 
1221,*D 
1072,0-0 
46 
31.03.36 
lO-O: 
38772,00 
50 
13065,00 
13 
25477,00 
6422,00 
6 
i536,00 
5924,00 
337,99 
0 
3399,0-0 
3 
3736,99 
66-02,00 
2315,-DO 
215,(K1 
0 
2600,0-0 
100 
1243 .•Xi 
43 
2'3,C^ i 
0 
1223 .0-0 
47 
13-5.7,0^ 1 
31,03,37 
im Rs 
ii32>Xi,0'3 
loo 
106332,00 
90 
61797,'XI 
15-411.00 
13 
29624,00 
6399.00 
6 
4469,00 
4 
7151,0-0 
6 
2631,99 
-1 
2157,00 
2 
4833,99 
4725,00: 
4 
113.99 
0' 
113,99 
0 
100 
512,00 
-483 
20.00 
2.-30 
-466 
665,99 
^a4 
31.03.3S 
X>0 Rs 
7. 
138635,-00 
l(i0 
121959,Xi: 
71-096,00 
51 
16059,Ci0 
12 
34304,0-1 
3267,C« 
13459.00 
10 
775S,0O 
6 
5701,0-3 
4 
3822,00 
•7 
1379,00 
1 
998.00 
1 
2377.00 
2 
510.00 
0 
2367.-30 
100 
1356,0-3 
57 
20.00: 
1 
1336,'>3 
5-6 
1011,30 
31.03,89 
000 RB 
I 
165459,00 
10-3 
147720,0* 
39 
33639,0-3 
51 
19977,00 
12 
44054,00 
27 
897,00 
1 
16342,-X) 
10 
5907,00 
4 
10935.00 
7 
4315,00: 
3 
6620,C« 
4: 
1733,00 
4 i 
3403.00 
1510,00 
1 
6393,-X) 
41 
100 
2444,0-3 
20,00 
0 
2424,'3-3 
35 
4449,00 
65 
31.03.90; FDR W PERIOD 
; mm 
00-3 RE ; FRCFi & LiSS 
I; STfiieieT 
1 9 2 1 6 0 , - > 3 ; A . 1 . m S « £ 3 
10-3; 
165«44 ,00 ;B . OJST CF SiXJK 
36; SOU) 
94958,00;2, Stocks 
49; toEijaec 
22691,00;3. Kaqes i 
12; Salaries 
47395,00:4. S i r K t «fQ. 
25; EjlpEfiEES " 
4733.(sO;C.5,Sen. l^^e^.sss 
22333,'X3;C.6.GR(SS PROFIT 
10; 
73-63,00;E.7. Interest 
4; 
14970,0-3;F.3, PRE Oe^< 
3; OPTS FRIFIT, 
4 8 9 1 , 0 0 ; G . 9 . DeprecidtiMi 
3; 
10079,X3;H.iO, 0PERATII6 
5; PROFIT 
4750,00; 1,11, t«NOPaR/ 
2; DEF/AM 
14329,-yi;j.l2. PRE-TAX 
8; PRffIT 
4575,X3;):,13. PPOV. m 
2; TAXES 
1 '3254,00;L.14 , t e f t ^ I T 
1(10 ;fX to Net Profit! 
3126,0-3;t1.15. PROFIT 
30; SISTRiaJTHi 
16,00;(1) Pref, 
0; Divideftd 
3110,00;(11) Equity 
30; DividEJid 
7 1 2 3 , 0 ^ I : H . 1 6 . PROFIT 
70; PxTAI!© 
Xage 
Ctenqe 
1990 
over 1989 
16 
17 
13 
14 
433 
37 
13 
52 
165 
76 
733 
49 
23 
-20 
- 2 ^ ' 
l o u r c e . 1 | ^ ^ _ S ^ ^ l i ? S n f f i ? f f i c i a l D i r e c t o r y . J a n . 1 4 , 
291 
7.6 MARKETIHG POLICIES 
TELCO is the largest private company in the country. Over 
the years, the company has introduced numerous models of 
different commercial vehicles in order to meet the changing 
consumer preferences. However, the dent made in its truck 
market by the Indo-Japanese commercial vehicles joint 
ventures in the post-liberalisation period led to a 
perceptible change in the company's marketing strategies. 
7.6.1 Product 
Originally and initially, TELCO was licensed to manufacture 
only 5-tonne trucks. But seeing the market potential and 
demand for 7.5-tonne trucks, it rapidly built up its 
fi7 production base for 7.5-tonne trucks . TELCO has had two 
models in the MCV range for quite some time -- an 8-tonner 
Rfi 
called 809 and a 9-tonner 909°°. Over a period of time, 
TELCO has introduced various models and products in the 
heavy, medium and light commercial vehicle segments. 
Presently, the product range includes commercial vehicles 
ranging from 2-ton to 24-ton gross vehicle weight. 
Till 1988, TELCO had no presence in the LCV market. Now it 
has the largest market share in the light commercial 
vehicles segment . TELCO's new four-door passenger car 
Tata Estate -- was launched on March 19, 1992. Ten months 
70 
earlier, the company had launched Tata Sierra . Says 
Pushpen Sinh, Executive Director in-charge of sales, "For 
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TELCO, it is not merely the product that is important, but 
also how the product is dealt with. The company's prime 
motto with respect to product is to identify a customer need 
71" 
and design a product to suit that need . 
Failing to get the Government permission in 1986 to tie-up 
with Honda Motor Company of Japan, for the production of 
passenger cars, the company concentrated on what is knew 
best -- developing different models of diesel commercial 
vehicles"^^. TELCO is all set to launch model 609, the bus 
version of 608, which resembles the Dyna range of vehicles 
of DCM Toyota. A full forward version of Tatamobile -- the 
company's station wagon model — is also on the cards. "In 
fact", says Ratan Tata, "we have six or seven ongoing 
73 projects for new models to be launched" . A five-door 
version of Tata Seirra and an upmarket monocoque car are the 
pick of these projects. Hew product or not, the fact is that 
TELCO is more vertically integrated than its competitors . 
7.6-2 Pricing 
TELCO's mission of technical excellence and product 
development aims at providing quality vehicles at a 
reasonable price. To ensure cost effectiveness, several 
aspects are kept in mind: excellence in technology, which 
has to be kept in line with that in the rest of the world. 
The products have to meet rigorous quality standards to be 
competitive. Excellence in marketing -- the quality of 
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customer service is extremely important and is taken care of 
by the company. And finally, the overheads are kept at the 
minimum level . 
The company has always tried to manufacture products at a 
viable scale of operations so as to enable it to price the 
product on the basis of its production efficiency. Between 
1981 and 1986, cost of major inputs -- like steel and power 
-- went up by 200 per cent to 300 per cent while TELCO truck 
7R prices, since 1981, have increased only by 32 per cent . 
However, TELCO hiked the price of its LCVs in 1990 by almost 
15 per cent despite the fact that it has no significant 
import content. The reason for this was that the company's 
ancillary units have also raised prices after their own raw 
77 
material costs went up 
TELCO hiked the prices of its medium and heavy duty trucks 
by Rs 3,000 to Rs 4,000 due to an increase in special excise 
duty from 10 to 15 per cent as announced in the 1992-93 
Union Budget. A month earlier, the company had to increase 
the prices of its vehicles due to rise in the prices of 
tyres . Otherwise, in an overall industry perspective, 
TELCO's vehicles are priced lower than its major 
competitors. 
During the recessionary phase in 1991-92, TELCO did not 
revise the commercial vehicle prices for the fear of 
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precipitating the slide-down despite the fact that material 
costs moved up by 20 per cent and labour costs by about 6 
per cent. Says TELCO's Vice-chairman and Managing Director 
J.E. Talaulicar, "We have not made any price correction for 
a long time "^. 
7.6-3 Proaot.inn 
About a decade ago, in a shortage situation, the company 
downplayed marketing of its products and concentrated on 
sales. But this emphasis visibly changed with the arrival of 
competititve forces in the automobile industry. 
Consequently, TELCO launched an aggressive marketing and 
advertisement campaign during the period 1991-92. A series 
of advertisement campaigns were launched through the print 
media highlighting the company's commitment to team work, 
social responsibility and training of its workforce through 
its slogan, "A Revolution called TELCO". 
Total expenditure on sales promotion in 1989-90 was Rs 245 
lakh and in 1990-91, it went up to Rs 394 lakhs^°. 
Commissions and discounts amounted to Rs 168 lakhs in 1989-
90 and Rs 241 lakh in 1990-91. Expenditure on advertisement 
and publicity was Rs 77 lakh in 1989-90 and Rs 153 lakh in 
1990-91.^^ 
To counter the effect of the deepening recession, TELCO has 
devised a strategy -- interest on hire-purchases has been 
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reduced since June 1992 from 13.5 per cent to 12.5 per cent. 
Says J.E. Talaulicar, "We expect this reduced-interest 
strategy to have an impact. Hire-purchase should be the next 
alternative to bank finance and sales should pick up 
soon"'^2 
The fallout of the Rs 4,000 securities scam has affected the 
promotion of the company's HCVs most severely, especially 
since HCV sales are heavily loan-financed. And with market 
interest rate as high as 24 per cent, even hire-purchase 
go 
schemes did not bring many consumers to the company . 
Though the HCV market is a duopoly, TELCO has the obvious 
edge and is now promoting its products harder in the 
southern market which has traditionally been dominated by is 
competitor Ashok Leyland. In the LCV segment, TELCO has been 
promoting its product on the basis of its lower price and 
84 
easy availability of spares and services . 
7.6-4 Distribution 
TELCO delivers its vehicles to 64 centres in the country. 
Normally, it takes the vehicles 4 to 5 days to reach these 
centres from the plant ^. After-sales service of Tata 
vehicles is rated very good by the buyers. Not only are the 
spare parts less costly but are available at "every nook and 
go 
corner" of the country . 
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Besides, the company's widespread distribution network, its 
clout with dealers and bulk buyers have made Tata vehicles a 
success in the market . 
TELCO attaches great significance to after-sales service of 
its vehicles and making available spare parts. The company 
has service centres and spare parts dealers in almost every 
state of the country. Technical staff of dealers are 
occasionally trained in after-sales service by the company. 
7-6.5 The State of Competition 
Primarily, there are three manufacturers in the HCV and MCV 
segments, including Hindustan Motors which produced just 448 
vehicles in 1990-91, and 25 vehicles during April-November 
1991-92^^. TELCO holds the major share (73 per cent) of the 
segment followed by the other major producer Ashok Leyland 
(27 per cent). In 1984, TELCO's share in medium and heavy 
commercial vehicles segment was 75.4 per cent. 
In the LCV segment, TELCO has 46 per cent market share. the 
rest is shared by eight other manufacturers. The company has 
a marginal presence in the car segment, though cars 
constitute 50 per cent of the four-wheeler market. Exhibit 
7.5 shows the major players and their market shares. 
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Exhibit 7.5 : Major Players & their Market Shares (1991-92) 
HCVs & HCVs LCVs 
Manufacturer Manufacturer Market 
Share (%) 
Market 
Share (%) 
TELCO 
Ashok Leyland 
73 
27 
TELCO 
Bajaj Tempo 
Eicher Motors 
DCM Toyota 
Others 
46 
26 
8 
5 
15 
TOTAL 100 TOTAL 100 
Source : Automotive Industry of India. Facts & Figures 
1991-92. Automotive Component Manufacturers 
Association of India, New Delhi, 1993, P. 3. 
Even with improved performance in the operations of Ashok 
Leyland, the company's major competitor in M & HCV segment, 
TELCO's market share has not been much affected. 
The growth of TELCO has also played a significant role in 
the development of numerous small scale and ancillary units. 
TELCO is a big customer for a host of ancillary units not 
only in Maharashtra but also in other regions. Nearly 60 per 
cent of the TELCO truck comprises of bought out items 
89 
sourced from nearly 4,000 suppliers . 
TELCO began export in 1961-62 while still under the 
collaboration with Daimler Benz. Starting from 1968-69, 
TELCO established its own export operations and developed a 
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large number of overseas markets. Tata vehicles are now 
successfully operating in about 40 countries around the 
globe. TELCO's major markets include Africa, West Asia, 
South and South East Asia. There are plans to begin exports 
to developed countries in the European Community . TELCO 
has consciously developed export markets despite the fact 
that there has always been more than adequate domestic 
demand to account for virtually all of its production. 
Exports, including deemed exports to Nepal and UN agencies, 
amounted to Rs 131 crore in 1990-91 — an increase of 28 per 
cent over the previous year when exports were of the order 
of Rs 105.63 crore. In 1991-92, export of TELCO vehicles 
91 
were worth Rs 270 crore . In 1984-85 exports amounted to Rs 
83.04 crore . As of present, TELCO holds fourth position in 
the list of top ten foreign exchange earning Indian 
93 
companies in the private sector . 
The effort to target newer markets, particularly hard 
currency areas, forms part of the company's strategic 
corporate plan. The company already has a fully-owned 
subsidiary in Zambia ( Tata Zambia) whose main activity is 
to assemble and service Tata vehicles. The company has two 
other subsidiaries; Tata Namibia and Tata Zimbabwe . TELCO 
depends on Tata exports -- a group company -- for 
qc 
mfrastructural, legal and liaison work overseas . 
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7.7 PRODUCTION AHD QPERATIONS POT.TCIES 
To achieve its goal of product development, the Company has 
embarked on programmes to improve the fuel-efficiency and 
reduce emission of engines to meet world standards rather 
than Indian standards alone. Plant modernisation and value 
engineering have been undertaken by TELCO to reduce 
manufacturing costs and to substantially offset cost 
increases. Quality standards and manufacturing tolerances 
are constantly upgraded to improve the quality, reliability 
and appearance of vehicles. TELCO's production and 
operations policies aim at designing a newer and broader 
range of products so as to enable the company to be more 
competitive in international markets, while at the same time 
providing the Indian buyer with a world-class range of 
96 
vehicles . In short, TELCO aims to be competitive in both 
quality and cost in domestic and export markets. 
In the recent past, TELCO has continued to invest in the 
modernisation arid upgradation of its manufacturing 
facilities with a view to improving the fits and finishes of 
products and to improve labour productivity. Value 
engineering has also received a special focus with the 
objective of reducing the cost of vehicles through design 
97 
and material optimisation . Training of key personnel and 
special surveys have been initiated for identifying further 
fruitful avenues for value engineering . 
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At TELCO, the materials department has been completely 
computerised. Monitoring supplies helps when rates are 
renegotiated with vendors every year. TELCO is able to 
confront them with their delivery delays, the faults in the 
qq 
components supplied and their rivals' pricing patterns . 
Investment plans for TELCO too have not been put to hold. 
During 1991-92, TELCO's capital outlay on modernisation 
added up to Rs 250 crore. And Rs 325 crore has been 
earmarked for 1992-93. Says Ratan Tata, "TELCO will invest 
900 crore over three years in modernisation and capacity 
expansion in some cases' . At present, average production 
capacity is about 120 vehicles per day . However, 
production had hit an all time low of 40 vehicles per day at 
TELCO's Pune plant last mid-year (June 1992) due to 
102 recession . 
At the Engineering Research Centre shop at Pune plant, a 
number of sophisticated tooling and testing machines are 
installed. The country's first 500 tonne forgings press is 
also installed at TELCO•^°^. The ERC is one of the best 
designing, manufacturing and testing facilities for 
automobile prototypes in the country. TELCO also has the 
laser cutting machines for steel (probably found in no other 
engineering workshop in India) and the CNC machines in large 
numbers. 
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The average age of TELCO's plant and machinery is less than 
10 years and much of it represents the latest 
technology'^ . Production programmes at both the plants-
Pune and Jamshedpur -- are inter-related. However, "the 
manufacture and passenger cars would be confined to the 
company's Pune factory only", says Ratan Tata. "The Lucknow 
plant of the company would look after the manufacture of 
heavy vehicles and concentrate on exports of spare parts and 
components," he adds . 
The company's designing skills have been put to good use 
even in modifying the older vehicles. Pushpen Sinh, 
Executive Director, says "TELCO's mainstay -- the 12-tonne 
Tata 1210 -- is not merely a Daimler Benz derivative. The 
direct injection engine of the 1210, the syncromesh gear box 
and large number of other features have been made by 
TELCO"^'^^. 
A manufacturing and technology driven company, TELCO has 
laid emphasis on establishing flexibility of operations. All 
the dies and many of the machine tools and production 
devices required for the 407 series were produced by TELCO's 
own Capital Goods Producing Division. Says Subodh Bhargava, 
Managing Director, Eicher Motors Ltd, "TELCO's lead in the 
Lev segment is a result of its ability to increase 
production quickly enough to take advantage of production 
1 nv problems of the Indo-Japanese LCV makers"-^^ . 
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7.7.1 Research and Development (R & D> 
In 1967, TELCO established a Engineering Research Centre 
(ERC) at Pune. Over the last 21 years, the company has 
invested over Rs 115 crore in this facility and has 
developed a team of designers and technicians who have been 
responsible for the development and improvement of all the 
commercial vehicles being manufctured by the company . 
Apart from new product development, considerable emphasis is 
given to the improvement and enhancement of the present 
range of vehicles with a view to improving fuel-efficiency, 
reducing emissions as well as attaining higher levels of 
109 
safety and greater driver comfort . 
Starting with a direct injection diesel engine for its 
trucks in the early seventies, TELCO designed several other 
parts of trucks, forklifts and earth moving machinery. The 
biggest challenge, however, came from the Japanese LCVs that 
flooded the Indian roads in mid-1980s. The answer to the 
Japanese LCVs was the ERC-designed 4-tonne Tata 407 launched 
in Febraury 1986 and the 6-tonne Tata 607 launched exactly a 
year later-'--^ .^ 
For the first time in India, a passenger vehicle has been 
entirely designed in-house. It must be mentioned that 
designing a passenger car is an extremely complicated 
technological exercise. In fact, there are very few motor 
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car companies in the world which have their own design 
capabilities. Says K.G.K. Rao, former Director (R & D) of 
TELCO, "We may not be like General Motors, but in principle 
we are not far behind them"-^ -^  . 
The company strongly asserts that the original Benz produced 
has been technologically upgraded as well as fully adapted 
to Indian conditions by TELCO's own efforts. Says Arun 
Maira, former Executive Director in-charge of exports, "The 
TELCO truck is perhaps not modern looking, but it is 
certainly the best designed for the Indian market, or for 
11? 
markets similar to India's" . Adds V.M. Raval, resident 
director of the company, "Our vehicles have many state-of-
the-art features which can only be found in upmarket cars 
•J -1 O 
abroad. These are not available in any Indian models" . 
TELCO's expenditure on R & D in 1989-90 was Rs 14.46 crore 
which went up to Rs 18.16 core in 1990-91 and further to 
Rs 19.19 crore in 1991-92,^^^ which is 0.6 per cent of the 
total turnover. TELCO's R & D centre at Pune employs close 
to 500 engineers and has, in the last 10 years, introduced a 
1 1 R 
new vehcile every year . 
7-8 MAHAGKHl-HT OF HUMAN RESQURCKS 
The high level of operations at the country's biggest 
private sector company has been possible due to the equally 
high level of professionalism in TELCO's management of human 
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resources. The company has developed professionals in every 
function mostly through its own in-house training. 
The doyen of Indian industry and at present Chariman 
Emeritus of the Tata Group, J.R.D. Tata, founded the Tata 
Administrative Service (TAS) in 1955, which is a unique 
corporate management cadre. "The basic idea of the cadre is 
to attract bright young men with high academic 
qualifications as they come out of the university for the 
purpose of building on administrative or management cadre 
for the Tata companies as a whole," said J.R.D. Tata on 
December 8, 1955^^*^. 
Modelled along the lines of the Indian Administrative 
Services, TAS recruits only a few fresh graduates every 
year. After they sign-up, they are put through an induction 
programme and a formal apprenticeship. After the training, 
TAS recruits are offered for placement to all Tata 
1 1 R 
companies . 
The company pays great attention and assigns high priorty to 
the training of its employees. The first building at the 
Pune plant to be constructed was the Training Centre which 
today runs not only apprentice training courses but 
refresher and retraining courses too. The company has also 
initiated special programmes for training in the areas of 
value engineering, total quality management and computer 
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literacy, to name a few. The investment in training at all 
levels has become an integral part of the Tata culture . 
The company has also successfully institutionalised 
corporate level programmes where top executives can build 
team spirit gaining an intensive exposure to developments in 
the environment and in basic disciplines of management. 
Around 27,000 employees went through retraining during the 
year 1985-86. Special programmes were conducted to keep 
technical personnel in touch with the latest developments in 
their fields of specialisation. The company also trained 
around 1,000 full-time trainees in various disciplines. 
Training schemes were also designed to help dealers to face 
the challenges of increasingly competitive markets . 
Out of the total workforce of 36,321, ^ •^'- 35,000 people are 
trained and retrained in areas that may be far removed from 
their jobs. In the year 1991 itself, three-fourths of the 
workforce was trained over a period totalling more than 
96,000 mandays. 
At TELCO, a graduate engineer trainee spends some part of 
1 22 his two-year training period on the shop floor . A group 
of 25 executives of the company attend a sharply focussed 
25-day seminar every year, with a curriculum encompassing 
everything from marketing to finance. To simulate the real 
world, ongoing TELCO projects are used as case studies^ . 
TELCO spends Rs 6 crore on training alone . 
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TELCO, or Tata group as a whole, is known to be a fair and 
generous employer. The company has one of the highest wage 
125 
structures in the Pune region . The company offers one 
time incentive to boost production. Workers are eligible for 
a minimum of Rs 1,000 if the daily average production over 
the last three months is above 160 vehicles, and more for 
every extra vehicles produced . Every year, a quarter of 
the workforce acquire a higher skill -- all promotions and 
increments being skill-related. At TELCO, the policy is to 
promote people from within. Such a policy though carrying an 
inherent advantage of motivating personnel has certain 
demerits too. "This", says V.F. Banaji, General Manager 
(Corporate HRD) of the company, "means that executives often 
lose touch with the outside world", unless of course, 
their skills are constantly upgraded. 
For the workers, every facility is provided to enable them 
to enhance their living standards. Almost 85 per cent of 
TELCO's workers today own a house and a two-wheeler. For the 
purchase of durables like colour TVs and refrigerators, the 
company provides soft loans . TELCO has set up voluntary 
institutions, for its workers, their wives and also their 
unemployed male dependents. Taken together, these welfare 
schemes provide employment to over 2,000 people. 
Labour relations at TELCO is a plant level function and 
senior executives are called upon to intervene only when 
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there is a major problem. Although the company has had a 
fairly placid labour history, TELCO plunged into a crisis 
due to labour problems in October-November 1989 due to wage 
settlement problems. Go-slow and tool-down tactics had 
disrupted production during the year. Says Ratan Tata, "We 
are willing to be flexible provided we do not Jeopardise our 
1 7^ 
right to manage' . Otherwise also, TELCO has always put up 
resistance to any outsider's entry into its labour affairs. 
Overall, employee relations at all locations have been 
cordial and a commendable effort has been made at every 
level to re-establish constructive and professional 
industrial relations at Pune following the labour disruption 
in 1989. 
Combined with the recession in the industry, labour costs 
moved up by about 6 per cent during 1991-92 . Employee 
costs in 1992 is around Rs 345 crore against previous year's 
Rs 280 crore . Meanwhile, TELCO has been cutting output 
and laying off temporary hands in its plant. During the 
first quarter of 1992, the company retrenched about 2,000 
casual workers . 
In a significant move, the directors of Tata Sons Ltd have 
decided to fix 75 years as the age limit for non-executive 
chairmen, deputy chairmen and vice-chairmen; and 65 years 
for executive chairmen, executive directors, managing 
directors, joint managing directors and whole-time directors 
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of Tata group of companies ."-^ ^ Ratan Tata explained the move 
as an attempt to introduce a practice in the group that is 
prevailing in professionally managed companies all over the 
world. This decision, however, is quite new and radical in 
the Tata set-up where, it is often said that the old men 
never step down. The action of fixing retirement age, is 
being viewed as a key factor in encouraging succession 
planning within India's largest business house . 
7-9 STRATEGIC PLAHS AHD FUTIIRK OUTLOOK 
TELCO is implementing plans to rationalise the product-mix 
of commercial vehicles to better meet market requirements. 
To satisfy the increasing demand, the company has taken up a 
massive modernisation and expansion programme. This move is 
expected to not only help increase productivity but would 
have a fair chance to absorb some surplus workers. Ratan 
Tata visualises the company's turnover to be around Rs 5,000 
crore in two years' time ^. TELCO's investment programme 
involves spending of about Rs 150 crore a year °. 
The company is also attempting to commercialise the 
engineering expertise built at its plants over the years. It 
has identified domestic and export markets for CNC machines 
and some other engineering products. TELCO is also exploring 
the possibility of exporting steel castings for excavators 
to its collaborators, Hitachi Construction Machinery Ltd, 
Japan. The company also plans to double its export turnover 
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to 10 per cent of its production of projected one lakh 
vehicles^^*^. 
TELCO is likely to come out with updated and improved 
versions of both the Tata Sierra and Tata Estate. Says J.E. 
Talaulicar, "We are raising facilities for Tata Sierra and 
Tata Estate vehicles. Their production is being gradually 
raised and should form a good portion of total output in the 
next few years. Plans are to introduce a new series of 
1 Tfl 
commercial vehicles' . 
Adds Talaulicar, "The company is also looking at acquisition 
of units which are techologically weak but could be turned 
around with its skills. Such units should not however be in 
totally different sectors. The acquisition should help TELCO 
in creating synergistic advantages. This would also help 
create tax shelter". TELCO also plans to export components 
for Daimler Benz in a big way. The company is already 
exporting sub-assemblies to Benz. 
TELCO is also planning to start manufacturing engines and 
ancillaries for Daimler Benz. While a major part of the 
production will be bought back by Daimler, some of it will 
be used in TELCO's export models. Also, components like gear 
boxes, clutches, axles, and propeller shafts for Benz's 
Indonesia plant will be sourced from TELCO . 
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Probably, the crux of TELCO' s long term strategy to emerge 
stronger, however, lies in its long-standing interest in 
roping in its 11 per cent stakeholder and erstwhile 
collaborator Mercedes-Benz. Says Ratan Tata: "Dialogue with 
Benz is still on for the manufacture and export of vehicle 
sub-assemblies to their units in various third world 
countries". Adds Talaulicar "The understanding is that both 
TELCO and Mercedes-Benz will look at all possible areas of 
mutual help and cooperation" . 
TELCO is currently having a dialogue with Cummins Inc. of 
USA (the largest diesel manufacturer in the world) for 
supply of engines which are fuel-efficient and emission 
free . Slated for launch in 1993 is the luxury passenger 
vehicle, the 10-seater Tata Calypso, targeted at the top 
end of the market. The focus is also on the new Tata 609 
modell42. 
As a part of its export offensive, TELCO is revving up to 
turn out its exLsting range of commercial vehicles in 
Bangladesh in a joint venture there. For the moment, TELCO 
has identified the 9-tonne TELCO 909 and buses for immediate 
production in Bangladesh. 
Foreign forays apart, TELCO's long-term growth strategy lies 
in widening the range of more user-friendly niche-market 
commercial vehicles which can stand the test in any export 
market. Efforts are also on to identify countries to set up 
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ffianufkcturing bases, mainly auto ancillary units . Various 
proposals for technical collaboration or joint ventures 
abroad for the assembly and sale of vehicles are also under 
4. • 144 examination . 
To capture the 1990s for the Group, Ratan Tata and some of 
the close advisers are formulating a groupwide restructuring 
that would involve spinning-off divisions into separate 
companies, and closing down unprofitable divisions . It is 
envisaged that the strategic plan for the nineties will push 
Tatas onto the growth path of acquisitions and mergers. 
Confirms N.A. Soonawala, finance director of Tata 
Industries, "Growth through mergers, amalgamations and 
acquistions will be part of our strategy in the 
n i n e t i e s ' . The plans of the Tata Group as a whole for the 
newly liberalised business environment envisage getting out 
of sick and unviable companies and concentrating in areas 
where the group has strength. This is being done through 
restructuring so that the major Tata companies which are in 
core sector and have hitherto operated in near monopolistic 
conditions can follow through expansion unhindered by the 
erstwhile MRTP restrictions and through mergers and 
acquisitions . 
^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^4^ 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ANALYSES AND INTERPRETAT1 ON 
8.1 Bajaj Auto Ltd 
8.2 Escorts Ltd 
8.3 Premier Automobiles Ltd 
8.4 Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. 
8.5 Consolidated Results and Concluding Comments 
AMALYSES AHD THTERPRETATIQH 
In the previous four chapters, profile of four companies-
Bajaj Auto Ltd, Escorts Ltd, Premier Automobiles Ltd, and 
the Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. -- have been 
presented. Earlier, in Chapter One, the researcher has 
discussed the major liberalisation measures, the impact of 
which on the business policies of these companies is the 
theme of the present study. In the present Chapter, company-
wise analyses is being presented. Later, Section 8.5 
consolidates the results and findings on the basis of the 
company analysis. 
Prior to proceeding for analyses, it is pertinent to mention 
again that the liberalisation measures, selected for the 
purposes of the study, are only the major ones relating to 
the industrial sector. There are, in fact, many other 
supporting measures that have been.excluded from the purview 
of this study as it is not methodologically feasible to 
include, and study, all the liberalisation measures. 
It must also be mentioned that the liberalisation measures 
included in this research study are in no way the only 
factors that affect the performance and policies of 
companies. A host of other environmental factors (social, 
legal, political, cultural, etc.) and operating factors, 
(customers, suppliers, potential entrants, etc.) may be 
acting in isolation -- or in concert with other factors 
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and affecting the policies of the companies. In short, there 
exists several imponderables in the business environment, 
the study of which is not feasible in a single research 
study. 
8-1 RAJAJ AUTO LTD 
In the pre-liberalisation period, Bajaj Auto Ltd (BAL) was 
virtually a monopoly in the market. The reputation enjoyed 
by it, and the premium commanded by its products, were 
reasons enough for the company's success. Even the limited 
growth of BAL made it a colossus in the duopolistic scooter 
segment which in turn led to the multiplication of its 
managerial hierarchies. However, due to increased 
competition posed by newer entrants as a result of removal 
of procedural impediments for obtaining industrial approvals 
and foreign collaborations, and need for quick action to 
meet the challenges of the market place, the company 
restructured some of its divisions in the post-
liberalisation period. In order to cut down time-lag for 
responding to market requirements, BAL also slashed the 
decision hierarchy. For quick implementation of decision at 
the shopfloor, the number of levels through which it is 
processed is also being reduced. 
Despite its willingness, the company could not expand in the 
pre-liberalisation period as HRTP companies were highly 
regulated by the Government. However, making use of the 
Government's policy towards expansion in the post-
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liberalisation period, BAL expanded its production capacity. 
Government's policies of capacity re-endorsement and 
prescribing of minimum economic capacity led to expansion of 
BAL' s installed capacity. The liberalised policy towards 
industrial approvals, and incentives provided to units 
located in centrally notified backward areas, prompted the 
company to set up a new plant at Waluj -- a backward area 
near Aurangabad -- with a licensed capacity of 3 lakh 
vehicles per annum in 1985. 
Freed from the regulation of ^substantial expansion', the 
company increased its licensed capacity at WaluJ plant to 10 
lakh vehicles in 1986-87. When the Government relaxed the 
restriction for new entrants, BAL entered into the 
manufacturing of motorcycles with an installed capacity of 
2,00,000 vehicles per annum -- the minimum economic capacity 
specified for two-wheelers by the Government. Although the 
company had an installed capacity of 30,000 three-wheelers, 
on receiving broad banding endorsement BAL set up a separate 
three-wheeler manufacturing divisiion at WaluJ in 1987 to 
produce 50,000 three-wheelers within the overall licensed 
capacity. As a corollary to the adoption of expansion grand 
strategy, the company recorded phenomenal rate of growth in 
the post-liberalisation period to become the third largest 
two-wheeler manufacturer in the world. 
The expansion of the company is also guided by BAL's 
philosophy to grow and expand, and its chief executive's 
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belief that the future success of the company rested on 
economies of scale. Besides, timely and adequate response to 
changing Government policies has ensured the dominant 
position of the company in the market place despite severe 
competition. In fact, its share of the two-wheeler market 
has grown from 30 per cent to 43 per cent in the post-
liberalisation period. 
After the relaxation in foreign technology and collaboration 
policy of the Government, the company entered into technical 
assistance agreement with overseas companies for the 
manufacture of motorcycles, machine tools for captive 
consumption, and product upgradation in order to gain 
competitive advantage in the market place. Increase in 
competition in the market place in the post-liberalisation 
period prompted the company to broaden its customer-base by 
setting up a subsidiary in 1987 for financing the purchase 
of its two-wheelers. 
Related expansion due to changing business environment led 
to increased capital acquisition in the post-liberalisation 
period. The company augmented its working capital 
requirements through capital market while new projects were 
financed by loans. Improved performance, as a result of 
adopting the right strategic tool at the right time, saw the 
company cross sales figure of Rs 1000 crore in 1990, and 
increased profitability. Financial planning is a major 
strength of the company. 
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Exhibit 8.1 : Change in Policy Variables : BajaJ Auto Ltd 
BUSINESS 
POLICY 
VARIABLES 
PRE-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
POST-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
ORGANISATION 
STRUCTURE 
AND MANAGEMENT 
Managerial hierarchies Managerial hierarchy 
SIZE AND 
GROWTH 
iriultiplied. Shopfloor 
implementation of 
decisions processed 
through four levels 
of management. 
Capacity doubled to 
1.6 lakh vehicles 
from 80,000 in '79-60. 
Three-wheeler capacity 
raised to 20,000 from 
15,000. Later increased 
to 30,000. 
Reasonable growth in 
production. 
slashed from 11 to 6. 
Shopfloor implementat-
ion of decisions to be 
processed through one 
or two levels of 
management. Restruct-
ured some of the 
divisions. 
New plant with capacity 
of 3 lakh vehicles set 
up in '85. Licensed 
capacity expanded to 
10 lakh vehicles in 
'86-87. Three-wheeler 
capacity increased to 
50,000. Installed capa-
city for 2 lakh motor-
cycles. Phenomenal 
growth between '85-90. 
CAPITAL 
ACQUISITION 
AND 
FINANCE 
Moderate requirement 
of working capital. 
Moderate turnover 
and good profit-
ability. 
Working capital require-
ments increased. 
Resorted to loans and 
offered NCDs. Invested 
in units of UTI for 
constant yield. 
Turnover crossed 
Rs 1000 crore mark in 
'90. Paid record 
dividend of 110%. Net 
profit increased. 
MARKETING 
POLICIES 
Only 2 brands of 
scooters. High premuim, 
low availability. 
Reasonable pricing. 
Negligible advertising. 
Dealers less than 150. 
Market share 95% in 
soooters and 70% in 3-
wheelers. Exports 
Introduced 2 more brands 
of scooters. Launched 
motorcycle, with 2 
variations, and a moped. 
Plans for 2 more produ-
cts. Emphasis on prod-
uction cost reduction. 
Advertising budget inc-
reased to Rs 10 crore 
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valued about Rs 3 crore in '90-91. Introduced 
in '84 for Middle East financial subsidiary. 
& South Asia, Dealers increased to 
300. market share down 
to 64% 
PRODUCTION 
AND 
OPERATIONS 
POLICIES 
Presence of sophisti-
cated production tech-
nology. Less emphasis 
on in-house R & D and 
fuel-efficiency. Hon-
value added system of 
operations. Less auto-
mation. Dependent on 
imported components. 
Increased efficiency 
and productivity. Em-
phasis on value engi-
neering and R & D . 
Increased automation. 
Well-defined quality 
assurance system. Under-
takes cost-reduction 
exercises. Less depe-
ndent on imports.• Prio-
rity to develop new 
products. Sought 
foreign techical 
assistance. 
MANAGEMENT 
OF 
HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
Encouragement to pro-
fessionalism. Normal 
recruitment policy. 
Change in recruitment 
policy. Emphasis on 
in-house training. 
1800 temporary workers 
retrenched in 1990. 
Productivity related 
incentives. Involve-
ment of all managers 
and workers. Intro-
duced Suggestion 
Scheme for reducing 
expenditure. 
Source Company Profile of Bajaj Auto Ltd (Chapter Four) 
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In response to the scheme of broad banding, and changing 
customer preferences, the company launched five models of 
two-wheelers in the post-liberalisation period. It has 
further planned to widen its range of products to maintain 
leadership in every segment and consolidate its position. 
Although the company has priced its product reasonably due 
to advantageous scales of operations yet its chief executive 
lays emphasis on reducing the cost of production. In the 
post-liberalisation period, the company has increased its 
promotional expenditure due to pressure from competitors. 
The number of dealers, service centres, and spare parts 
dealers has increased in the past few years. BAL now 
emphasises on appointing dealers who can compete in the 
market. The company is adopting modernisation strategies to 
consolidate its position in the overseas market. The 
company's chief executive plans to ^reinvent' BAL towards 
this objective. 
BAL has adopted technology as a strategic tool. For 
achieving manufacturing efficiency, it has implemented 
modernisation strategies. To meet the changing market 
demands in the post-liberalisation period, and to reduce 
lead time for introducing new models, the company is making 
effort for rapid readjustment of manufacturing capacity. In 
the face of increasing competition, due to Government's 
liberalisation policies, emphasis on quality and 
productivity has increased. To become truly internationally 
competitive, the company is upgrading its product through 
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its own R & D . BAL has increased its expenditure on R & D in 
the post-liberalisation period. 
With the advent of competition in the automobile industry, 
the company's recruitment policy has undergone a change and 
there is more emphasis on in-house training. More emphasis 
is laid on team-work, irrespective of functional 
specialisation, for increasing productivity and quality. BAL 
has also implemented Suggestion Scheme for reducing 
expenditure. However, when recession seeped into automobile 
industry, the company reduced staff strength in its Quality 
Department. 
8.2 ESCORTS LTD 
Escorts Ltd (referred to as only Escorts hereafter), since 
its inception, has followed the path of growth and expansion 
through conglomerate diversification. Spreading over of 
resources, attention and risks led to lack of concentration 
on its mainstay operations in motorcycles in the pre-
liberalisation period. With increase in competition due to 
Government's liberalised policies with regard to industrial 
approvals and foreign collaborations, the company started 
losing its market share. In order to regain its position in 
the market, the company is following combination grand 
strategy through stability, expansion and retrenchment. 
Threatened by the challenges of the new business 
environment. Escorts has planned to become a lean organi-
sation. Restructuring of Escorts is part of the company's 
long-term group planning which it has started recently. 
330 
Exhibit 8.2 : Emerging Business Policy Directions at 
Bajaj Auto Ltd 
nRaANTSATIQH f^TRUCTURE AHD MANAGEMENT 
Levels of management reduced; change in implementation of 
decisions at shopfloor; undergoing organisational 
restructuring; some divisions restructured. 
51ZE Al^ D GRQtiTH 
New plant; licensed and installed capacity increased; 
expansion; grew enormously; share in two-wheeler market 
increased. 
CAPTTAL ACQUI^^TTTON AND FINANCE 
Increase in capital acquisition; turnover and net profits 
increased; paid record dividend; improved financial 
planning. 
MARKETING PQLTCTES 
New product; entered new two-wheeler segments; extensive and 
intensive promotional strategies; increase in product 
promotion expenditure; new subsidiary; dealership increased; 
decrease in scooter share; increase in two and three-
wheelers share; exports on the rise. 
PRODiJCTIQH AND OPERATIONS POLICIES 
Efficient manufacturing process; increased productivity; 
backward integration; quality-consciosness; team work; 
increased automation; emphasis on cost reduction; product 
upgradation and development; less import dependent; 
optimising on input cost; increased R & D . 
MANAGEMENT QF HUMAN RESOURCES 
Recruitment policy changed; emphasis on in-house training; 
some retrenchment; employee involvement; introduced 
Suggestion Scheme. 
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As a result of Government's policy towards minimum economic 
capacity and expansion in the post-liberalisation period. 
Escorts increased its licensed and installed capacity for 
manufacture of motorcycles. However, major capacity 
expansion was primarily in the pre-liberalisation period. 
The reason why Escorts could not expand in a big way in the 
post-liberalisation period is the process of liberalisation 
itself. The liberalised policy towards industrial approvals, 
and the scheme of broad banding, was utilised to their 
advantage by other new entrants and existing players in the 
shortest possible time. On the other hand, the strategic 
response of Escorts was either marked by pre-mature 
assessment of impending customer preferences and 
requirements, or by considerable time-lag. The company 
intorduced a 350 cc motorcycle in 1983, manufactured with 
Japanese collaboration, when customers were relying on 
indigenous sturdy vehicles. The product did not suit the 
requirements of end users as it had poor fuel-efficiency. 
Later, when there was a perceptible shift in customers' 
preferences for fuel-efficient and stylish vehicles. Escorts 
took long to upgrade its 100 cc motorcycle. 
The growth of the company was mainly in the pre-
liberalisation period during which it availed of every 
business opportunity. Escorts witnessed deceleration in 
growth in immediate years preceding and succeding the year 
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1985, when industrial liberalisation was initiated. Though 
causes for slow growth have been many, the most important 
was the bid for a hostile takeover of the company in 1983. 
However, during the same period the company planned for 
horizontal and vertical integration for its existing 
businesses. Related diversification due to broad banding of 
capacity in 1985, nevertheless, increased its volume of 
production of motorcycles. 
Prior to the relaxation in foreign technology and 
collaboration policy of the Government, Escorts entered into 
a technical collaboration agreement with Yamaha Motor Co. of 
Japan. As no foreign collaborations were permitted in the 
automotive sector at that time, the company had availed the 
facility of Technology Development Fund of the Government. 
After the announcement of liberalisation measures, the 
company integrated this techology in the diversification and 
expansion of motorcycle operations. The company began 
commercial production of 100 cc motorcycles in the post-
liberalisation period. To broaden its customer base, and to 
meet the challenges posed by competitors in the post-
liberalisation period. Escorts established a financial 
service subsidiary in 1990. Later, owing to the same 
reasons, it renewed its agreement with Yamaha Motor Co. in 
1992 for expanding its product range. 
333 
Exhibit 8.3 : Change in Policy Variables : Escorts Ltd 
BUSIHESS 
POLICY 
VARIABLES 
PRE-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
POST-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
ORGANISATION 
STRUCTURE 
AND MANAGEMENT 
SIZE AND 
GROWTH 
CAPITAL 
ACQUISITION 
AND 
FINANCE 
MARKETING 
POLICIES 
Divisionalised manage-
ment structure. 
Adopted profit-centre 
concept. Each centre 
highly decentralised. 
Growth and expansion 
through conglomerate 
diversification. Major 
capacity expansion 
and growth. Decelerat-
ion in growth. Estab-
lished a new plant in 
'84. 
Increased requirement 
of capital. 
Moderate turnover 
and good profit-
ability. Vastly under-
capitalised . 
Introduced 350 cc 
motorcycle besides 
existing products. 
Reasonable pricing. 
Less emphasis on 
product promotion. 
Vast dealer network 
Market share 47%. 
Ancillarisation part 
of growth strategy. 
Exports worth Rs 2 
crore to mainly 
Becoming a leaner 
organisation. Adopting 
combination grand stra-
tegy. Corporate game-
plan for consolidation 
as automobile company. 
Leveraging subsidiaries 
and formulating growth 
plans for each. 
Started long-term 
group planning. 
Licensed capacity in-
creased to more than 
6.5 lakh vehicles. 
Horizontal and Verti-
cal integration plan-
nned. Related diver-
sification increased 
production. 
Increased working and 
normal capital expen-
diture requirements. 
Raised capital through 
rights CDs/NCDs. 
Turnover increased 
but profits declined. 
Financially, not 
operating at optimal 
levels. Vastly under-
capitalised . 
Ceased 350 cc production 
Introduced 100 cc in 
'86. Launched another 
motorcycle in '87. Plans 
to launch 125 cc motor-
cycle and a moped. 
Prices increased. Agg-
ressive marketing stra-
tegy. Increase in pro-
motional expenditure. 
Established financial 
subsidiary. Decline in 
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South Asia and 
Africa. 
market share to 27%, 
Dealership network 
strenghtened Substantial 
increase in exports 
since '90. 
PRODUCTION 
AND 
OPERATIONS 
POLICIES 
MANAGEMENT 
OF 
HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
Highly labour-intensive.Less labour-intensive 
Conscious decision for Induction of latest 
non-induction of latest technology. Increased 
technology. Presence of automation to improve 
engineering infra-
structure. Established 
research centre. 
Developed professional-
ism. Acknowledged 
people make organisa-
tion successful. 
Overstaffed with 
growth of company. 
Emphasis on social 
development. 
quality and producti-
vity. Emphasis on cost-
effectiveess. Product 
and technology impro-
vements in existing 
areas. Upgraded manu-
facturing facilities. . 
Vertically integrated. 
Plant modernisation. 
Product development. 
Emphasis on R & D . 
Trained R & D personnel 
abroad. Renewed technical 
agreement. 
Trying to reduce man-
power by introducing 
automation. Offering 
golden handshake. 
Emphasis on fewer 
people and team-work. 
Fresh induction stopped. 
Emphasis on training 
and development. 
Retrenched senior 
executives. 
oource Company Profile of Escorts Ltd (Chapter Five) 
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Expansion, inodernisation and diversification by the company 
has led to increase in its capital requirements in the post-
liberalisation period. Mostly, the company has raised its 
working capital and normal capital expenditure requirements 
through the capital market. Although the turnover of the 
company has increased, profit after tax has declined. 
Besides other reasons, implementation of new projects with 
long lead times have depressed profits. As the Indian 
private corporate sector environment is becoming competitive 
and hostile in the liberalised industrial regime due to 
relaxation of MRTP Act, Escorts is vulnerable to takeovers 
as it is a vastly undercapitalised company. 
The manufacture of 350 cc motorcycle -- a product launched 
in the pre-liberalisation period, had to be stopped in the 
post-liberalisation period. The company launched its 100 cc 
motorcycle in 1986 as a result of broad banding policy of 
the Government. Escorts is planning to broaden its product 
base by launching a 125 cc motorcycle and a 50 cc moped, 
both with the help of foreign collaborators. Though the 
company prices its products reasonably, the price of its 100 
cc motorcycles increased due to imported inputs and 
devaluation of rupee. At times, the company finds it 
difficult to raise price due to a competitive market. In the 
pre-liberalisation period. Escorts' 175 cc motorcycle was 
India's largest selling motorcycle due to which emphasis on 
product promotion was not much. However, with the entry of 
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new players in the motorcycle segment in the post-
liberalisation period led to adoption of an aggressive 
marketing strategy by Escorts. The company's dealer network 
has evolved over years which helped keep Escorts ahead of 
its competitors in the area of distribution. Market share of 
the company has declined considerably in the post-
liberalisation period. Escorts' exports grew substantially 
after 1990. 
In the pre-liberalisation period, the company made a 
conscious decision of not inducting latest technology. 
However, the liberalisation of industrial sector in 1985 and 
the resultant competition changed the company's priorities. 
It is now inducting newer techology and increasing 
automation to improve quality and productivity. Escorts has 
also undertaken product improvements in existing areas of 
production. It is also planning for backward integration by 
establishing casting and forging facilities. There is more 
emphasis on cost-reduction. Plant modernisation has been 
undertaken to reduce manufacturing cost. The company 
increased its R & D activities in the post-liberalisation 
period with an eye on the future, and has trained its R & D 
personnel abroad. 
Due to increased competition in the post-liberalisation 
period, the company is trying to retrench unnecessary 
manpower by introducing automation and comiputerisation. A 
'golden handshake' scheme is being offered to affected 
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workers. To curtail costs, fresh induction has been frozen 
for the last five years. Workers are being trained to make 
them versatile. To rationalise operations, the company 
retrenched ten senior executives in the post-liberalisation 
period. 
8.3 PREMIER AUTOMOBILES LTD 
As one of the earliest company in the business, Premier 
Automobiles Ltd (PAL) heralded the establishment and 
eventual growth of automobile industry in India. In the pre-
liberalisation period, passenger cars produced by PAL used 
to command high premium. However, the company had to face 
competition even before the liberalisation policies were 
announced as Haruti Udyog Ltd (HUL) entered the pasenger car 
segment in 1983 and secured 17 per cent of the car market by 
1984-85. Nevertheless, real competition in the car segment 
arrived only after January 1985 when Government relaxed 
procedures for expansion, industrial approvals, and foreign 
collaborations. 
In the pre-liberalisation period, and during a major part of 
the post-liberalisation period, the company followed a 
traditional style of management. However, increasing 
competition in the passenger car segment and changing 
customer preferences resulted in all round decline in the 
company's performance. Coupled with these, and other such 
factors, the recession in the automobile industry threatened 
the very survival of the company. 
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Exhibit 8.4 : Emerging Business Policy Directions at 
Escorts Ltd 
ORffAHTSATTON STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT 
Becoming lean organisation; redefining operations; adopting 
combination grand strategy; emphasis on rationalisation of 
business interests; consolidation as automobile company; 
leveraging subsidiaries; formulating growth plans for each 
subsidiary; restructuring as part of long-term group 
planning. 
STZE AND GROWTH 
Licensed and installed capacity increased; horizontal and 
vertical integration; related diversification; growth in 
production. 
CAPITAL ACQUISITION AND FINANCE 
Increase in capital requirements; turnover increased; 
profits declined; not operating at optimal levels; vastly 
undercapitalised. 
HARKETIHG POLICIES 
New products, widening product base; aggressive marketing 
strategy; increase in product promotion expenditure; shift 
in brand positioning; new subsidiary; restrengthening 
dealership network; decline in market share; reliance on 
ancillaries; rise in exports. 
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS POLICIES 
Less labour-intensive; induction of new technology; 
increased automation and computerisation; emphasis on 
quality and productivity; product and technology 
improvements; upgradation of manufacturing facilities; 
vertical integration; emphasis on cost-reduction; product 
development and innovation; plant modernisation; emphasis on 
R & D . 
MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
Reducing manpower; offering golden handshake; freeze on new 
induction; emphasis on team-work; increased in-house 
training and development; retrenched senior executives. 
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In order to regain its pre-eminent position in the market, 
PAL changed its management style recently and moved towards 
a decentralised system of operations. The company now places 
emphasis on faster decision making by delegating 
responsibilities. From a pyramidal management structure, PAL 
now has a flattened structure. By implementing a massive 
restructuring plan, the company is becoming a lean 
organisation. 
Consequent to the Government's liberalised policy towards 
size of an enterprise and granting of permission for 
expansion, the company increased its licensed capacity from 
28,600 to 50,000 vehicles per annum. The liberalisation 
policy of the Government helped the company in installing 
capacity in excess of licence granted for. PAL made use of 
Government's policy of capacity reendorsement and the scheme 
of broad banding. By way of a composite licence for four-
wheelers and 25 per cent automatic enhancement of capacity, 
the company has a licence for 62,500 cars per year. Thus, 
PAL has benefitted from Government policies in the post-
liberalisation period. 
The growth of the company was mainly in the pre-
liberalisation period as it used to operate in a duopolistic 
market which was always starved of product preferences. As 
the company could not quickly respond to the entry of MUL .in 
the market and the subsequent policies of liberalisation, 
PAL witnessed deceleration in growth in the years 
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immediately following liberalisation. However, the company 
made good progress in growth after 1986-87 and increased its 
production to almost 43,000 cars in 1990-91. Overall, during 
the eighties, PAL recorded a sales growth of 836 per cent. 
Related diversification and enhancement of product-mix were 
other reasons for the growth of the company. 
With relaxation in foreign technology and collaboration 
policies in 1985, PAL entered into collaboration agreements 
with well-known overseas companies for upgradation of its 
existing product as well as for technology-related 
concentric diversifcation. More recently, the company signed 
a memorandum of understanding with Peugeot Motor Co. of 
France in order to introduce newer products to meet the 
challenges of the new business environment. 
In the post-liberalisation period, PAL undertook expansion 
and modernisation programmes which increased its working 
capital and normal capital expenditure. Increased capital 
acquisition resulted in issuance of non-convertible 
debentures. Turnover of the company increased considerably 
in the post-liberalisation period due to the expansion 
strategies followed by it. However, despite improved 
performance in terms of turnover, profits of the company 
stagnated in the post-liberalisation period due to increased 
competition from HUL and other market-related factors. The 
company, however, continued to pay dividends. 
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Exhibit 8.5 Change in Policy Variables 
Premier Automobiles Ltd 
BUSINESS 
POLICY 
VARIABLES 
PRE-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
POST-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
ORGANISATION 
STRUCTURE 
AND MANAGEMENT 
SIZE AND 
GROWTH 
CAPITAL 
ACQUISITION 
AND 
FINANCE 
MARKETING 
POLICIES 
Pyramidal management Relatively flattened 
structure. Style of management structure, 
management traditional Style of management 
and bureaucratic. 
Less delegation of 
authority and res-
ponsibility . 
Capacity increased to 
28,600 from 18,000 
in '83-84. 
Reasonable growth in 
production. 
Moderate requirement 
of working capital. 
Major capital re-
quirement met 
through capital market 
Good turnover and 
profits. 
One brand of car. 
Low availability of 
product and high 
premium. Less pro-
promotional expen-
diture. Good distr-
ibution network. 
Market share ranged 
between 40-50%. Less 
dependent on vendors. 
Negligble exports. 
professional and less 
bureaucratic. More dele-
gation of authority 
and responsibility. 
Becoming a lean orga-
nisation. Positive 
change in management 
culture. 
Capacity increased to 
35,000 vehicles in 
'85-86. Later 
increased to 50,000 
in '88-89. Installed 
capacity 54,500. 
Excellent growth in 
production since 
'86-87. Related diver-
sification and widened 
product-mix. 
Increased capital 
acquisition through 
HCDs in capital 
market. Excellent 
turnover but profits 
stagnated. Un-
interrupted dividend 
payment. 
New model of car. 
Introduced different 
versions of car. Re-
structuring product-mix 
Reducing price. Incre-
ased promotional expe-
nditure. Adopted agg-
ressive marketing str-
ategies. Declining 
market share. 
More dependent on 
vendors. Negligible 
342 
PRODUCTION 
AMD 
OPERATIONS 
POLICIES 
MANAGEMENT 
OF 
HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
Modest technology by 
contemporary standards 
Negligble emphasis on 
R & D and fuel effi-
ciency. High cost of 
of production. Less 
emphasis on moder-
nisation. Less auto-
mation. Inflexible 
operation methods. 
Poor inventory mana-
gement . 
Encouragement to profe-
ssionalism. Bloated 
employee strength. 
High wage costs. 
Disturbed industrial 
relations. Produc-
tivity-linked ince-
ntives. Payments to 
workers for over-time. 
exports. Emphasis on 
segmentation. 
Modernising plant and 
equipment. Emphasis on 
cost reduction, 
productivity and 
quality, value 
enginering, single 
point manufacturing. 
Improved inventory 
management. More . 
automation. Flexible 
operation. Emphasis on 
R & D and fuel-
efficiency. Closed 
loss-making units. 
Encouragement to 
professionalism 
increased. Restruc-
tured manpower. 
Retrenched workers 
by VRS. Reducing wage 
costs. Stopped produc-
tivity-linked incentive 
and over-time payments. 
Reducing manpower, 
further. Cordial 
industrial-relations. 
Stopped fresh induction 
lately. 
Source : Company Profile of Premier Automobiles Ltd 
(Chapter Six). 
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The threats posed by the competitors, and the opportunities 
provided by the liberalised regime, brought forth the 
strengths and weaknesses of PAL. As a result, the com;pany 
re-oriented its marketing strategies in the post-
liberalisation period. PAL introduced a new model of car 
with higher engine capacity with higher-fuel efficiency. It 
also introduced a diesel version of its old car and improved 
its fuel-efficiency. To meet customer requirements, PAL 
introduced an economy model of its car. It is now planning 
to introduce a restyled car with improved aesthetics, to 
broaden its customer base. PAL is also restructuring its 
product-mix. The company has adopted retrenchment and 
modernisation strategies to further lower down the prices of 
its products. In the post-liberalisation period, PAL 
increased its product promotion expenditure and embarked on 
aggressive marketing strategies to contain its declining 
market share. The company also changed its product 
positioning strategy and is now planning to enter different 
segments of the car market including overseas market. As 
part of its cost-reduction strategy, PAL is increasing its 
dependence on component suppliers. 
To counter the competitive challenge in the post-
liberalisation period, PAL has adopted modernisation 
strategy. It has modernised plant and equipment, cut costs 
and overheads, and used underutilised manpower and plant as 
part of its production strategy. PAL has also adopted 
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retrenchment strategy and closed its loss-making foundry 
unit. The task of inventory management has also improved in 
the post-liberalisation period. PAL is giving more emphasis 
to indigenisation, technology absorption, value engineering, 
improved productivity and quality, and single point 
manufacturing. To become competitive, the company is 
upgrading its product through in-house R & D. PAL has 
increased its R & D expenditure in the post-liberalisation 
period. 
Labour strength, and costs, of PAL increased in the post-
liberalisation period. Therefore, to restrengthen its 
competitive advantage, the company reduced its employee 
strength by introducing a Voluntary Retirement Scheme. PAL 
also stopped over-time payments and productivity-linked 
incentives for workers. In the earlier part of the post-
liberalisation period, the company reduced the wages of its 
workers. At present, fresh induction has been stopped in the 
company. 
8.4 TATA EHGIHEERING & LOCQMQTIVT? CO 
The Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. (TELCO) has always 
been a forerunner in the private corporate sector. However, 
the liberal policies of the Government, initiated in 1985, 
have changed the business environment which has provided 
opportunities and challenges for TELCO. An integrated 
strategic business plan was drawn in pre-liberalisation 
period which was ignored by the Tata Group of Companies. The 
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Exhibit 8.6 : Emerging Business Policy Directions at 
Premier Automobiles Ltd 
QRGAHISATIQN STRUCTURE AHD HAHAGEHEHT 
Change in management style; change in management structure; 
changing management culture; delegating authority and 
responsibility; restructuring organisation; becoming lean. 
f^ TZF AHD GROWTH 
Increased licensed and installed capacity; related 
diversification; expansion; growth in production; 
establishing new companies; proposing a joint venture. 
CAPITAL ACQUISTTIQH AND FIHAHCE 
Increase in capital acquisition and requirement; increasing 
turnover; stagnant profits; regular dividend payment; 
improving financial planning. 
HARKETIHG POLICIES 
New product; product variations; technology-related 
concentric diversification; restructuring product-mix; 
reducing price; aggressive marketing strategy; increased 
promotional expenditure; change in product positioning 
strategy, emphasis on segmentation; restrengthened 
dealership; increaing dependence on vendors; declining 
market share; emphasising on exports. 
PRQDUCTIQH AHD OPERATIONS POLICIES 
Plant modernisation; induction of new technology; emphasis 
on quality and productivity; emphasis on indigenisation and 
technology absorption; value engineering; improving 
inventory management; increasing automation; emphasis on 
single point manufacturing; flexibility in operations; 
closing loss-making units; farming out components; 
increasing in-house R & D; emphasis on design technology; 
optimising on inputs; improving worker productivity; product 
development and innovation. 
MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
Reducing workforce; re-introducing voluntary retirement 
scheme; freeze on new induction; moving towards succession 
planning; reducing wage costs; restructuring manpower. 
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emergence of a liberalised industrial regime, however, led 
to a change in strategic planning. Formally, Group planning 
V7as stopped. Instead, a strategic planning cell was set up 
in the post-liberalisation period. The Group is now planning 
consolidation after surveying areas of overlapping 
businesses. Such consolidation may lead to mergers within, 
or even without, the Group which will affect TELCO also. 
The company increased its licensed capacity of commercial 
vehicles from 36,000 to 56,000 vehicles in the pre-
liberalisation period. Consequent to Government's 
liberalisation policy, its licensed capacity increased to 
78,000 vehicles per annum. TELCO established a new plant at 
Lucknow in the post-liberalisation period. However, the 
company has been following a strategy of volume expansion 
since its inception. Government's liberalised policy towards 
expansion and introduction of broad banding of capacity in 
1985, resulted in excellent growth in production. 
After liberalisation of foreign technology and collaboration 
policy of the Government, the company entered into technical 
agreement with foreign companies for improving the 
performance of its commercial vehicles' diesel engines, 
conversion to petrol engines and for manufacture of key 
inputs. TELCO took over an iron casting manufacturing 
company last year and converted it into a backward 
integrated division. 
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For use in its capital expenditure programme and working 
capital requirements, the company raised funds through 
convertible debentures in the post-liberalisation period. 
For its capital expenditure requirements, TELCO augmented 
its finance through capital market. Thus, there was an 
increase in capital acquisition in the post-liberalisation 
period on account of modernisation and expansion strategies 
followed by the company. TELCO's turnover increased 
phenomenally due to improved performance in the post-
liberalisation period. Profits, too, showed an upward trend. 
However, the company is not innovative in its tax planning. 
Although the company had introduced various models of medium 
and heavy commercial vehicles in the pre-liberalisation 
period, yet it had no presence in the light commercial 
vehicles segment. Making use of the broad banding policy of 
the Government and its own engineering strengths, the 
company entered the light commercial vehicle market in 1986. 
With Government refusing permission in 1986 to collaborate 
with an overseas manufacturer for production of passenger 
cars, the company launched two models of indigenously 
developed cars in 1991 and 1992. TELCO also developed 
different models of diesel commercial vehicles. The company 
is vertically integrated which helped it in expanding its 
product range and market base. The company's products are 
reasonably priced, and price hikes were mostly due to 
extraneous factors. 
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Exhibit 8.7 : Change in Policy Variables : TELCO 
BUSINESS 
POLICY 
VARIABLES 
PRE-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
POST-LIBERALISATION 
PERIOD 
ORGANISATION 
STRUCTURE 
AMD HAWAGEHEH 
SIZE AND 
GROWTH 
Divisionalised manage-
ment structure. Integ-
rated strategic plan 
drawn in 1983 but not 
taken up. 
Increase in capacity 
from 36,000 to 56,000. 
Recorded 22.5% growth 
between '80-85. 
Adopted expansion 
strategy. 
Group planning stopped. 
Strategic Planning Cell 
of the Group guides 
Company. Moving towards 
consolidation. 
Increase in capacity. 
Established a new plant 
Total capacity increased 
to 78,000. Related 
diversification in-
creased production. 
Recorded 48.2% growth 
between '85-92. 
Following expansion 
strategy. 
CAPITAL 
ACQUISITION 
AND 
FINANCE 
MARKETING 
POLICIES 
Considerable require-
ment of working 
capital. Good turn-
over and net profits. 
Various models and 
products in heavy and 
medium categories. 
Reasonable pricing. 
Less emphasis on mark-
keting. Concentrated 
on sales. Widespread 
distribution network. 
Market share stable. 
Consciously developed 
export markets. 
Increased capital acq-
uisition through CDs 
and PCDs in capital 
market, Turnover incr-
eased phenomenally. 
Emerged as the largest 
private sector Company 
Profits increased. Tax 
planning not innovative. 
Introduced LCV in 1988. 
Launched two models of 
cars in '91 and '92, 
Prices increased. 
Aggressive marketing. 
Increased promotional 
expenditure. Demographic 
promotion of HCVs. Re-
strengthened dealership. 
Market share stable in 
M & HCV segment. Excep-
tional increase in 
market share of LCV. 
Exports increased. 
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PRODUCTION 
AND 
OPERATIONS 
POLICIES 
MANAGEMENT 
OF 
HUMAN 
RESOURCES 
Manufacturing and tech- Product development. 
nology driven company. Vertically integrated 
Presence of engineering Emphasis on plant mo-
infrastructure. Conti-
nuous R & D efforts. 
Developed a team of R 
& D personnel. 
Encouragement to pro-
fessionalism. High 
priority to training. 
dernisation and value 
engineering. Thrust on 
quality. Increased 
computerisation. Inves-
ted in modernisation. 
Emphasis on flexibility 
of operations. Increased 
R & D activities. 
Emphasis on training 
in value engineering, 
TQM and computers. 
Increase in training 
mandays and investment 
in training. Institu-
tionalised training 
for top executives. 
Emphasis on dealers' 
training. Retrenched 
casual workers in 1992, 
Fixed retirement age for 
.chief executive and 
senior managers. 
Source Company Profile of TELCO (Chapter Seven). 
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In the pre-liberalisation period, TELCO downplayed marketing 
of its products and concentrated on sales. However, the 
liberalisation policy of the Government intensified 
competitive forces, especially in the LCV segment, which 
prompted TELCO to embark on an aggressive marketing and 
advertising campaign. The company's expenditure on product 
promotion increased in the post-liberalisation period. 
Although the HCV segment is a duopoly and TELCO has many 
advantages, yet it started promoting its product in south 
India, which is dominated by its competitor Ashok Leyland, 
to increase its market base. The company restrengthened its 
already widespread distribution network. TELCO's share in 
medium and heavy commerical vehicle market has remained 
stable in both pre- and post-liberalisation period. However, 
its market share in LCV segment has increased exponentially. 
Exports have been on the rise and effort to target newer 
markets is the part of the company's strategic corporate 
plan . 
To achieve competitive advantage in a changed business 
environment, the company has embarked on a programme of 
product development. There is increasing emphasis on plant 
modernisation and value engineering. In order to maintain 
its competitive,,edge over its competitors, TELCO is laying 
emphasis on quality, reliability and appearance of vehicles. 
The production policies aim at designing newer and broader 
range of products to enable the company to be 
internationally competitive. In the post-liberalisation 
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period, TELCO has invested in modernisation and upgradation 
of manufacturing facilities. The materials department has 
been completely computerised. The company has laid emphasis 
on establishing flexibility of operations in order to meet 
changing market requirements. R & D activities of the 
company have increased in the post-liberalisation period as 
considerable emphasis is being given to improvement of 
present range of products. For the first time, an indigenous 
passenger car entirely developed in-house was introduced by 
the company in the post-liberalisation period. 
The company assigns high priority to the training of its 
employees. In the post-liberalisation period, the company 
has initiated special training programmes in the areas of 
value engineering, total quality management and computer 
literacy. TELCO retrenched casual workers last year in order 
to reduce labour costs. The company fixed retirement age for 
its chief executive and top managers in the post-
liberalisation period in order to introduce succession 
planning. 
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Exhibit 8.8 : Emerging Business Policy Directions at 
TELCO 
ORGANTSATTOH STRUCTURE AND HAHAGEMEHT 
Group planning stopped; moving towards consolidation; 
planning groupwise restructuring; following growth 
path of acquisitions and mergers. 
SIZE AND GROWTH 
Increase in licensed and installed capacity; vertical 
integration; .strategy of volume expansion; growth in 
production. 
CAPITAT, AND ACQUISITION FINANCE 
Increase in capital requirements; turnover increasing fast; 
increase in profits; emphasis on tax planning. 
MARKETIHg POLICIES 
Entered new segment; new products; widening product and 
market base; aggressive marketing; increasing promotional 
expenditure; shift to demographic product positioning; 
restrengthened dealership; increasing market share in LCV 
segment; efforts for increasing market share in other 
segments; emphasis on customer needs; pricing on basis of 
production efficiency; exports a part of growth strategy; 
targetting new export markets. 
PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS POLICIES 
Product development; plant modernisation; value engineering 
for manufacturing cost reduction; thrust on quality 
improvements; aiming at newer and broader range of products; 
increasing investment in upgradation of manufacturing 
facilities; improving labour productivity; material 
optimisation; developing designing skills; flexibility of 
operations; increase in in-house R & D activities. 
MANAGEMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
Increase in in-house training; covering new areas for 
training; corporate level programme for top executives; 
increasing investment in training; training dealers; 
retrenchment of casual workers; moving towards succession 
planning. 
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8.5 CnHSOLIDATED RESULTS AND CQHCLUDIHG COMMENTS 
The company-wise analyses in the previous four sections of 
this Chapter have amply demonstrated that there has been a 
qualitative change in the policy environment since January, 
1985. The present study on Liberalisation and its Impact on 
Business Policies of Selected Private Sector Conpanies in 
India has come to the conclusion that companies were under 
discernible pressure to respond to changes effected by the 
Government in the past eight years. A consolidation of 
strategic behaviour and response of the selected companies 
in the post-liberalisation period (1985 and onwards) would 
support the above proposition. 
The liberalisation policies of the Government perceptibly 
increased the interface and interaction of companies with 
business environment. Over the past eight years, the 
business environment has undergone considerable change. The 
pressure of intense competition, the accelerated rate of 
technological obsolescence, the nature of market, the 
fundamentals of management responsibility, and new 
approaches to planning and operating provided unparalleled 
opportunity and challenge to the companies. 
1, A significant finding of this study is that 
businesses which earlier did not plan for their groups 
have started long - term group planning. And the ones 
which already had group planning process have now 
graduated to strategic planning. Moreover, 
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subsidiaries are increasingly being guided by the 
parent group or company. As a corollary to their 
consolidation strategies, unrelated diversified 
companies are rationalising their business interests 
while the vertically and / or horizontally integrated 
companies are moving towards concentric 
diversification. Responding to the attitudinal change 
in the Government and rapid change in business 
environment, companies under review moved away from 
traditional management style to the "adaptive" 
professional style of management. No longer do the 
bureaucratic multiple hierarchy and centralised system 
of operation exists. Instead, companies are either 
reducing managerial hierarchy or decentralising their 
system. The emphasis, and realised need, is on quick 
decision making which obviously has led to delegation 
of authority and responsibility. Restructuring of 
company or divison or group is the latest trend in the 
private sector. The focus of all such restructuring 
exercises is consolidation in their respective 
business. It is also found that large size of 
organisation does not necessarily mean success. 
Therefore, the emphasis is on lean organisation. 
2. The Governmental policies of minimum economic 
capacity, capacity re-endorsement and expansion 
(especially for HRTP companies) have led to a growth 
in capacity in the post-liberalisation period. The 
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obvious, and intended, impact has been the positive 
growth in production which was relatively higher than 
the pre-liberalisation period. Expansion of capacity 
and growth in production have meant sound business 
strategy for the companies as they always wanted to 
establish the internal capability which could enable 
them to respond adequately to the market demand. 
Volume expansion strategy was also adopted as there 
has been emergence of new markets -- locally as well 
as globally. 
However, for Indian companies, growth has rarely come 
through a singular indigenous effort -- even in the 
pre-liberalisation period. Government's earlier 
regulatory regime was an obstacle in development of 
capabilities which could accelerate industrial growth 
on its own. As an obvious fallout, the growth strategy 
followed by companies in the post-liberalisation 
period was formulated with overseas help. ' Al«i 
companies have signed a number of collaboration 
agreements with foreign companies for upgrading 
products in order to grow in the changing business 
environment. Relaxation / Abolition of procedural 
impediments in foreign technology and collaboration 
policies by the Government have helped considerably in 
this regard. 
3. The growth path, and grand strategies, followed by 
companies have had a direct bearing on capital 
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acquisition and finance of the companies. 
Modernisation and growth plans devised to 
(re)strengthen their position in the market have led 
to increase in working capital and normal capital 
expenditure. Mostly, the companies have met their 
financial requirements through capital market, or 
loans from banks, financial institutions or other 
lending agencies. Here too, intense competition has 
had an impact on companies. Although companies have 
recorded modest to impressive turnover in the post-
liberalisation period, profits have either stagnated 
or declined. Despite visible frequent increases in the 
price of products, companies could not pass the entire 
cost increases to the customers due to price 
competitiveness. Absorption of cost increases 
adversely affected the profitability of companies, 
though in varying degrees. 
4. The mechanism of control and regulation in the pre-
liberalisation period had ensured the scarcity of 
products, unofficial premia, high prices, limited 
market and a restricted product choices. As an obvious 
fallout, there was a lack of competition in Indian 
industry. Government's policy of liberalisation, 
however, changed the characteristics of the market. 
The scheme of broad banding allowed the companies to 
widen the product-mix in order to ensure greater 
capacity utilisation and customer orientation. As a 
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result, companies introduced new models and different 
variants of their products to cope with changing 
customer preferences in the new business environment. 
Some companies also entered into new segments in order 
to include different customer groups. The emerging 
trend among the companies is to identify newer markets 
and segments, and get closer to them. As markets are 
emerging as conglomerates of niches, the companies are 
planning to focus their product(s) on niche markets. 
In view of the increasing rivalry between the existing 
competitors, and threats of new substitutes and new 
entrants, companies are re-orienting their marketing-
mix strategies. Due to the adoption of aggressive 
marketing strategies, and intensive and extensive 
product promotion strategies, expenditure on product 
promotion has increased in the post-liberalisation 
period. Contrary to the earlier emphasis on sales, 
companies are now concentrating on marketing. In the 
post-liberalisation period, product positioning 
strategies have also witnessed a change. In order to 
boost sales in a highly competitive market, the 
companies have set up financial subsidiaries for 
purchase of their products on instalments. The network 
of dealership has either been restrengthened or 
widened in the post-liberalisation period. Companies 
are placing emphasis on dealer training and 
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development, and are looking for financially sound 
result-oriented dealers. 
The effect of the previous regulatory environment and 
the response to the liberalisation policies is well 
exemplified in the fluctuations of market share of 
companies. While some companies have increased their 
market share in respective categories, others have 
witnessed a decline in market share, though with 
varying degrees. Besides, there is also the case of 
maintaining leadership position but with considerable 
decline in market share. Such variations can be 
directly related to the reaction time taken' to meet 
complex demands. Companies vhich have reacted quickly 
to the rapid environmental changes have had a decisive 
advantage over their competitors. In the post-
liberalisation period, pricing of products has been a 
complex issue. Despite reluctance on the part of 
companies, extraneous factors led to price increases. 
However, there is a gtowing realisation that 
competitive pricing, and lower prices, would play a 
decisive role in future growth of the companies. Price 
consciousness also emanates from the companies' desire 
to explore and enter the growing overseas markets. As 
a result, companies are emphasising on production cost 
reduction. 
5. There has been a paradigm shift in the production 
practices of the companies in the post-liberalisation 
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period. Obsolete technology has given way to new 
technologies. Companies are placing emphasis on 
product upgradation and development in order to 
satisfy the customers' demand. Efficient manufacturing 
processes, upgradation of manufacturing facilities, 
and plant modernisation are the new concerns of 
companies. Increased automation and computerisation 
have become a part of production strategy in the post-
liberalisation period besides raising of capital and 
worker productivity. 
The policies of liberalisation, and the changing 
requirements and preferences of customers, have led to 
the adoption of flexible manufacturing process. In 
order to satisfy the increasingly quality-conscious 
customers, the companies are emphasising on the 
concepts of TQH (Total Quality Management) and design 
technology. Other issues of strategic concerns are 
productivity, value engineering, indigenisation, 
material optimisation, restructuring of product-mix, 
single point manufacturing, cost reduction, and 
farming out of components manufacturing. The companies 
are also improving the system of inventory management. 
However, of much significance is the priority being 
accorded to R & D by the companies. 
6. The change in business environment and intensification 
of market forces have affected the personnel 
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management in companies. The complex issue of human 
resource management in a dynamic but uncertain 
environment have led to the adoption of varying 
strategies by the companies. With current emphasis 
being on lean organisation and cost-reduction, some 
companies have retrenched casual workers while others 
have 'reduced the strength of employees by means of 
Voluntary Retirement Scheme or 'golden handshakes'. 
Most of the companies have changed their recruitment 
policies and have stopped fresh induction. At the same 
time, encouragmeent is being given to professionalism 
and professionals. In-house training and development 
has received impetus in the post-liberalisation 
period. In some cases, the emphasis is on team-work 
and employee involvement. In the post-liberalisation 
period, the emerging trend has been the move towards a 
well-defined succession planning by the companies. 
The analyses of the present study, therefore, confirms the 
research propositions that 
(1) Liberalisation has had a varying impact on different 
policy variables. 
(2) Liberalisation has had a varying impact on different 
private sector companies. 
(3> Liberalisation has had an impact on business policies 
of private sector companies. 
In conclusion, it can be said that a new trend in management 
has emerged in the process of liberalisation which shows the 
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sensitivity of enterprises to changes in public policy. 
Therefore, global changes will also have their implications 
for Governmental policy and organisational growth. The 
future growth of world economy, the globalisation of 
markets, rise and consolidation of economic blocs like 2C 
(European Community) and NAFTA (North American Free Trade 
Agreement), etc. will sooner or later have their impact on 
Indian business. At home, the overall economic growth, 
economic and political stability, the rise in living 
standards, improvement in quality of life, availability and 
versatility of human resources, 'glocalisation' of Indian 
market and future social parameters will have their bearing 
on the performance of Indian companies. 
The task of environmental scanning will assume much 
significance and the horizons for planning would much wide.T. 
The complex demands of the market would require fresh 
initiatives and fast reaction time. In such a situation 
traditional and predictable responses may not work. The 
concern for business would be action and not rhetoric. 
Organisations will have to be strategic in their 
functioning. On the other hand, management response will 
have to address the issues of technology, information 
system, organisational flexibility and global orientation. A 
close scanning of environmental changes and development of 
rapid response capability is likely to make the 
organisations successful. 
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Technology and R & D would be the decisive issues for the 
success of companies. The accelerated pace of technological 
obsolescence would not only require quick and strategic 
response but also techno-economic management. Companies will 
have to be flexible and adaptive in order to avail the 
impending opportunities or to ward-off the visible threats. 
Of course, the "ritualistic" behaviour of organisations will 
have to relearn the intricacies of business and reinvent 
themselves as companies. 
Other issues that may take priority in future agenda of 
organisations include "demand" management, export 
performance, environmental issues, human resource management 
and business ethics. Customer satisfaction is already 
gaining importance among enterprises. 
Therefore, perceptive organisations must change. A greater 
harmony of functional areas within the organisation would 
ease the task of meeting the emerging environmental demands. 
Moreover, Government and business will have to work together 
for increasing international competitiveness. Organisations 
which can u.se information and intuition for a vision of the 
future would have a decisive advantage in the coming years. 
Not taking business environment seriously would be self 
deception. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
SUMMARISED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.1 Bajaj Auto Ltd 
9-2 Escorts Ltd 
9.3 Premier Automobiles Ltd 
9-4 Tata Engineering & Locomotive Co. 
9.5 Cone 1usions 
9.6 Directions for Future Research 
SUMMARISED FIHDIHGS &HD CQHCLUSIOHS, 
AND DIRECTIQHS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Based on the conceptual framework of the study, and keeping 
in view the scope, the analyses and interpretation have been 
directed towards qualitatively evaluating the impact of 
liberalisation on the- business policies of four selected 
private sector companies. The analyses made in the preceding 
chapter supports the general propositions of the study. This 
chapter presents the summarised findings and conclusions, 
and attempts to provide some directions for future research 
in the area. 
9-1 BAJAJ AUTQ LTD 
The summarised findings relating to Bajaj Auto Ltd (BAL) 
are as follows: 
1. BAL restructured some of its divisions in the post-
liberalisation period in order to take quick action to 
meet the challenges of competitive market. The company 
also slashed the decision hierarchy so as to reduce the 
time-lag for responding to the market requirements. The 
increased competition posed by the new companies due to 
the removal of procedural impediments for industrial 
approvals and foreign collaborations necessitated these 
changes. 
2. As a result of removal of controls for expansion, 
especially for HRTP companies like BAL, the company 
expanded its production capacity. Government's policies 
of capacity re-endorsement and prescribing of a minimum 
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economic capacity helped the company in expanding its 
installed capacity. Utilising the incentives provided to 
units located in centrally notified backward areas, BAL 
set up a new plant in the post-liberalisation period. On 
receiving broad banding endorsement, the company set up a 
separate three-wheeler manufacturing division in 1987. 
All these strategies to Governmental policy changes led 
to a phenomenal growth of the company in the post-
liberalisation period. 
3. The expansion strategy followed by the company, due to 
the changed business environment, increased the capital 
requirements of BAL. The company augmented its capital 
acquisition through loans and capital market. BAL's 
phenomenal growth led to a positive effect on its 
finances as the turnover and profitability of the company 
increased in the post-liberalisation period. This later 
helped BAL in absorbing price increases of its product 
and remain competitive in the market. 
4. The scheme of broad banding, and changing customer 
preferences, prompted the company to introduce five 
models of two-wheelers in the post-liberalisation period. 
The relaxation in foreign technology and collaboration 
policies was strategically used by BAL as it entered into 
the motorcycle segment through overseas collaboration. 
The increase in production volume as a result of various 
liberalisation measures has been helpful for the company 
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in achieving economies of scale and maintaining 
reasonable pricing of its products. The intensified 
competition in the liberalised environment increased the 
promotional expenditure of BAL and adoption of aggressive 
marketing strategies. The company also restrengthened and 
increased its dealership network. As a result of 
increased production and widening product range, market 
share of BAL in the two-wheeler segment increased in the 
post-liberalisation period. 
5. In order to meet the changing market demand and achieve 
manufacturing efficiency, BAL implemented modernisation 
strategies more effectively in the post - liberalisation 
period. Intense competition due to liberalisation policy 
of the Government have emphasised on .quality and 
productivity of firms. Therefore, BAL is upgrading its 
products through in-house R & D . The company is making 
efforts for rapid readjustment of manufacturing capacity. 
BAL has also increased its R & D expenditure and has 
resorted to manufacturing cost reduction in order to be 
competitive in the post-liberalisation period. 
6. The company has changed its recruitment policy with the 
advent of competition in the market place. It now 
emphasises on in-house training. BAL has also laid 
emphasis on team work for increasing productivity and 
quality. 
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9.2 ESCORTS LTD 
The findings related to Escorts Ltd are summarised below: 
1. The entry of new competitors due to liberalised policies 
of the Government with respect to industrial approvals 
and foreign collaborations eroded the dominant position 
of Escorts in the market. To regain its position, the 
company is following combination grand strategy through 
stability, expansion and retrenchment. It has also 
adopted the policy of becoming a lean organisation and 
started group planning to meet the challenges of the new 
business environment. 
2. In response to the Government's policies of minimum 
economic capacity and relaxation on expansion, the 
company increased its licensed and installed capacity in 
the post-liberalisation period. Escorts did not expand in 
a big way in the post-liberalisation period as it 
responded late to the policy changes compared to its 
competitors. Although related diversification due to the 
broad banding of capacity increased Escorts' volume of 
production, growth in the post-liberalisation period was 
relatively moderate. One of the reason for less than 
expected growth was the bid for a hostile takeover in 
1983 which consumed most of the managerial attention in 
the succeeding years. 
3. Expansion, modernisation and diversification by Escorts 
has increased its capital requirements in the post-
liberalisation period. Mostly the finances required have 
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been raised through the capital market. However, net 
profits of the company has declined despite the increase 
in turnover in the post-liberalisation period. Absorption 
of manufacturing cost increases and implementation of new 
projects with long lead times are some of the reasons for 
decline in net profits. In view of the relaxation in MRTP 
Act, Escorts has become more vulnerable to takeovers for 
being a vastly undercapitalised company. 
4. The policy of broad banding helped the company in 
stopping the manufacture of a loss-making product and 
introducing a new product in 1986. Prices of vehicles-
could not be checked due to the imported inputs required 
by the company and devaluation of rupee. At times, the 
competitive market has forced Escorts in absorbing price 
increases. The promotional expenditure of the company 
increased in the post-liberalisation period due to 
increased competition in the market. The company adopted 
an aggressive marketing strategy after the entry of new 
players due to Government's liberalisation policy. 
Although the dealer network was restrengthened in the 
post-liberalisation period, market share of the company 
declined considerably. However, exports grew 
substantially in the post-liberalisation period. 
5. The liberalised policy, and the resultant competition, 
led to the adoption of newer production technology and 
increased automation to improve quality and productivity. 
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In order to be price competitive in the market, the 
company now places greater emphasis on manufacturing cost 
reduction. The company has increased its R & D 
expenditure in the post-liberalisation period. 
6. Escorts is pruning its manpovfer strength by introducing 
automation and computerisation in the post-liberalisation 
period in order to be competitive in the changed market. 
To curtail costs, a golden handshake is being offered to 
affected workers and fresh induction has been stopped. In 
order to increase productivity, workers are being trained 
to develop a wider range of skills. 
9.3 PREMIER AUTOMOBTLKS LTD 
Following are the summarised findings relating to Premier 
Automobiles Ltd (PAL): 
1. Increasing competition and changing consumer preferences 
resulted in all round decline in PAL's performance. In 
order to regain its pre-eminent position, the company 
changed its style of management and adopted a 
decentralised system of operations. PAL now places 
emphasis on faster decision making by delegating 
responsibility in order to respond quickly to market 
requirements. The company's management structure, too, 
has flattened and it is trying to become a leaner 
organisation to face the challenges of competition. 
2. Government's liberalisation policy with regard to size 
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and expansion helped the company in increasing its 
licensed capacity. By making use of the policies of 
capacity re-endorsement and broad banding, PAL has 
installed more than the licensed capacity. The policies 
of liberalisation, however, resulted in decelerated 
growth for the company as new entrants made the market 
competitive. Related diversification and broadening of 
product-mix nevertheless increased the volume of 
production in the post-liberalisation period. 
3. Expansion and modernisation programme undertaken by the 
company in the post-liberalisation period increased its 
capital requirements. Turnover, too, increased 
considerably due to the expansion strategies followed by 
PAL in the post-liberalisation period. However, market 
related factors and increased competition stagnated the 
profits of the company in the post-liberalisation period. 
4. PAL re-oriented its marketing strategy due to the 
threats posed by its competitors in the post-
liberalisation period. A new model and variants of 
existing products with higher fuel efficiency were 
launched to counter the challenges of the market. The 
company has adopted modernisation and retrenchment 
strategies in order to competitively price its vehicles. 
PAL adopted an aggressive marketing strategy and 
increased its promotional expenditure in the post-
liberalisation period to contain its declining market 
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share. The company has become more dependent on component 
suppliers in the post-liberalisation period. 
5. PAL has adopted modernisation strategy to become 
competitive in the new business environment. To cut down 
costs, the company also adopted retrenchment strategy in 
the post-liberalisation period. PAL has increased its R & 
D expenditure and is laying emphasis on product 
upgradation. Indigenisation, technology absorption, value 
engineering, productivity, quality and single point 
manufacturing are some of the other priorities of the 
company in the new business environment. 
6. In order to restrengthen its competitive advantage in 
the post-liberalisation period, the company reduced its 
employee strength by introducing a Voluntary Retirement 
Scheme. As a cost-reduction strategy. PAL stopped 
overtime payments and productivity-linked incentives for 
workers. 
9-4 TATA EMGTNF.F.RTNG & LOCOMOTIVE CQ. 
Presented below are summarised findings relating to Tata 
Engineering & Locomotive Co. (TELCO): 
1. The emergence of a liberalised industrial regime 
provided opportunities and challenges to TELCO which 
changed its strategic planning process. The planned 
consolidation by the Tata Group may lead to mergers and 
amalgamations which will affect TELCO also. This 
possibility has increased because of the relaxation in 
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the HRTP Act. 
2. Consequent to Government's policy of liberalisation with 
respect to expansion by MRTP companies, TELCO increased 
its licensed production capacity. It also established a 
new assembly plant in the post-liberalisation period. The 
introduction of broad banding and expansion policies 
resulted in excellent growth by the company in the post-
liberalisation period. 
3. On account of expansion and modernisation policies 
followed by the company, capital requirements increased 
in the post-liberalisation period. Mostly, the company 
augmented its financial requirements through the capital 
market. TELCO's turnover increased phenomenally in the 
post-liberalisation period due to improved performance. 
Profits of the company also increased in the liberalised 
business environment as a result of removal of 
constraints on growth and expansion. 
4. The company, utilising the policy of broad banding, 
entered into a new segment of commercial vehicles in the 
post-liberalisation period. TELCO also launched two 
models of passenger vehicles, and developed and 
introduced variants of existing products. Though, the 
company prices its vehicles reasonably, extraneous 
factors have led to price hikes. The intensification of 
competitive forces as a result of policies of 
liberalisation prompted TELCO to embark on an aggressive 
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marketing and advertising campaign. The company gave 
emphasis to demographic product positioning. Although the 
company's market share in some segments has remained 
stable, its market share in the new segment of light 
commercial vehicles increased exceptionally in the post-
liberalisation period. As a part of strategic corporate 
plan, exports are being targetted to newer markets. 
5. To achieve competitive advantage in a changed business 
environment, the company embarked on a programme of 
product development and plant modernisation. In order to 
maintain a competitive edge over its competitors, TELCO 
is now emphasising on quality, reliability and appearance 
of vehicles. The company has also computerised its 
operations and is establishing flexibility of operations 
in order to meet the changing requirements of the market 
at a quicker pace. TELCO has increased its R & D 
activities in the post-liberalisation period. 
6. TELCO assigns high priority to the training of its 
employees. It has initiated special training programmes 
on specialised subjects in the post-liberalisation period 
to broaden the horizons of its employees in the light of 
the new business environment. In order to reduce costs, 
TELCO retrenched casual workers. In the post-
liberalisation period, the company fixed retirement age 
for its chief executive and top managers in order to plan 
succession. 
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9.5 CONCLUSIQHS 
The summarised findings based on the case studies of the 
four selected companies lead to the following conclusions: 
1. The businesses which did not plan for their groups have 
started long-term planning in the post-liberalisation 
period. Those which already had group planning have now 
graduated to strategic planning. Subsidiaries are being 
guided by the parent group/company. Another conclusion 
that can be drawn is that unrelated diversified companies 
are rationalising their businesses while the 
vertically/horizontally integrated companies are going 
for concentric diversification. 
In response to the rapid change in business environment 
due to Government's liberalisation policies, companies 
are increasingly relying on professional style of 
management rather than the traditional style. Moreover, 
the need for quick decision making has led to delegation 
of authority and responsibility. 
Another significant finding is that the restructuring 
exercises adopted by companies aim at consolidation in 
their respective businesses. It is also found that large 
size of a company is a cause for being less adaptive to 
the changing business environment. As a result, the 
emphasis is on lean organisation. 
2. The Governmental policies of minimum economic capacity, 
capacity reendorsement, and expansion have led to a 
growth in production capacity in the post -liberalisation 
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period. Companies have largely followed volume expansion 
strategy in view of the emergence of new markets. 
Growth strategy followed by companies in the post-
liberalisation period have been aided by overseas 
collaborations. Relaxation in procedural impediments with 
respect to foreign technology and collaboration policies 
have been helpful in this regard. 
3. The grand strategies and growth path followed by the 
companies to become competitive in the post-
liberalisation period have led to an increase in capital 
requirements. Companies have followed different policies, 
or a financial policy-mix, in this regard. Intense 
competition has put pressure on profits with varying 
degree though the turnover of the companies have 
increased in the post-liberalisation period. 
4. The increase in competition has led to widened product 
choices in the post-liberalisation period. Companies are 
now making efforts to satisfy customer requirements and 
preferences. There has been a virtual change in the 
adoption of marketing-mix strategies. Aggressive 
marketing and promotional strategies have been adopted by 
the companies in the post -liberalisation period. 
Companies are now concentrating more on marketing than 
sales. The challenges posed by the new entrants have led 
to fluctuations in market shares of companies. Companies 
which have reacted quickly to rapid environmental changes 
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have had a decisive advantage over their competitors. A 
positive impact of liberalisation has been the 
introduction of price competitiveness and price 
consciousness among the companies. 
5. There has been a paradigm shift in the production 
practices adopted by companies. In the post-
liberalisation period, companies are laying emphasis on 
product development and upgradation, manufacturing 
efficiency and plant modernisation. The level of 
automation and computerisation has increased. Priority is 
now being given to raising productivity and improving 
quality to meet customer requirements. Manufacturing 
cost-reduction is the latest trend in the companies. In 
the post-liberalisation period, companies are according 
priority to R & D activities. 
6. Varying strategies have been adopted by companies with 
respect to human resource management. As the present 
emphasis is one cost reduction and lean organisation, 
companies have adopted various strategies to reduce 
manpower stirength. Recruitment policies, too, have 
changed in the post-liberalisation period. In-house 
training, team-work, employee involvement and succession 
planning are some of the issues that have gained 
importance in the post-liberalisation period. 
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The summarised findings and conclusions, therefore, 
support the general propositions of the present study 
mentioned in Chapter Three. 
9.6 nTRKCTTQHS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This researcher has undertaken two research studies related 
to liberalisation. The preliminary study, completed during 
the pre-doctoral course, dealt with impact of liberalisation 
measures on three selected industries viz, automobile, 
fertilizer and petrochemicals. The study was, therefore, 
macro in nature. As an extension of the earlier study, the 
present study deals with policy issues at micro level, that 
is at the firm-level. 
On the basis of research work undertaken during the past four 
years, it is desirable that certain directions be proposed 
for future research as a single, time-bound study is unable 
to deal with all relevant issues of the subject. The 
following directions are suggested for future research: 
1. It could be possible to explore the relationship between 
the liberalisation measures and their impact on business 
policies of companies in general by means of : 
a) Considering a larger number of measures. 
b) Considering a larger number of policy variables. 
2. The term liberalisation is itself of a wider 
connotation. Other type of liberalisation measures, for 
instance, trade, fiscal, financial could also be taken up 
for an assessment of their impact on business policies. 
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3. Another probable approach in future could be to study the 
impact of liberalisation across comparable industries 
such as electronics, petrochemicals, or food processing. 
4. The impact of liberalisation measures can also be studied 
across heterogenous industries like jute, textiles, etc. 
5. A possible direction could be to study the impact of 
liberalisation on different elements of strategic 
management process such as strategy formulation, strategy 
implementation, and strategy evaluation. 
6. An approach that could intensively focus on policy 
variables could consider fewer companies which could be 
studied longitudinally over a period of time to assess 
the impact of liberalisation measures. 
7. Finally, a study mainly based on quantitative and 
statistical measures could be undertaken to evaluate the 
impact of liberalisation. 
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